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Zusammenfassung
Kollektive Irrationalita¨t durchdringt alle Bereiche des sozialen Lebens. Von der Herden-
bildung an Bo¨rsen zur politischen Polarisierung und sogar bis in die epistemische Gemein-
schaft der Wissenschaft misslingt es Gruppen, die optimalen Mittel zu wa¨hlen, um ihre
Ziele zu erreichen. Der Begriff der kollektiven Rationalita¨t la¨sst sich pra¨zise fassen durch
eine Analyse der Argumente, die seine Zuschreibung rechtfertigen. Dazu ist es erforder-
lich, die Entscheidungsumgebung, die ablaufenden sozialen Prozesse und die relevanten
normativen Standards zu erfassen, wozu sich insbesondere agentenbasierte Modellierung
und Simulationen eignen.
Diese Methode wird auf zwei Fallstudien angewendet, jeweils eines aus dem Bereich
der theoretischen und eines aus dem der praktischen Rationalita¨t. Die erste Fallstudie be-
schreibt die Entstehung sogenannter unpopular social norms, also solcher sozialer Normen,
die dem Interesse der u¨berwiegenden Mehrheit der Gruppe zuwiderlaufen. Die Analyse
eines entsprechenden Modells, in dem begrenzt rationale Akteure mit eingeschra¨nkter In-
formation versuchen, eine optimale Norm zu wa¨hlen, zeigt, dass der zugrundeliegende Pro-
zess zwar ineffiziente Normen generieren kann, ha¨ufig jedoch effiziente Ergebnisse liefert.
Das unmittelbare Urteil der kollektiven Irrationalita¨t muss daher zuru¨ckgewiesen werden.
In der zweiten Fallstudie wird der Einfluss strategischen Verhaltens in einer Gruppe von
Agenten, die Informationen aggregieren, untersucht. Simulationen unterstu¨tzen die These,
dass es keine universell optimale epistemische Strategie gibt: Agenten, die unter idealen
Bedingungen erfolgreich sind, unterliegen im Falle strategischer Einflu¨sse konkurrierenden
Agenten, die wiederum unter idealen Bedingungen suboptimale Ergebnisse erzielen. Eine
evolutiona¨re Analyse des Modells belegt daru¨ber hinaus, dass nichtepistmisch motiviertes
Verhalten unter einem wengistens teilweise auf epistemischen Werten basierenden Beloh-
nungssystem zuru¨ckgedra¨ngt wird, ohne jedoch vollsta¨ndig zu verschwinden.
Die Verwendung agentenbasierter Modellierung und Simulation la¨sst sich insbesondere
durch die epistemischen Eigenschaften der Methode rechtfertigen. Anders als Computer-
simulationen im Allgemeinen sind Modelle epistemisch transparent, das heißt nicht opak.
Sie ko¨nnen außerdem unter den richtigen Bedingungen auch Besta¨tigung liefern. Gepaart
mit der großen Flexibilita¨t in der Modellierung handelt es sich daher ABM um ein wertvol-
les Werkzeug fu¨r ingenieursma¨ßig betriebene Philosophie. Dieser Ansatz strebt konkrete
Lo¨sungen fu¨r spezifische philosophische Probleme an, ohne vorher die Rechtfertigung einer
fundamentalen Theorie zu fordern. Philosophische Probleme sind real und allgegenwa¨rtig
und verlangen daher Lo¨sungen; die obigen Untersuchungen schlagen solche Lo¨sungen vor.
xiv Zusammenfassung
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Arguments on Collective Rationality
In one of the most famous passages in the historiographic writings of Livy, a large portion of
the Plebs leave the city of Rome and gather outside on Mons Sacer. The Roman aristocracy,
needing them both as soldiers and peasants to maintain the state, send Agrippa Menenius
to negotiate the return of the Plebs to the city. What was the conflict about in the first
place? The plebeians perceived themselves as doing all the work, while the aristocracy was
just enjoying their leisure, living off the fruits of the labor of others, though still wielding
all the power in the city.1
Agrippa Menenius realized that he would neither be able to coerce or threaten the
Plebs back, nor could he reasonably rely on any moral argument. Therefore, he decided
to approach the Plebs by reference to the interest of the state as a whole and in turn their
own interest as a class within this state. Put otherwise, he appealed to their rationality as
part of a larger collective.
To this end, he narrated the well-known allegorical story of the belly and the members.
In brief paraphrase, this is its content: Once, the members started rebelling, complaining
that the stomach was just sitting in the middle of the body, being fed by them, but not
contributing anything itself. Therefore, they decided to stop feeding it: the arms no longer
put food into the mouth, which the mouth wouldn’t have chewed if they did. Deprived of
food, the stomach could no longer provide the necessary nutrition and the whole body got
ill.
What is this story besides a glaring piece of aristocratic propaganda? It is an interesting
case study in what is difficult about collective rationality. Let me pick out just three central
points. First, the members do not actually understand how the system they are a part of
works. As a consequence, they fail to acknowledge the contribution certain parts of the
system make to its maintenance, resulting in an overall deterioration of system performance
against their own best interest. Thus, lesson one for the student of collective rationality is
to understand the processes and interrelations in their object of analysis, be it society as
1My interpretation is based on Giebel (2015), book 2 paragraph 32.
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a whole, a school class or the legislative body of a democracy.
Second, there are multiple levels of collective rationality involved. On the highest level,
the maintenance and development of the state as a whole is at stake and figures as an
evaluative standard. But to gain full argumentative force towards the Plebs, the argument
needs to establish a connection between their interest as a class and the state as a whole
– a connection that is presumed by the analogy with a body, though not clearly mapped
onto Roman society. At any rate, the Plebs’s class interest itself is still a collective end, as
opposed to an individual one. Thus, the second lesson is to clearly determine the relevant
evaluative standard, for otherwise the argument will fail to convince its target audience.
Third, the whole story of the members and the belly seems to assume a very limited
set of options for the Plebs. Why shouldn’t they go somewhere else and create a whole
new state, where the leadership is chosen by lot from their ranks, and there is no inherited
aristocracy at all? The answer is, at least as far as the historiographical depiction goes,
that none of the people involved considered such an option realizable. So the third lesson
is that any argument for or against the rationality of a pattern of behavior has to be
presented against the backdrop of certain restrictions on what can and cannot be done,
sometimes in an apparently arbitrary fashion.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that collective rationality is conceptually disconnected
from morality. There is nothing in the narrative suggesting the immorality of the behavior
of the plebeians; at worst, it is foolish. On the other hand, the Roman state itself might
have been an immoral agent without taking away one bit from the argument.
The purpose of this essay is to contribute to a more thorough understanding of what
is necessary to argue for – or against – an attribution of collective irrationality. Explain-
ing and understanding social processes, explicating and applying a variety of evaluative
standards for the collective rationality of behavior; and taking into account the situational
restrictions on implementable options. As a result, we should be able to not only give
better arguments than the one Menenius famously gave, but also protect the audience
of such arguments against falling for invalid lines of reasoning. Ideally, even suggestions
for interventions on collectively irrational behavior can be supported by the suggested
analyses.
This chapter proceeds in the following way: In the next step, I shall establish the
real-world relevance of collective irrationality in more recent times. Then I proceed to
establish the methodology of agent-based modeling and simulation as a useful tool for
social philosophy and the study of collective rationality (Section 1.3), as it will be employed
in the central chapters of this essay. Finally, Section 1.4 gives the larger agenda for the
rest of my investigation.
1.2 The Real World of Collective Irrationality
One of the most important questions to any abstract intellectual enterprise certainly is
whether it serves any practical purpose. What are the real-world problems the concepts,
theories and models are supposed to apply to, and why should we care? The analysis of
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collective (ir)rationality finds application in all areas of human social life, and a better
understanding of the phenomena, the underlying processes and the evaluative standards
could greatly improve our ability to organize everything from markets over democratic
government to cooperative scientific inquiry and the social norms of everyday life.
The social philosopher therefore can pick and choose their examples, and I will sketch
just a few: some for their significance, others for the exceptional clarity in exemplifying a
phenomenon.
The political polarization of large portions of the citizenry of democratic states in
Europe and North America might be the most significant case of a threat to collective
rationality in recent history.2 Political polarization, i.e. the concentration of opinion in
(most often two) opposing camps, is often perceived as both irrational and a threat to
democratic institutions. It is viewed as a symptom of irrationality since most citizens have
access to largely the same sources of both empirical evidence and arguments built on it.
So how can they disagree on matters of fact, such as anthropogenic climate change, unless
irrationality plays a part?3
But not only the origins of polarization are worrisome: its potential consequences pose
a threat to the functioning of democratic polities and effective collective action. The
debate on climate change provides a frightening example: failure to resolve polarization
towards the most rational shared assessment of the matter may irreversibly deteriorate
living conditions on earth. More immediately, polarization makes it more and more difficult
to arrive at political compromises, which seem to be a necessary precondition for democratic
rule. Therefore, it is important to analyze the underlying processes and come up with
solutions to these problems if possible.
A quite different field of application stems from research in social psychology and so-
ciology. To the initial puzzlement of observers, certain groups uphold social norms which
are against the interest of all, or almost all its subjects. Bicchieri and Fukui (1999) discuss
a wide variety of instances of such norms, from footbinding over alcohol overconsumption
to gang violence. The difficulties with such unpopular social norms start with correctly
identifying and explaining them. How does a population end up with such a norm, if close
to nobody wishes to adhere to it? To be more precise and to increase the explanatory
difficulty, the agents generally also do not prefer others to obey the social norm.
With respect to their normative status, unpopular social norms provide a relatively
simple case, at least prima facie: their collective irrationality derives from the aggregation
of its universal individual irrationality. As in a simple coordination problem, the agents
2Opinion polarization has been a topic in political science for a long time (McCright and Dunlap, 2011;
Fiorina and Abrams, 2008; Evans, 2003; Poole and Rosenthal, 1984), but the theory of collective opinion
formation leading up to polarization is still developing (Hegselmann and Krause, 2015; O’Connor and
Weatherall, 2018).
3There are numerous routes to explain the phenomenon, some which are not reliant on anything partic-
ularly irrational happening on the collective level; maybe everything social is adequate, but the individuals
engaged in the process are not sufficiently rational. However, if either rational or irrational individuals
could end up with poor outcomes due to a poor process, the resulting explanation is robust across various
actual and counterfactual populations, and may also open up interventions that do not require changing
the cognitive capacities of hundreds of millions of individual agents.
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are just worse off by miscoordinating, and as a consequence, the result seems collectively
irrational. In practice, the problem is more complex, since universal indifference or dis-
preference for the norm-guided behavior do not prevail across all members of the group of
norm abiders; often a small subpopulation actually prefers the behavior suggested by the
unpopular social norm. This insight may not necessarily threaten its descriptive status
as an unpopular norm, since unless the relevant subgroup is able to coerce the group into
norm-following, we are still facing an explanatory puzzle.
But to still claim that something normative is going wrong, it becomes necessary to in-
troduce additional assumptions and stronger normative standards. This potentially creates
a need for controversial argumentative moves such as the assumption of intercomparability
of utilities. All told, unpopular social norms provide a prime example for the prevalence
of collective irrationality and the difficulties of its analysis.
Turning to the field of economic behavior, so-called herding (Banerjee, 1992) threatens
the efficiency of markets. Herding occurs when economic agents follow the lead of particu-
larly visible agents, thereby causing an information cascade: once a few traders started to
herd, it becomes more and more compelling to believe they are correct in their judgments,
and therefore to follow them. However, as Bannerjee shows, such cascades can be caused
by arbitrary initial decisions under the right – or more accurately, wrong – circumstances,
even though the agents are assumed to be rational Bayesians. Once again, the devil is in
the details of the information-gathering process and interactions of traders. A proper anal-
ysis of the overall rationality of herding cannot simply point out the fairly uncontroversial
inefficiencies it results in, but also explain how they realistically could be avoided.
A final remark on these real-world examples: it should already emerge from the sketches
provided here that the actual collective irrationality of behavioral patterns is itself contro-
versial. Ambiguity can arise from competing evaluative standards, disagreement about the
process at work or the implementability of its alternatives, and potentially a number of
other factors. One of the most demanding – but also most important – requirements for a
philosophical analyst of collectively irrational phenomena is therefore to be precise about
the limitations of any judgment of collective (ir)rationality.
1.3 An Agent-Based Approach
There are at least three major reasons for a social philosopher to employ agent-based
modeling and simulation: (1) Arguments in social epistemology, political philosophy and
related disciplines often have to rely on plausible descriptions of social processes and their
evolution in time. (2) Agent-based models (ABM) offer specific, precise reconstructions
of philosophical problems, supporting an engineering approach to philosophy. (3) Formal
models create a discursive bridge to the empirical sciences, since they are formulated in
the shared language of mathematics. Let me argue these points in some more detail.
State-of-nature theory in political philosophy serves as a perfect example to the first
point. From Hobbes (1651) to Nozick (1974), political philosophers relied on informal
descriptions of the state of nature and offered speculative derivations of the evolving be-
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havioral patterns of their agents.4 A common weakness of the resulting arguments is their
reliance on implicit assumptions about human behavior in counterfactual circumstances.
This problem is compounded with further implicit assumptions on social processes and
human interaction.
For example, Nozick handwavingly argues that his process will not yield rogue states
that willingly transgress the basic rights he presumes to be followed in the state of nature
(cf. Nozick, 1974, p. 17). But the argument is less than clear, largely due to the lack of a
sufficiently precise description of the process he is imagining.5
Agent-based models solve the problem by requiring the modeler to specify precisely all
the initial assumptions and transition rules of the modeled process. Given the model, the
resulting outcome can be checked and replicated by any recipient of the argument. Note,
that ambiguity can re-enter on the level of interpretation; but at that point, the argument
already gained substantially in interpersonal transparency.
Naturally, this advantage comes at a certain cost, namely a loss in generality. The
philosopher employing agent-based modeling is not suggesting a grand theory of human
nature and statehood (or the human epistemic condition and epistemic communities in
other cases), but restrains himself to a more specific problem. This leads immediately up
to the second reason.
In the preface to their “Bayesian Epistemology”, Bovens and Hartmann (cf. 2003, Pref-
ace) argue for what could be called the engineering approach to philosophy. In an argument
resounding in Titelbaum (2017), they worry that the grand theories of philosophy tend to
go past our most pressing present problems in epistemology. According to this argument,
it is therefore worth to concentrate on problems as specific as possible, provide focused ac-
counts and potential solutions to these concrete problems before aiming for the full picture
of the heaven of ideas.
I suggest to supplant their claim with an argument from a grand philosophical theory,
namely reflective equilibrium.6 The engineering approach to philosophy consists in devel-
oping contained accounts of problems, revising them in the light of empirical evidence,
analytical insight and general principles and iterating the whole procedure until an at least
temporarily satisfying picture has been established. This methodology fits perfectly the
requirements of reflective equilibrium, and it recovers the intuition of many proponents of
the method that in non-ideal conditions, perfect convergence is not always possible.
Agent-based models in turn are a natural tool for the engineering approach to philos-
ophy. They need to be concrete to be implementable; they are always revisable given the
vast design space every ABM lives in; they are able to incorporate highly general principles,
but they are often judged in part by their fit to our empirical knowledge about the process
to be modeled. Thus, ABM are certainly a prime method of the engineering philosopher,
although not the only one.
4Nozick briefly discusses a game-theoretic representation of his account, but his general argument relies
on the informal account.
5Even though this is not an essay on political philosophy, the widespread knowledge of state-of-nature
theory suggests it as an example. The argument translates to problems in social epistemology.
6cf. Rawls (1975) for the most famous statement of this method.
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Finally, the capability of ABM to bridge the gap between philosophy and empirical
science constitutes a third important reason. Over the millenia, the sciences emancipated
themselves from the philosophical enterprise. For all the advances it enabled, this differen-
tiation also deprived the resulting disciplines of certain intellectual resources. Specifically,
odern empirical science is limited in its capacity to analyze normative questions. There-
fore, it is crucial to acknowledge the shared interests of, in the case of this essay, social
philosophers and sociologists, economists, political scientists and psychologists.
But not only do these disciplines differ in methodology and perspective, they often
do not even share a common language. This is where agent-based models – among other
formal models – can step in. A social epistemologist can read and understand a paper on
opinion dynamics written by a sociologist, and vice versa, due to the shared methodological
apparatus and language of ABM.7
Therefore, agent-based modeling and simulation is, despite its limited utilization in
philosophy in general, a particularly reasonable choice in an investigation of collective
irrationality. Any such investigation needs to take into account observations and insights
on collective behavior from the empirical sciences, and should aim to feed back into those
sciences in turn in the currency of theoretical explication, conceptual clarification and
hopefully normative guidance.
1.4 Overview
The number of legitimate ways to approach the challenges posed by collective rationality
and its failure is legion. Therefore, there is no choosing without some degree of arbitrari-
ness. A great advantage of this situation is the creative freedom it provides the philosopher
with; and this essay certainly takes some liberties to stray away from the more traditional
philosophical outlook.
But as any thorough analysis, first some conceptual foundations have to be laid out. The
second chapter deals with the general form of arguments to attribute collective rationality
or irrationality. What reasons can support a claim to collective rationality? Where are
the critical points to look for failures of collective rationality? How does the resulting
understanding of group-level rationality relate to the more familiar concepts on the scale of
individuals? Are norms of collective rationality fundamentally reducible to those applicable
to individuals?
As I shall argue, there are standard components to any analysis of collective action and
belief formation, namely the environment the group is situated in, the process governing
group behavior – the actual object of evaluation – and the evaluative standards applicable
to the given case. To clarify the resulting argument scheme, two case studies are introduced:
unpopular norms and belief formation under incentives.
7This is not to dispute the fact that there are major inter- and intradisciplinary problems in commu-
nicating ABM in a canonical fashion. Efforts like Richiardi et al. (2006) and Grimm et al. (2010) stand
witness both to the difficulties and the possibility of resolving them.
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These two informal case studies then form the backdrop for chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3
offers an agent-based model for the evolution of unpopular social norms. Social psychology
frequently finds social norms being held up in a population to the interest of almost none
of its members, posing not only a normative, but also an explanatory challenge. The
model relies on theoretically grounded assumptions on informational limitations and the
bounded rationality of its agents to recover such observations and to more clearly state the
conditions of their emergence.
Besides providing a potential explanation, it showcases the possibility of apparently
collectively irrational behavior to be the result of a generally effective and efficient process.
By discussing minor interventions, which greatly influence outcomes, it also cautions the
analyst of collective behavior: the (ir)rationality of a social process generally depends on
the available and implementable alternatives, and often a comprehensive analysis, and
therefore a deductively valid argument for either rationality or irrationality is practically
impossible.
Chapter 4 moves from the problems of practical rationality, i.e. choosing social norms
to govern one’s actions and expectations towards the actions of others to the theoretical8
problems facing epistemic agents in a social setting. Exemplar instances are to be found in
the aforementioned problems of opinion polarization on subjects such as climate science,
but also difficulties within mainstream science to aggregate and evaluate socially avail-
able information in an environment of mixed motivations and limited cognitive as well as
material resources.
Once again, the arguments are building on an agent-based model and its analysis by
simulation. The major result supported by the model is a trade-off between epistemic
performance under ideal circumstances and robust performance under a wider variety of
conditions.
Finally, no philosophical essay would be complete without a thorough reflection on its
main methodology. As an engineer needs to be able to build her own tools, philosophers
should understand the epistemology of their methods. Therefore, chapter 5 discusses the
epistemic features of agent-based modeling and simulation, and in particular the kind of
arguments stylized formal models support and their relationship to alternative methodolo-
gies. Chapter 6 summarizes the results and sketches important future directions for the
enterprise of assessing collective rationality.
8The term “theoretical” is used here in the sense of the distinction between theoretical and practical
rationality: it refers to the rationality of beliefs and other mental states as opposed to the rationality of
actions.
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Chapter 2
Conceptualizing Collective
Rationality
2.1 Motivating Collective Rationality
There are many ways to approach a concept, but maybe the most genuinely philosophical
way is by asking for the kind of argument one needs to supply to justifiably apply that
concept. What does the proponent have to provide to attribute collective irrationality?
How can a group defend itself against the charge of irrationality, or establish its collective
rationality?
Taking the perspective of a disputant on a group’s rationality has several distinct ad-
vantages, most importantly its direct connection to motivation. In the case of individual
agents’, arguments for the instrumental rationality of a particular behavior often provide
immediate motivation to the agent. Though there are clearly exceptions, such as weak-
ness of will, cognitive shortcomings or the insight that one’s original ends supporting the
argument are in need of revision, an agent realizing their irrationality would usually be
motivated to react to the charge.
The same possibility is licensing the argumentative approach to collective rationality,
though with some restrictions. In the case of a group, it is not always clear who exactly
should be motivated to revise their behavior – or even just their belief. A group is only
able to act through the actions of its members, and in some cases, no member might feel
obliged to serve the rationality of the whole.
This limitation notwithstanding, constructing arguments to motivate the group is in
practice a major objective of research on collective irrationality, as a number of applications
reviewed in the course of this essay show. Even if the group itself is not motivated by such
an argument, the social surroundings of the group might be the adequate recipient. To
preview an example, the jury in a criminal trial potentially does not care at all about the
accuracy of their verdicts on the individual level; but if there is a strong argument for their
systematic incompetence, the legal system can be motivated to take action.
The argument-centric perspective has the further advantage of specifying a context of
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justification. As I argue throughout this essay, little is to be said about collective rationality
with perfect generality; it is extremely context-dependent. What alternative processes are
available to a group and which ends can plausibly be attributed to it changes dramatically
with context. Having a target audience for an argument in mind helps delineating the
relevant context for a particular study.
Finally, an argument-centric view sidesteps problems associated with the traditional
approach of providing necessary and sufficient conditions; arguments naturally provide
pro tanto reasons, and hence are not made obsolete by arbitrarily chosen counterexamples.
Furthermore, it becomes clear in the next sections that this approach combines particularly
well with a modeling methodology, with various models being able to fill the roles required
by a generic argument scheme.
This chapter proceeds in the following way: First, an argument scheme for collective
(ir)rationality is constructed and its major components, environment, processes and ends
are analyzed in some detail, with an eye on formally modeling group behavior. Thereafter,
Section 2.3 applies the argument scheme informally to two stylized examples to clarify the
details of both its structure and the individual premises. Finally, Section 2.4 addresses
the fundamental problem of attributing collective ends, refuting a functionalist view and
suggesting more appropriate alternatives.
2.2 An Argument Scheme
Constructing an argument for or against collective rationality requires three main premises:
What is possible, what is realizable within the constraints of the possible, and by what
norms or standards it is to be judged. This delivers the following structure:
P1 Given an environment E (What is possible?)
P2 group G performing a social process P on E (What is realized within the constraints
of E?)
P3 results in outcome O = P (E) judged by norm N with N(P (E)) ≥ N(P ′(E)) for all
known alternative implementable processes P ′. (Which normative standard applies?)
Cc Then, performing P is collectively rational in E according to N .
As a corollary it follows that P is collectively irrational in E according to N if there is a
process P ′ such that N(P ′(E)) > N(P (E)). Of course, much of this argument depends on
spelling out in more detail what is meant by environment, processes and norms or collective
ends, a task to be approached momentarily.
With respect to the argument scheme itself, it is generally more difficult to argue for
rationality than irrationality, since the former requires to justify a universally quantified
premise, while the latter only needs an existential statement. The observation is accurate,
but requires a qualification. In practice, it is not necessary to show that it is logically
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impossible to find an alternative process yielding better results, but only that there is no
known process that is also actually implementable given the circumstance.
Rationality cannot require the group to perform epistemically inaccessible options.
There is some room there for discussion, since rationality might require the group to inquire
into possible mechanisms it is currently unaware of, but these details can be put aside for
the sake of simplicity. Before such intricacies are to be discussed, the main components of
the argument scheme have to be explicated in more detail.
2.2.1 Environment
An environment is constituted by everything externally given under the chosen description
of a scenario up for evaluation. As a matter of absolute fact, very few things are given
strictly in this way in real-world targets; however, from a modeler’s, or more general,
observer’s or intervening agent’s perspective, and even more from from inside the social
system under consideration, quite a few features that are not logically, metaphysically or
nomologically impossible to change have to be taken as fixed.
Analyzing, for example, the phenomenon of schoolyard bullying, student-teacher ra-
tios, the allocation of students to schools and classes, or the preferences of the children
involved will often be taken as a given, despite the fact that all of these can be intervened
on in principle. Similarly, the quality of empirical data, research funds or the cognitive
capabilities of scientists are often beyond the reach of intervention in social epistemology
and therefore have to be understood as features of the environment.
The environment determines the input for the process layer, and it is important to
specify it precisely; it restricts what is assumed to be possible, and therefore defines a
ceiling achievable outcomes relative to the pertinent evaluative standard. Since rationality
demands only to make the best of what is available, e.g. to hold the most accurate
beliefs given the evidence available, different environments justify the rationality of different
processes. While this might seem obvious, it is rarely stressed sufficiently how much the
result of an analysis depends on the details of what can and cannot be changed.1
There is no general set of rules to determine what should be considered part of the
environment, even if a given framework, such as game theory, often provides the analyst
with useful modeling patterns to determine the line between environment and process.
Certain variables are more easily endogenized, while others are often left exogeneous for
tractability considerations only. In such cases, the argument is obviously to be qualified
with the conditional “if the tractability assumptions do not prevent a process superior with
respect to N to be implemented”.
In many cases, endogeneity varies across applications. Evolving networks provide a
good example of a variable shifting from exogeneous to endogenous in different contexts:
as Buskens et al. (2015) suggest, treating both networks and behavioral rules as evolving
1This is particularly true for formal models, where everything to be part of the scenario has to be
described explicitly. An example for dealing with this problem can be found in the discussion of model
limitations in Chapter 4.
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increases the difficulty of analysis, and hence often requires the analyst to leave either
component as exogenous as an idealization.
Besides interaction structure, behavioral rules, agent preferences, signal qualities, avail-
able resources, population size (or at least the limiting value) and initial mental states of
agents are standard components of the environment. In different frameworks, further fea-
tures of the scenario under consideration are identified as part of the environment. In the
Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey interactions (Volterra, 1926), coefficients for death,
replication and predation as well as the assumption of random encounters all form parts
of the environment.2
The pragmatics of environment modeling are quite intricate. When models are pre-
sented, they often create the impression that most or all decisions to treat a feature as
part of the environment or the moving parts of the model were more or less rationally
necessitated. Arguments for treating something as given are often derived either from
a particular modeling framework or tradition such as game theory, tractability limits or
features of the specific target to be modeled and analyzed. As a consequence, it is often
necessary to go back and forth between modeling the process and deciding what has to
be endogenous in the process model and what is deferred to the environment. Particular
mechanisms and processes the modeler is interested in may suggest to exogenize certain
features rather than others, once the process is better understood.
For instance, a study of voting procedures normally calls for binary propositional atti-
tudes, whereas belief revision procedures akin to Bayesian learning require the agents to
hold graded beliefs. One response to this can be to argue that graded beliefs are more
fundamental and introduce additional behavioral assumptions to map credences to binary
judgments for voting. Whether this approach makes sense or binary propositional attitudes
should just be included in the environment immediately is a pragmatic choice.
As a consequence, the actual differentiation between environment and modeled pro-
cesses is often an iterative procedure, where the modeler has to revise the details of the
environment submodel or adapt the process submodel according to the needs of her in-
vestigation. To be clear, the iterative nature of the pragmatics of the procedure does
not influence the structure of the final argument, which resides entirely in the context of
justification.
Let me conclude on a remark about the formal structure of an environment description.
In the argument scheme, little is specified about the internal structure of E. It needs
to be able to be treated as the domain of the function or algorithm describing the social
process, but nothing more can be required in general. In practice, the environment is likely
stochastic, and the investigation is run by sampling from the environment distribution,
e.g. a distribution of network structures, and to apply the social process to the sample,
evaluating only the results generated from this sample. Therefore, the actual argument
constructed is generally inductive, not deductive, since the generic scheme is realized for a
sample of environments, not for the entire domain of possible environment configurations.
2If a feature as the coefficient for predation was variable instead, a substantially different model family
would arise.
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2.2.2 Process
The processes, procedures and mechanisms determining a group’s behavior form the core
of any thorough analysis of collective behavior. When it comes to (ir)rationality, these
are the proper subjects of criticism or appraisal. They also delineate, by participation in
the process, who is considered a proper group member for the adjudication of collective
rationality. Claiming that collection A of agents is irrational means they employ a proce-
dure, are engaged in a process or implement a social mechanism P that is worse than the
implementable alternative P ′ relative to the group’s ends represented by N .
Formally speaking, the process component maps a certain environmental input onto a
certain outcome that can be evaluated by whatever standard of rationality is appropriate
in the case under dispute. Processes need not be deterministic, as the equivocation with
mechanisms may have suggested, and often aren’t, at least for any observer equipped with
limited knowledge.
The analysis of social processes can actually aim at two very different purposes. Much
of the analysis (and formal modeling, by extension) in the social sciences tries to capture
causally crucial features of actual processes to assess them. In that epistemic context, it is
important to attain a sufficient match with reality, since an insufficient fit invalidates any
inferences to the target system.
But particularly in areas such as the design of markets, voting rules or semiformal
and formal knowledge aggregation procedures, the direction of fit changes. A process is
analyzed, and if evaluated positively, suggested for implementation in reality. Such models
generally still need to make certain assumptions about the behavior of actual agents within
the process, because there is usually some part of it beyond the reach of the designers
control. However, the core of the process, e.g. an auction system or voting procedure is
not supposed to represent anything actual, and thus cannot fail in that respect.
Most commonly, to instantiate the argument scheme, an analyst has to take into account
at least two processes: One that is criticized for being suboptimal, and another one that
both proves that suboptimality and may be considered as an alternative to be implemented.
The first of the two usually falls into the first category above, while the second one often
will be a so far fictitious process.
Although this type of comparison might be the most common, there are also examples
both for comparisons between two actually implemented procedures, like electoral systems
across democratic countries, and multiple fictitious processes to determine which of them
is the most advantageous. Such studies are best interpreted as partial instances of the
argument scheme, since they explicitly make no claim about the universal quantifiability
of their evaluative results.
Turning to the pragmatics of process modeling, it is a common strategy to split the
process into rules for individual behavior, interactions and aggregation. Consider, for
example, the following sketch of an analysis of jury deliberation: every single juror may
update their beliefs by Bayesian (or approximately Bayesian) belief revision; they receive
evidence during the trial individually. Later on, they engage in interactive deliberation, a
process that could, at least as a first approximation, be described by a model such as the
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Lehrer-Wagner-model, where agents assign each others’ opinion weight and change their
beliefs by calculating a weighted average over the set of beliefs (Lehrer and Wagner, 1981).
Finally, they are subject to a unanimous voting procedure for aggregation.
The separation into subprocesses should be understood conceptually, rather than
causally. A natural objection to the above model would be that the fact that aggregation
takes place under unanimity rule likely impacts the way agents interact with each other
before, and maybe even how they revise their beliefs in the light of evidence. But this
argument supports a demand for a more precise description of interactions and individual
behavior and does not imply that the three parts are conceptually intermixed.
Furthermore, any of the three subprocesses can be empty. In a standard analysis of
voting procedures, there is no interaction; agents cast their vote (individual behavior) and
the collection of votes is aggregated, e.g. by majority voting (aggregation). In other cases,
there is no actual aggregation taking place, as in a decentralized market. Individuals engage
in actions and are able to interact with each other, but there is no centralized aggregation
in the end. In such cases, if an analyst wants to describe a separate subprocess formally, the
algorithm modeling the respective empty subprocess just passes its input on, not posing
any problem for the generality of the scheme.
Importantly, this implies that evaluative schemes constructed from the group’s ends
need to be adapted to the actual outcome’s degree of aggregation. In some cases, the
normative standard applies to a unique decision or single expressed aggregate belief, while
in others, it needs to account for a whole distribution. This point becomes more impor-
tant when discussing the logical independence of individual-level and group-level norms in
Section 2.4.
2.2.3 Ends
A group’s concrete ends can vary drastically: from the policy goals of an NGO over the ed-
ucational purpose of a school class to the ends of a scientific community to grasp important
features of the social or natural world, groups’ ends differ as vastly as those of individuals.
However, when cast in more abstract terms, large classes of ends can be collapsed into
more generic evaluative standards. Epistemic groups strive for accuracy, political agents
may strive for utility maximization or equality preservation, and so on.
The most difficult task when it comes to the analysis of collective ends is to attribute
those ends in the first place. Which goals does a newly emerging political movement
pursue? Can the evaluative standard applying to behavior in a school class be derived
merely from the students’ preferences? I defer the question of attributing collective ends,
and focus on the role it plays within the argument scheme, assuming that an end or set of
ends has been established for the group under consideration.
The task is to translate a concrete purpose, goal or end into a more abstract normative
standard. For example, many epistemic goals, though not all, can be translated into a
desire for accuracy, which can in turn be modeled in various ways. Casting the group’s
ends in terms of more generic, abstract norms is, however, not only useful for modelers: it
allows the analyst to abstract from all the irrelevant variations in the way that a group’s
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goal can be expressed in everyday language.
A highly generic argument scheme enables the observer to capture not only norms that
are typically investigated in formal frameworks, such as accuracy and utility. Nothing
in the argument scheme prevents one from comparing outcomes to the prescriptions of a
catalog of rights the group is committed to uphold. The only condition is that there is a
formulation applicable to the outcomes generated by the social processes in question. As
a formal sidenote, the argument scheme also assumes that the normative standard implies
a partial order over outcomes. This should be understood as a minimal standard to allow
for comparisons, which is a necessary precondition for meaningful normative judgment.
However, there is one critical assumption in the way the argument scheme is set up: a
normative standard describing the group’s ends is not an arbitrary product of the social
process in operation. It persists entirely across various possible processes to enable an
actual comparison according to the same standard.3 But social processes in general impact
a group’s end structure. For example, a political party organized in different ways may
end up with substantially different concrete political aims. Is the scheme thus not nearly
as general as I claimed?
To answer this question, let me distinguish two classes of such moving targets. First,
in many cases, when different ends emerge in concert with different processes, the relevant
norm for the argument scheme can be recast as a more general norm. Different interaction
structures may lead the members of a scientific collaboration to pursue quite different
concrete ends, which may still be cast in terms of accuracy. There is an overarching goal,
and the more concrete ends take the form of conditionals referring to the implemented
process.
However, a second class of cases is not adequately captured by reference to a unifying,
more general end. Imagine a commercial enterprise manufacturing drugs. The purpose
of this enterprise is profit, which can, for example, be cast in terms of utility. But at
some point, the owners just have enough money and decide to turn their operation into an
entirely epistemic enterprise. They no longer aim at selling drugs (even though they might
still engage in doing so!), but instead want to further mankind’s medical knowledge.
Admittedly, it might still be technically possible to devise a sufficiently abstract measure
of utility to incorporate this shift in goals. But a more adequate response is to deny the
possibility of judging collective rationality across this shift in goals; a shift that may very
well be a consequence of the internal processes within the group forming the enterprise.
Another way of phrasing this claim is that the group became a different entity at some
point, even though it is still constituted by the same individual agents.
This conclusion may seem unsatisfactory, but it is a consequence of limiting the dis-
cussion to instrumental rationality. As for an individual, shifting ends prohibit a unique
answer to the question of optimal means. For the case of instrumental rationality, the
argument scheme remains fully general. To fill the concepts used in the argument scheme
with life, I will now turn to two case studies that will follow me throughout this essay.
3I thank Nicole J. Saam for pointing out this assumption.
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2.3 Case Studies
2.3.1 Norms of Violence
Norms of violence are an interesting test case for any account of collective irrationality.
As Elster (1990) argues, there are norms sanctioning the use of violence in a community
to its overall detriment, in his case norms of revenge. Let me preface my discussion by
repeating an important observation by Elster: if one allows to stipulate any combination of
preference and belief structure, any analyst worth their salt can find a collectively (as well
as individually, though maybe not both at the same time) rational reconstruction of any
pattern of behavior. This is what makes the task demanding, since one does not only have
to provide a coherent analysis, but also ascertain its utility as an account of the behavior
in question.
A second important observation is that norms of violence often pose a moral problem in
addition to the potential failure of collective rationality. This offers a strong, but also dis-
tracting motivation to the analyst: since rationality, unlike morality, is usually something
the agent, collective or individual, would try to obey if only aware of its requirements;
hence, to offer an argument confirming the irrationality of norms of violence is particularly
useful if those norms are to be abolished. If only the group realized how detrimental their
accepted norms are, they would be motivated, if maybe not immediately able, to change
them. While this is both a morally compelling and rational motivation, it creates an in-
centive for wishful thinking the analyst has to resist: rational behavior is not by necessity
morally right behavior.
With these preliminaries in mind, what is a norm of violence? A social norm4 of violence
refers to any stable pattern of violent action in a given type of situation within a population,
together with the expectation to act according to the pattern.5 That expectation is to be
understood both descriptively and normatively. Not only do the norm-followers believe of
each other to act violently in the right type of situation, but if they fail there might be
sanction. The sanctioning agent is usually not the victims of a norm violation themselves
but members of the larger population subject to the social norm. Even if there is no actual
sanction, the norm-following agent operates under the assumption that others, if not all
others, prefer them to follow the norm. A few examples should be illuminating.
(1) Longstanding international conflicts often take this form. Imagine three countries,
Tomainia, Bacteria and Osterlych6 They have a long-standing tradition of minor border
violations returned more or less immediately in kind. Now assume Tomainia violates the
border of Osterlych, with Osterlych not retaliating. This might surprise both Tomainia
and Bacteria, and prompt Bacteria to worry about the potential weakness of Osterlych
to threaten their balance of power. If Bacteria is to still follow the norm, they cannot
4For a more detailed discussion of social norms, cf. Chapter 3.
5This definitory sketch has been inspired by the definitions offered by Elster (2000) and Bicchieri (cf.
2005, p. 11).
6These names are from the famous Charlie Chaplin movie to avoid political disputation of the assump-
tions.
2.3 Case Studies 17
retaliate in place of Osterlych, and their only option is to try to motivate, by whichever
means, Osterlych to eventually retaliate themselves.
Such a pattern can be upheld for a long time if nobody gains the upper hand, and it
certainly creates a descriptive expectation. What makes this example interesting is that
not everyone in the population has precisely the same normative expectation: Tomainia
prefers Osterlych and Bacteria to retaliate against each other, but has no interest that
either retaliates against them. Mutatis mutandis, the same is true for the other nations.
Such cases should still be considered social norms in the sense introduced above. Normative
expectations are not necessarily held uniformly across the population.
(2) Imagine a street gang, frequently using violence to signal strength, and thereby
creating a norm of violence (cf. Bicchieri and Fukui (1999)). The pattern of action is
imprudent violence against the outside world, e.g. in the form of vandalism.7 While no
individual might prefer to be violent in this imprudent fashion – it is imprudent after
all – having built up both descriptive and normative expectations itself may keep up the
repeated pattern. Even sanction, in such cases referred to as false enforcement (cf. Centola
et al., 2005, for an account), can occur and be upheld as long as everyone sticks to their
belief in each other’s preferences.
In this case, the norm is a likely candidate for a collectively irrational behavioral pattern.
However, it is also possible that the gang can only be held together by relying on violence
as a signaling mechanism. This is not the place to provide a detailed analysis of gang
violence, but the case exhibits a common thread: often there is more than one plausible
mechanism (or social process) to be stipulated, and the (ir)rationality depends on subtle
details regarding the implementability of alternative processes. If the gang requires violence
as a signal and will disband without and the persistence of the gang is one of it’s collective
ends, the disadvantages of following the norm may not render it irrational on their own.
(3) Schoolyard bullying is a common problem, threatening both the personal devel-
opment of children and the efficacy of learning institutions (Salmivalli et al., 1996). Not
all bullying is necessarily the expression of norms of violence, physical, mental or social,
but social norms constitute a legitimate candidate explanation. The social norm governing
violence in a schoolyard regulates who does what kind of harm to whom on which occasion.
Furthermore, it also includes subnorms of defense, support and retaliation.
One interesting feature of bullying not as obvious in the previous examples is the role
differentiation of the norm. There are distinguishable bullies, victims, bystanders and
defenders, and depending on the role assigned, descriptive and normative expectations
vary substantially. More generally, several difficulties arise when applying the tripartite
argument scheme to norms of schoolyard violence.
With respect to the environment, is there an implementable social norm prohibiting
any violence, even if the majority of children did prefer such a norm? With respect to the
social process of norm formation, what can be assumed about the children’s capabilities
7There might be a substantial amount of within-gang violence, too, but potential norms governing those
patterns are not the subject.
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of judgment and their preferences?8 Are there children who just like to be violent, be it
by nature, nurture or any other influences beyond the reach of their schoolyard? Finally,
which ends is the analyst justified to project onto the school population as a whole to
argue the irrationality of norms furthering violence? Are the school’s educational goals
a legitimate standard to impose, or does one have to be constructed from the students’
preferences themselves? If so, what can legitimately be assumed about these preferences?
A formal account of the process of norm formation is provided in Chapter 3, but an
informal sketch of an argument for the irrationality of bullying as a social norm could run
like this: children generally have the capability to establish norms of at least low violence,
i.e. they actually choose in an environment where little to no violence is an available option
in principle. This assumption rests on the combined premises that an average school does
have few enough children who are unconditionally violent and enough potential defenders
to keep those that exist in check.
However, the children have a limited understanding of the process of norm formation,
and have to rely on their own observations largely limited to their friendship clique.9 School
children, like human beings in general, learn by social influence. They try to conform to
what they perceive as common behavioral patterns and fulfilling descriptive and normative
expectations. In the next step, it needs to be shown that this process frequently generates
norms of excessive violence, i.e. bullying.
If so, we are warranted to call that process collectively irrational given that we are
able to construct a standard that implies bullying to be a bad outcome. Social norms
supporting violence hinder numerous potential collective goals. But it is actually fairly
easy to construct a standard restricting violence from reasonably weak assumptions on
preferences. If preferences are distributed uniformly along the possible levels of violence,
everyone is interested in coordination on a social norm and otherwise self-regarding, equal
weighing leads to the average of the distribution of preferred levels as a plausible yardstick
for evaluating outcomes.
Thus, a medium level of violence would be acceptable under this standard. If instead
the distribution of preferences is shifted to lower levels of violence, the resulting standard
requires ceteris paribus a lower level of norm-supported violence to concede rationality to
the process of norm formation.
This is how far I will take the informal analysis. However, it allows for a number of
observations. First, the norm of violence itself is neither rational nor irrational under this
description. It is understood as the product of a process subject to evaluation, not as
the process itself. If instead the analyst took norm-following behavior as a social process
creating another outcome, e.g. progress in learning, one could ask whether the norm itself
would be rational. Either are legitimate questions, but it is important to understand them
as distinct.
A second lesson to be drawn is that what looks like collectively irrational behavior in
the end result may well be the outcome of a process itself rational in the sense that it
8For an analysis of the relevance of moral judgment capabilities in bullying, see (Doehne et al., 2018).
9cf. Doehne et al. (2018) for an analysis of clique conformity in bullying behavior
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generates on average better outcomes than the alternatives.10 As holding a false beliefs
does not immediately render someone irrational, the fact that a group operates under a
detrimental norm at any given point in time does not imply their collective irrationality.
It needs to be shown that the agent could have followed a better procedure, e.g. one that
would have left them with an accurate belief more likely than the procedure they employed.
Similarly, it needs to be shown that the group was not merely failed by their environment
or the failure of an otherwise rational process. This is not to say that the group should
stick with an outcome they are aware of being suboptimal and they could change. But in
practice, they need to implement a better process to achieve, to stick to the example, lower
levels of accepted violence. Changing social norms is in practice a difficult and involved
process; more than understanding the suboptimality of an end result is required, namely
the reform of an underlying process.11
2.3.2 Aggregating Knowledge
The establishment, maintenance and change of norms is generally considered a question
of practical rationality, since it involves action, choice and preference. But what about
the rationality of collective belief, the efficacy of aggregation procedures or organization
of behavior in epistemic groups? The tripartite scheme of environment, process and ends
applies to such questions quite analogously, only the ends are now epistemic ones.
Before getting into an illustrating example, I shall digress a little on an important
difference between individual and collective theoretical rationality. While contested, on the
individual level there is a plausible distinction between theoretical and practical rationality.
As Lackey (2010) points out, what is practically most rational to accept as a belief may
clash with what is best supported by our evidence and thereby seems to be the belief
sanctioned by theoretical rationality.12 But how is the state of belief in a group determined
independently from the behavior of its agents?
Consider a standard procedure to determine a group’s state of belief: majority voting13.
The outcome of the vote, and thereby the group belief, cannot be directly determined from
the beliefs of the individual members. They might choose to vote strategically, they may fail
to cast their vote, or they may actually make a mistake; but the appropriate state of belief
to attribute is the outcome of the actual vote. The alternative to this conceptualization
of group belief in this example would be to assume that the actual collective belief is
an aggregate created by an ideal omniscient observer, or less mythical by an idealized
10The relevance of the average across outcomes is an additional normative assumption, that could be
replaced by, for example, maximin norm when the worst case outcome is of greater importance to the
group’s ends.
11Bicchieri and Mercier (2014) provides a good example for this: Their approach is to create awareness
of the suboptimality of the norm but at the same time being very deliberate about the processes governing
norm maintenance and change to actually enable progress.
12A classic example is the athlete who would increase their chances by believing in their ability to win,
but have actually good evidence they won’t, cf. Lackey (2010).
13cf. List and Pettit (2011) for a detailed philosophical discussion of the procedure.
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process.14
But there are good reasons to dismiss this idea. The main argument is provided by
List and Pettit (2011), who show that once multiple propositions are in play, there is no
non-arbitrary way to construct consistent beliefs from an unrestricted domain of beliefs
under anonymity. This also implies that actual votes may be inconsistent, but the actual
vote is, unlike any suggested idealized procedure, unique.
Furthermore, an analogy to the case of an individual provides another compelling reason
to reject an ideal aggregate as the “true” group belief; imagine an agent who holds the
prior degree of belief p(H) on hypothesis H, and the likelihood p(E|H) = q. Assume,
for the sake of argument, that the uniquely rational way to respond to evidence E for
that agent is to employ Bayesian updating. Does it follow that the agent then holds the
credence p′(H) = p(H|E) = p(E|H)∗p(H)
p(E) ? That seems absurd. The agent could end up with
any credence, it just might render him irrational. Similarly, the group as a whole may
be considered holding any belief that is actually created by an aggregation procedure the
group performs.
The main concern here is that, by applying various procedures, the group seems to end
up with different and incompatible beliefs. If that is the case, and there is no reason to
belief that something relevant changed in between applying the procedures, the group will
count as irrational, since it might be attributed both the belief in a proposition and its
negation by this standard. Therefore, in the case of groups, the analyst always has to rely
on behavior and therefore at least individual-level practical considerations to determine
collective theoretical rationality.
With these preliminaries in mind, let me turn to the case study. Imagine a community
of researchers, studying human choice behavior in various simple situations, such as in
the field of behavioral economics.15 Given different theoretical background assumptions,
methodological choices, and potentially non-epistemic individual-level goals, how should
these researchers treat the results provided by their peers? What would be a collectively
rational process to employ? Once again, I provide an informal analysis to be complemented
with a formal account in Chapter 4.
The environment in modern day science is very different from more everyday epistemic
contexts: researchers generally have to assume that socially available information on the
research of others is an indispensable resource. Everyone seriously engaged in scientific
research plausibly finds partially, if generally imperfectly, reliable results. Thus aggregating
them is in principle desirable. At the same time, most of the time such results are only
made available by publication, leaving significant room for the above mentioned factors
such as different theoretical background assumptions to partially confound the results.
Around the field of behavioral economics and the psychology of choice behavior, an
intricate debate has developed on the actual prevalence of individual irrational behaviors.
While prominent figures such as Kahnemann, and scholars such as Thaler and Sunstein
14Under different circumstances, other options are open to ascribe collective belief; the group may have
chosen an expert panel explicitly to determine their collective belief, to give just one common example.
15A paradigmatic piece of work in this field is Kahneman and Tversky (1979), more popular accounts
are to be found in Ariely (2008) and Kahneman (2011).
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(2008) building on them are convinced of widespread individual irrationality, authors such
as Gigerenzer (2015) heavily questioned their conclusion. This is not the place to pass
judgment on which account is more accurate, but it shows that contemporary research can
lead into discussions where it becomes difficult to aggregate all socially available results
due to their inconsistency.
Let me postpone the question of the precise process assumed to be in place, and turn to
the deceptively simple question of norms in science. The obvious goal of authentic scientists
is to produce (approximately) true insights about the world. As a standard for analysis,
this can be rephrased in terms of accuracy, i.e. closeness to the truth. Accuracy can in
turn be measured, for example, by employing proper scoring rules (Brier, 1950). However,
for practical purposes, one often has to rely on what may be called proxy standards. It
can take a scientific community years, if not decades, to judge the accuracy of a scientist’s
results – even if it is assumed, at least for the sake of argument, that such a thing is actually
possible.
The community therefore has to rely on alternative standards to assign credit. These
are not necessarily the norms the analyst applies in their judgment of rationality, but
they are crucial to reconstruct the enterprises of epistemic communities. This leads to the
postponed question of the processes in question.
The description of the exchange of research results in terms of opinion exchange suggests
itself; however, there is significant design space to analyze and model opinion exchange. A
particular interesting feature in the case of a largely decentralized epistemic project such
as a scientific discipline, potential interventions are likely to be implemented at the level of
incentives for individuals.16 But there is a serious risk that agents present their opinions
strategically. Hence, it becomes an important questions whether there is a behavioral
strategy, and thus a social process, that is robustly rational across the relevant environment.
Chapter 4 offers a formal argument supporting the claim that there is no such process across
important instances of the epistemic environment of science.
But for the time being, it should have become clear enough how to apply the three
components of the argument scheme to a given case. It should also be well-understood
that there is substantial room to attribute features of a case study to different components,
thereby changing the course of the analysis. This is not a weakness of the argument
scheme, but an unavoidable consequence of the contextual nature of collective rationality.
The available background assumptions to attribute norms, goals and standards or the
distinction into an environment and a social process depend not only on the scenario,
but also the analyst’s epistemic context. With the conceptual framework set up by the
argument scheme, it is time to turn to the problem of attributing collective ends; up to this
point, I had to appeal to reasonable assumptions and common sense, which is generally
insufficient for a compelling argument, and this profound problem needs to be addressed
before focusing attentions more on modeling social processes.
16This is not to say that the interventions are not targeted at structural features such as communication
networks, but the implementation often has to run through the pathway of individual motivation.
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2.4 Attributing Collective Goals
The problem of end attribution to collections of agents already cropped up multiple times.
More precisely, the question is which ends can legitimately figure in an argument on col-
lective rationality for a given group as the ends-component.
To avoid confusion, the following discussion is not committed to the claim that collec-
tives have mental state in any kind of realist sense. For certain groups it seems reasonable
to interpret ends as mental states, at least in a functionalist manner of speaking; in hu-
man agents, what plays the functional role of ends in means-ends rationality is commonly
referred to as desires, and accurately described as a mental state.17 On the theory of
collective ends considered here, as he discussion of collective ends attribution will clarify,
collective ends can also be identified with, among other things, the reason for their incep-
tion, and hence are not necessarily identifiable with its mental states, metaphorically or
literally.
On another clarificatory note, it is important to distinguish between an ex ante and
an ex post perspective on means-ends rationality, characterized by different epistemic po-
sitions. To an analyst operating ex ante, it may neither be known which exact ends a
group has, nor, for any given process, how its going to be realized in detail. Once both the
group is identified and the process realized, it is possible that a process ex ante irrational
according to the process model and an end attribution based on abstract norms turns out
to be an optimal means to the actual ends of the group. Vice versa, a process that is ex
ante identified as collectively rational may be realized in such a way as to not optimally
further the actual ends of the group.
This does not imply that different concepts of rationality are in play; abstract norms
such as consistency of belief or acyclicity of preferences are justified on the basis of concrete
instances where violating them is a bad means to actual ends. A money-pump argument
to reject cyclical preferences as irrational constructs a concrete scenario where cyclical
preferences end up hurting an agent’s ends (Davidson et al., 1955). Generic norms of
rationality, collective or individual, are supposed to guide behavior and belief before it is
known or even knowable which means are optimal, and sometimes even before an entirely
concrete set of ends is epistemically accessible. But the defining case is the actual efficacy
of means to concrete ends.
The investigation naturally starts with an aggregative approach, i.e. an attempt to
construct collective ends from the goals of group members. The limitations of this approach
lead up to a functionalist perspective, which turns out to be inappropriate for the normative
project at hand. In the face of these difficulties, the discussion concludes with a discussion
of several heuristical devices for collective ends attribution reconstructible from basic reason
and scientific practice; these devices at least partially resolve the issues of the aggregative
approach.
17How this attribution is to be understood precisely is a controversial question in the philosophy of mind,
cf. Dennett (2009).
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A B C
Agent 1 1 2 3
Agent 2 2 3 1
Agent 3 3 1 2
Table 2.1: Preferences for Condorcet’s Paradox
2.4.1 Aggregation Failure
The first problem when trying to aggregate individual level ends into collective ones is
the need for homogenization: The ends across individual group members may be diverse
in kind. This problem can, at least in principle, be solved by translating everything into
preferences over accessible states of affairs.18
But as Arrow (1950) and many subsequent writers have shown, this preference-based
approach combined with a few intuitively plausible conditions implies the mathematical
impossibility of coherent aggregation. Let me walk through the simplest recurring example,
generally ascribed to Condorcet (cf. List and Pettit, 2011, p. 47).
Imagine three members of a committee facing three possible states of affairs to choose
from, labeled A, B and C. The preferences are depicted in Table 2.4.1, with 1 representing
the most preferred option. What is sometimes called Condorcet’s paradox is the following
insight: imagine, that the committee votes first on A and B. Since agents 1 and 2 both
prefer A to B, A wins by the majority principle. Now A is compared to C, where C wins.
But if the committee went one step further and also checked the numbers on C vs. B, they
found out that collectively, B > C. Hence, the resulting ordering is circular and therefore,
any suggested choice is rationally objectionable on the basis of that ordering. Arrow and
subsequent social choice theorists have widely generalized this result. The most famous
theorem is Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem (Arrow, 1950), which states that there is
no aggregation rule that jointly satisfies the following conditions and creates a collective
weak ordering over the states of affairs:19
1. Unrestricted Domain (UD): All ends, i.e. all preference orderings are allowed to be
fed into the aggregation procedure.
2. Pareto Efficiency (PE): The procedure preserves a uniform preference or indifference
over any two options. If all individuals either prefer A over B or are indifferent
between the two, the aggregate cannot prefer B over A.
3. Independence of irrelevant alternatives (I): If two states of affairs A and B are ordered
by the procedure in a certain way, that ordering is preserved under the addition and
removal of further possible states of affairs C, C ′, . . .
18This is the approach chosen by social choice theory in the style of Arrow (1950). For a survey of
classical results, cf. Sen (1986)‘.
19For a more technical statement, cf. Morreau (2016).
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4. Non-dictatorship (ND): There is no individual agent whose exact preference ordering
forms the social preference ordering for all possible cases.
Many social choice theorists and philosophers have since been invested in relaxing such
conditions to retain possibility results. However, this is not the subject here. Instead,
I take the prevalence of impossibility results as one of several problems this approach
generally faces as a universal approach to determining collective ends.20 Let me consider
these problems in turn.
First, any group for which the premises of the General Possibility Theorem hold cannot
be attributed the ends that would result from aggregation. Note that this is conditional on
all of the premises of the theorem being applicable. One common way out when employing
an aggregation procedure to a concrete group is to relax UD: For a known, static group,
one could check whether the kind of cycle arises that created the paradox in the initial
committee example. For some groups it may also be acceptable to identify their collective
ends with that of a dictator; social choice theorists argue against dictatorship assuming
that the object of choice is the entirety of arrangements in a society. For more constraint
groups, a general – and fundamentally ethical – argument against ends dictatorship is not
following from the background assumptions of social choice.21
In general, however, it is a priori unknown to the analyst whether the Arrovian condi-
tions hold or fail to hold for a certain group, and therefore an attribution of ends by, for
example, majority voting on individual-level ends cannot be assumed to work.
Furthermore, the dynamic nature of group membership in many contexts threatens
well-defined aggregation. The collective end structure identified may itself impact the
future evolution of the group in terms of members; whose preferences would then have
to be aggregated? A case can be made for considering all actual current, past and future
members, only actual present members, or even all possible members of the group. Without
additional contextual knowledge, it seems hard to recover a single static group for the
application of aggregative procedures on a group’s constitutive ends.
Next, there are plausibly groups for which collective ends stem from an entirely differ-
ent source than individual preferences. Criminal juries, for example, plausibly have the
collective end to produce accurate verdicts. But even if none of its members shares this
goal, the jury as a group remains collectively irrational if it systematically fails to produce
the right verdict.22 Similarly, the ends of a political party cannot simply be broken down
to the interests of its members; they extend at least to those of its voters, in addition,
but those are not generally participating in the social processes delineating the party as a
20As a side note, List and Pettit (2011) have shown that an analog impossibility result holds for ag-
gregating beliefs. That insight is important when it comes to judging theoretical rationality, even though
ends in those cases may still be cast in terms of preference orderings. It excludes the possibility to assume
that there will be just one unequivocal collective belief to be assessed.
21Commercial enterprises with a single owner provide an example; though one might disagree on the
moral permissibility of ends dictatorship even in that case, it is prima facie plausible.
22Given, as usual, sufficiently benevolent environmental conditions. If the evidence is already completely
biased when presented to the jury during the trial, it might be impossible to rationally arrive at the correct
verdict.
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group.
Note, that this objection relies on the plausibility of treating collectives such as juries
or school classes as groups whose rationality can be judged without expanding the group
to the larger embedding social environment. The ends attributed to a criminal jury are
defined by the legal system, the goals of which are in turn defined by society as a whole.
If it is not universally necessary to expand the scope of a group until there are no external
factors left influencing its ends, aggregation cannot be applicable to certain groups – namely
those not existing for the interests of their members.
As it is in some cases impossible to find any attributable ends by aggregation, in other
cases the result is underdetermined.
Imagine two groups of agents, one comprised of software developers supposed to famil-
iarize themselves with a particular platform for a large project, and the other comprised
of scientists chasing down the structure of a particular molecule.
One collective goal that can reasonably be attributed to either group from this descrip-
tion is accuracy in their respective beliefs, understood as closeness to truth. For individuals,
accuracy is often defined as quadratic distance of a degree of belief from the truth in formal
accounts.23 But given a distribution of individual beliefs, how is accuracy to be applied?
In the case of software development, it is crucial that everyone understands at least
the basic properties of the development platform, since the eventual purpose of the team
is to write code, much of which is interdependent in the sense that if one module feeds
errors into the software system, the whole is flawed and may even fail entirely. Hence, to
aggregate individual accuracy goals to a collective one, a maximin-norm is recommendable.
Under such a norm, any social process employed is judged by the accuracy of the worst-
performing individual, and therefore, this end structure suggests to maximize minimum
accuracy as a collective end.
The scientists are in a very different situation; once the molecule’s structure is uncov-
ered, it does not matter how far off all the other scientists were – assuming that, once
the structure is correctly identified, this result can easily be checked by other experts in
the field. Hence, the normative standard to judge social processes in this case is instead
by maximaxing: the collectively most desirable process is judged by the best performing
agent, since eventually, the success of the project depends on that agent.24
What follows is that there is no unique way to aggregate the end of accuracy for a
group; end attribution depends on details of the group, and cannot merely rely on their
belief distribution and a priori plausibly generic norms of individual rationality.
A more technically demanding argument for this problem is to be found in the discussion
of aggregating utilities under uncertainty presented by Mongin and Pivato (2016). They
point out that under uncertainty, applying the genuinely collective normative standard
23Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010a,b) offer an argument for this measure. It has been objected to as a
unique measure of accurate belief by Levinstein (2012). For the purpose of my discussion, I will assume
that there is a uniquely adequate interpretation of accuracy for individuals, since otherwise the collective
problem becomes only worse.
24Note, that the best performing agent may not be same across possible social processes or even different
scenarios for the environment under the same process.
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of Pareto-efficiency is confronted with underdetermination: applying Pareto ex ante may
lead to substantially different aggregate results than applying it ex post. Unless there is a
conclusive a priori argument as to which version of the Pareto principle is adequate, there
is once again no uniquely attributable collective end.
To summarize, aggregation of individual ends faces a wide variety of objections. Even
though the objections are all limited to certain types of groups, aggregation cannot serve
as a universal tool for attributing ends. Therefore, the inquiry has to be taken elsewhere
for solutions.
2.4.2 The Intentional Stance
The aforementioned List & Pettit suggest a functionalist perspective to avoid the problems
facing aggregation. They refer to it as the intentional stance, thereby referencing Dennett
(2009). According to this approach, mental states such as beliefs and desires are to be
identified with their functional roles. If a certain behavioral pattern is observed in an
individual, the researcher identifies a set of beliefs and desires that would explain it given
the individual’s rationality. Whichever mental states thereby could explain the behavior
are to be attributed to the agent.
Regardless of the predictive merits and demerits of such a view – which clearly are
Dennett’s main concern –, it fails to support a normative analysis. Rationality is what
is to be adjudicated. But to identify a unique set of beliefs and desires25, rationality is
prerequisite. Put otherwise, without a further set of constraints, beliefs and desires are
underdetermined by behavior. Therefore, the constraints provided by classical norms of
individual rationality, such as the ones List & Pettit employ, cannot be assumed without
creating vacuous circularity; thus, the functionalist approach cannot deliver ends in the
required sense.
The proponents of functionalism with respect to collective agents partially recognize
this problem, since they concede that agents regularly fail to behave rationally, due to the
complexity of their environment and their own mental life, combined with various cognitive
shortcomings (cf. List and Pettit, 2011, p. 31). However, they offer no solution. Basically,
it would be necessary to specify those circumstances where behavior provides the basis to
attribute collective beliefs and desires, and then to judge all other behavior according to
the standard set thereby.
But this solution runs into two further problems. First, it still fails to address the
problem presented by a multiplicity of available norms of rationality. It still has to assume
that, for example, there is a clear-cut answer as to whether ex ante or ex post Pareto-
efficiency are to limit the collectively rational.
But the choice of reference behavior to determine collective ends is itself unsound. Any
criteria to distinguish reference situations from the ones to be judged are objectionable as
arbitrary. This is, to note, the crucial difference to a merely descriptive context: there,
25Sufficiently unique for the explanatory purpose, since the resulting utility functions representing the
agent’s preferences are generally only unique up to positive affine transformation (Savage, 1972).
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predictive power serves as an external criterion to evaluate categorization; whether a subset
or all situations are supposed to enable attribution of beliefs and desires, the adequacy
of that choice can be judged by the resulting predictive accuracy. When it comes to
adjudicating rationality, no independent measure of success is available before normative
judgment is passed. Hence, functionalism cannot solve the fundamental problem of ends
attribution.
A further downside of List & Pettit’s approach in particular is the limitation of its
domain: many collections of interacting agents are disqualified as group agents proper.
Traders in a common market, for example, are explicitly excluded. But a large part
of welfare economics is invested in answering exactly the question which mechanism of
resource allocation – a class of which markets are an instance – is most efficient; a question
that is interpretable as asking for the mechanism’s collective rationality. For any more
general answer to the problem of ends attribution, this particular functionalist account
cannot offer any help. To which devices are we left then?
2.4.3 Alternative Approaches
With two major candidates for a universal method of goal attribution found wanting,
students of collective rationality are left with more limited tools. Those can be understood
as heuristical devices, the applicability of which is limited to particular types of groups.
Nevertheless, in lack of a more comprehensive alternative, they are useful tools to the
inquirer.
The devices presented here are assumed to be reconstructions of both pretheoretical
reason and scientific practices of goal attribution. They are meant neither as exclusive nor
exhaustive, but to offer an idea of how to choose and justify a method of attribution a
posteriori on fallible information about the group in question.
Explicit Statement One obvious approach to attributing ends is to simply ask the
agent for them. For a number of reasons, this approach is often rejected for individuals.
Economists in particular are frequently worried about either the ability or willingness of
agents to reveal their actual preferences or beliefs in anything but sufficiently incentivized
action.26 For groups, the situation with explicitly stated goals and ends is different in
several important respects.
(1) The form in which collectives explicitly state goals is often not merely verbal, but
in more or less official documents. A research group has to state its ends when applying
for funding, a party writes them down in a political program, and so on. Therefore, these
ends are both less ephemeral, i.e. they generally persist for a substantial amount of time,
and can be pointed out to the group who explicitly committed to them. This makes them
both explanatorily – through persistence – and motivationally – through referentiability –
more useful than the ends stated verbally by an individual.27
26Gintis (2009) argues for the use of relevant monetary payoffs in laboratory experiments for this reason.
27This may go up to the point of actual legal liability, but that is certainly a limiting case.
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(2) As I argued above, the assumption that, under at least a limited set of conditions,
actions reliably reveal preferences is not supported in the context of group rationality. The
very existence of a phenomenon such as an unpopular social norm implies that it cannot
be assumed for groups to end up with coherent patterns of action. Therefore, relying on
explicit statement can be simply the best method available in the absence of a preferable
alternative.
This method is of course limited in its scope: many informal and ad hoc groups the
collective rationality of which is of great interest are not constituted in such a way as to
provide a statement of their ends. Founders of a company, to give just a simple example, are
in general not going to write down explicitly that they aim for profit – or anything else. So
explicit statement cannot warrant the ascription of profit goals to commercial enterprises;
it seems, however, generally justified to project this end onto a company, because of a
different method of attribution.
Attribution by Categorization Many collections of agents can be categorized; they
belong to a certain class of groups, such as schools, commercial enterprises, political parties
or military units. For these categories, one can determine generic ends applicable to all
proper members of that class.
Commercial enterprises, for example, are pursuing profit. They may pursue other ends,
such as improving public health, creating jobs for unemployed members of the founders’
family, or any number of additional goals that are harder to attribute. But if they fail to
pursue monetary gain, this particular collection of agents fails to be a commercial enterprise
in the first place.
The actual attribution of course needs to rely on a robust inclusion in the relevant
category. There are a number of ways to determine membership. In the case of for-profit
companies, the analyst can refer to their legal status. In other cases, categorization itself
requires an argument based on a group type definition in social science, and those may
change due to progress within those sciences. The definition of a socio-economic class, to
name just one prominent category, has undergone substantial change since the days of Karl
Marx.
A further difficulty with this approach is that it is sometimes unclear whether the an-
alyst should rather give up on putting a group into a certain category or conclude that
they are irrational. In many cases, the end they pursue is itself an important determinant
of category membership – a problem mirroring the circularity argument against function-
alism. In such cases, unless there is an independent determinant, there is no unequivocal
conclusion on collective rationality on the basis of ends attributed by category. But our ini-
tial examples of schools, companies and political parties, all of which are normally legally
constituted as category members, exemplify the relevance of this approach, even in the
light of its limitations.
Aggregation Revisited The objections raised before led me to dismiss aggregation as
a general method for ends attribution. But there are groups for which the conditions that
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support the objections to aggregation fail. A disclaimer is in order at this point: the
analyst has to have intimate knowledge of a group to judge whether these conditions hold
or not, and therefore this approach is not only limited by the threat of impossibility and
inadequacy, but also by the epistemic restrictions of the observer. But a plausible, though
fictitious, example is easily found.
Imagine several large sugar companies trying to fix prices. Their situation can be
described as an n-person prisoner’s dilemma: for any single company, it would be most
preferable if all the others asked high prices while they themselves sold for slightly less.
As a consequence, if their product is assumed to be equivalent, everyone would buy from
them, and they could turn in a large profit. But if all sugar companies followed that logic,
they would all end up asking competitive prices instead of the monopoly prices they could
ask if all would cooperate to fix the price.
Why is it possible to end up with monopoly-pricing if the would-be sugar cartel decided
by majority vote? For simplicity, assume that the companies only consider three types of
scenarios: monopoly pricing, competitive pricing and a situation with one defector charging
monopoly prices and everyone else asking higher prices, leaving out mixed cases where some
ask the monopoly price and multiple others charge less. Every company prefers monopoly
pricing to both competitive pricing and any situation where someone else asks less than
the monopolistic price while they hold up the higher price. The only scenario preferable to
monopoly pricing is the one where the focal company defects while all others cooperate.
Hence, the second-most preferred option for all is monopoly pricing, and everyone
disagrees on the most preferred option. Therefore, every other option is beaten in a ma-
jority vote by monopoly pricing, and monopoly pricing is the attributed end. Obviously,
monopoly pricing is also Pareto-efficient for the cartel. The General Possibility Theorem
does not apply due to the restricted domain of preferences, and the problem of aggre-
gation under uncertainty cannot arise because of the underlying assumption of a shared
assessment of the relevant probabilities for matters of fact.
With both impossibility and indeterminacy out of the way, there is still the problem
whether a group is accurately described as serving some aggregate of its members’ interests.
This is why a business cartel is such a convenient example: its sole purpose is to further
the private interests of the participants.
How many groups are actually analyzable by aggregation? I conjecture that there are
very few for which such an analysis is as adequate as that of the sugar cartel, and it is not
even necessary to point to impossibility results to support this point – even though they
clearly make things worse. Imagine what might seem a typical example of an organization
representing an aggregate of its members, a labor union. Historically, labor unions often
pursued ends far beyond at least the immediate individual interests of their members.
e.g. by also representing unemployed workers to some degree. This creates serious doubt
whether an aggregative analysis would do the ends of this type of group justice.
Nevertheless, the case of a business cartel shows that general impossibility results should
not let the student of collective rationality reject attribution by aggregation entirely; it just
requires sufficient diligence to ascertain its applicability to a given case.
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Inspecting the Process The examples discussed to showcase the indeterminacy of col-
lective accuracy as a generic norm point to yet another method to figure out adequate
ends: one can take a closer look at the social process. For the two epistemic groups –
software developers and molecule-hunting scientists – the larger context of the behavior
under consideration is referenced. But what is crucial is to understand certain features of
social processes themselves.
For the software developers, the quality of their collective effort is assumed to be highly
interdependent; all the pieces of the final complex software need to interlock and operate
correctly. Furthermore, in this case it is difficult and costly to monitor the quality of any
single agent’s work directly to respond appropriately.
In the scenario of the molecule hunters, neither property features in the process: their
work is assumed to be perfectly redundant and success or failure easy to detect on the level
of individual belief. Therefore, an observer can support the arguments for a particular
interpretation of collective accuracy to apply.
This method can only operate conditional on sufficiently detailed knowledge of the
process. Furthermore, it may sometimes still not be sufficient to determine collective norms:
the description of the two groups is simplified to arrive at a clear argument; in practice, to
give just a simple example, the work of scientists is, to a certain degree, interdependent.
Publication of a misleading result can hinder the efficacy of other scientists in their pursuit
of truth.
Inspecting processes in more detail also opens up the possibility to detect potential
sources of irrational outcomes. Failing communication within an organization, the preva-
lence of biases in deliberation or individual conflicts of interest are all potential symptoms
of irrational processes. They are, however, only symptoms; without a previous attribution
of collective ends, such observations cannot support a robust inference to irrationality. In-
stead, they should be viewed as diagnostic tools, relying on the attribution of maximally
generic ends in the absence of more detailed knowledge about the group.
To summarize, inspecting the available social processes and the larger encompassing
systems can allow the resolution of indeterminacy and therefore establish certain generic
norms of collective rationality attributable to a group. In the given example, however,
attribution depends on the prior plausibility of assuming accuracy as an end at all. The
prior attribution is based on attribution by categorization, showcasing how these heuristics
can be combined to surpass at least some of their limitations.
This leaves the somewhat disheartening conclusion that none of the above methods is
universally applicable. For each one a description of a group can be found serving as a
counterexample to its universality.
2.5 Summary
At this point, two important goals are met: there is a generic argument scheme, which
can be filled in to instantiate an argument for any suggested case of collective irrationality.
Plugging in the concrete details is, as the following chapters will exemplify, a substantial
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task, but having a standard scheme eases the process of reconstructing the actual argu-
ments made based on models, case studies or other potential methods. Our second major
achievement is to more clearly spell out the problem of attributing ends to arbitrary col-
lective bodies, and to offer at least partial solutions to this major problem of normative
social philosophy.
Having established how to argue for the (ir)rationality of various social processes and
mechanisms in groups, a further critical question arises: if the process-focused account
given here is appropriate, is it a social philosopher’s task to construct such arguments at
all? Should it not be left to actual social scientists and psychologists? Insofar as expertise
from social science and psychology is necessary, yes, but philosophical analysis can greatly
contribute to the project. Philosophers are not confined to use results provided by other
philosophers. They can build on results from empirical disciplines, as they historically
often did.
What follows from the environment – process – ends account is that philosophers have to
engage relevant empirical results when constructing models of environments and processes.
The most genuinely philosophical project, evaluating behavior by normative standards,
needs to build on process models as well as inspire their form, because the argument scheme
requires the output of processes to fit into the evaluative algorithm suggested. In this spirit,
the next two chapters provide a deeper analysis of the problems introduced informally in
the case studies, but employing the tool of agent-based modeling and simulation.
The construction of models of the evolution of unpopular norms and the impact of
strategic behavior on epistemic success in communities should be understood as an attempt
to contribute to social theory in general. As any theoretician, a philosopher’s arguments,
theories and models have to stand the complementary tests of utility and adequacy to the
target domain, but there is no reason to be held back by this truism.
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Chapter 3
The Evolution of Unpopular Norms1
3.1 Introduction
The evolution and persistence of social norms is one of the core topics of social theory.
Social norms form the core of grand sociological theories such as Parsonian systems theory
(cf. Joas and Kno¨bl, 2013, chapter 2-4), and more recently, even proponents of rational
choice (Gintis, 2009) and analytical sociology (Kroneberg, 2014) emphasize the explanatory
importance of social norms. The meaning of the term social norm is therefore broadly
construed. In general, it describes a complex of behavioral patterns, expectations and
potential sanctions.
Traditionally, social norms have mostly been considered as solutions to problems of co-
operation and coordination in social groups (Raub et al., 2015). Rational choice theory in
particular often provides descriptions that make successful cooperation in human societies
seem almost miraculous. Since the seminal work of Axelrod (1984), various models, partic-
ularly computational models, have been developed to explain the evolution and persistence
of social norms and cooperation in a world of limited resources and egoism. 2
But beyond this world of overall beneficial norms that allow their subjects to cooperate
in complex social settings, there are also norms that appear to be largely detrimental to
their subjects: so-called unpopular norms. These are norms that hurt the interests of the
majority or even all its subjects, without being coerced onto the population from outside;
for example, an enforced code of conduct in a prison does not constitute an unpopular
norm, no matter how unpopular it is among the prisoners. If, on the other hand, the
prison guards perceive a norm of strictness and hostility towards the prisoners and align
their behavior with that norm against their actual private preferences, an unpopular norm
has been constituted. In fact, this example is not far-fetched, since social psychologists
discovered such a pattern in the U.S. penitentiary system (Kauffman, 1981).
How do such norms arise, and how are they maintained? In some cases, the answer
is relatively simple. In a corrupt political system, bribery might be the established social
1The content of this chapter is in large parts published in Merdes (2017)
2For a recent example in social philosophy, see Skyrms (2004, 2014).
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norm. Such a situation is easily modeled as an instance of a prisoner’s dilemma: If firm
A stops bribing while firm B goes on, firm A will loose valuable contracts and eventually
might just go out of business. But, at least potentially, both firms would prefer a situation
where neither A nor B would bribe (defect, in terms of the prisoner’s dilemma). Such
ambiguous cases can be understood in various ways.
One option is, contrary to Bicchieri and Fukui (1999), to argue that such cases should
not be classified as norms at all. The expectations of the members of the relevant popula-
tion might not be sufficient to constitute a social norm. To clarify this, it has to be laid out
in more detail what exactly constitutes a social norm.3 An alternative stance is to allow
for some unpopular norms to be fully explained in terms of rational choice, while others
require a more subtle psychological and sociological explanation, such as the mechanism
of pluralistic ignorance. Case like these often appear quite puzzling to the observer.
Such puzzlement is effected most strongly in cases where unilateral deviation appears
to be advantageous to at least some of the agents. And in fact, social psychologists have
suggested norms of alcohol consumption at a college campus as a case study (Prentice and
Miller, 1993). Their data supports the hypothesis that students systematically misperceive
the preferences of their fellow students with respect to the excessive consumption of alcohol.
Similar patterns have also been reported on sexual promiscuity (Lambert et al., 2003). In
both cases, the behavioral expectation leads students to behave in potentially harmful ways
against their own actual preferences. These cases call for an explanation in its own right.4
Bicchieri and Fukui (1999), among others, have argued that a major source of unpopular
norms is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance. In a social group, behavior is often
coordinated by perceiving behavior and inferring a preference to coordinate with from
the observations. This process of social influence appears to be evolutionary successful,
establishing widely accepted behavioral expectations with limited resources. But limited
information or misinterpreted behavior can also start a cascade of misrepresentation and
failed communication of true preferences, resulting in an unpopular social norm.
Once such a norm is thereby established, it reproduces the suboptimal behavior and
maintains a system of misrepresentation of preferences. If a strict system of sanctions is
implemented to protect the norm, it can survive indefinitely, as it appears to be the case
with certain anachronistic religious norms. But if sanctions are weak, or powerful external
events shake up the social system, an unpopular norm is expected to be very fragile. Once
successful communication is enabled, the norm’s subjects have strong incentive to deviate
and dethrone the norm.
3There is also an extended discussion about the question whether norms can always be identified with
game theoretic equilibria of some kind. It will be argued in more detail in Section 3.2 whether that is
actually a reasonable assumption.
4It is actually quite difficult to ascertain for a specific case that unilateral deviation would be advan-
tageous, since there might be subtle sanctions that weren’t registered by any particular study. However,
the above cases of alcohol and sex seem to be genuine cases of advantageous unilateral deviation, since the
actual expectations differed so much from the perceived ones, removing the major motive for sanction. Of
course, there is also the phenomenon of false enforcement (Centola et al., 2005), but the burden of proof
rests with the party offering the less plausible prediction, which appears to be sanction in these cases.
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The open question is how to formalize this informal theoretical account of the growth
of unpopular norms. In the spirit of generative social science (cf. Epstein, 1999, p. 43):
If you didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain the phenomenon. Agent-based modeling (ABM)
provides an extremely useful tool to develop a model from informal theory. The main
contributions of this chapter are thus
1. The development of an agent-based model providing a potential explanation of the
evolution, maintenance and decline of unpopular norms
2. An analysis of the dynamics underlying the end result of an unpopular norm
3. Qualitative comparisons with empirical results from both survey and experimental
research
4. The provision of an easily extensible baseline model, as shown by the addition of
central influences
In terms of the three-partite argument scheme for collective (ir)rationality, the model
formalizes a set of assumptions on the actions available to norm-choosing agents, their
preferences and cognitive capabilities which constitute the the fixed boundary conditions.
Within this norm-choice environment, the agents employ a process of restricted observation
and communication; extensibility of the model is crucial to ensure its ability to respond to
challenges not only to its empirical fit, but also to any normative inferences to be drawn,
given the importance of possible alternative processes in the argument scheme. Finally,
the discussion will be limited to a simple goal structure projected onto the agents, with
pointers to plausible alternatives.
This chapter proceeds in the following way: First, the empirical literature on pluralistic
ignorance is reviewed to extract a qualitative benchmark for the model, followed by a crit-
ical examination of an existing theoretical model and the concept of social norms assumed
for the analysis. Next, a network-based ABM is introduced and analyzed in various simu-
lation experiments. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the model’s limitations,
a short summary of the results and a review of open questions for future research.
3.2 Evidence and Theory of Unpopular Norms
3.2.1 Empirical Background
Pluralistic ignorance has been shown by social psychologists in a variety of contexts. Stu-
dents of US universities misperceive the expectations and preferences of fellow students
with respect to excessive alcohol consumption (Prentice and Miller, 1993) and so-called
hooking-up behavior (Lambert et al., 2003). In the study by Prentice and Miller, the ac-
tual preferences on alcohol consumption were approximately uniformly distributed on their
scale. The perceived preference of other students, however, turned out to be normally dis-
tributed with a significantly higher mean than the preference distribution – where the
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preference of the other students is also interpreted by the study’s authors as the expecta-
tion of subjects towards their peers.5
The transformation of a uniform distribution of individual preferences to a normal
distribution of expectations can be explained as the students trying to coordinate on a
shared normative expectation. The shift in the mean then shows the failure of the social
influence mechanism to find the optimum; in that sense, the resulting norm is considered
unpopular.
Similar patterns are also found outside college campuses. Prison guards in the United
States turned out to misperceive their colleagues as way less liberal than themselves and
than they are (Kauffman, 1981). The perception of support for segregation among white
men is another case where the members of a group failed to recognize the actual distribution
of preferences (O’Gorman, 1975). Bicchieri and Fukui (1999) argue that even norms of
corruption can be the product of a social failure to reveal preferences.
Importantly, not all cases of pluralistic ignorance lead to the establishment of an unpop-
ular norm. Bystander scenarios (Darley and Latane, 1968) can be explained by pluralistic
ignorance, i.e. the failure to correctly infer another person’s mental states from behavior,
but the problem is limited to a specific situation. Pluralistic ignorance is a mechanism that
potentially creates an unpopular norm, if it is sustained in a population over time. The
studies cited above focus mostly on measuring the deviation between private preference
and behavioral expectation. While this deviation is a valid operationalization of the con-
struct of an unpopular norm, it doesn’t provide understanding of the underlying dynamics
of pluralistic ignorance, which are supposed to explain the pattern of expectations.
The study by Shamir and Shamir (1997) provides such a dynamic picture. They inves-
tigate the development of the political climate in Israel prior to the election of 1992. They
show that private opinion became more and more friendly to the idea of returning territory,
but the perceived political climate remained almost stable. Their explanation relies on the
limited information on which Israeli citizens formed their opinions, in particular the strong
influence of the incumbent conservative government. The spell was broken by the actual
outcomes of the election that led to government turnover, therefore revealing the private
preferences in a secret election.
Coming from a very different methodological angle, Ge¨rxhani and Bruggeman (2015)
observed such a lag in adapting expectations in an experimental setting. Constraints on
communication allow a certain perception of social expectation to last when its actual
support is decreasing. In both settings, the perceived shared belief is adapting eventually;
but at least in the political climate case, a significant change took place only after an
important external event. Thus, at least in some cases, an unpopular norm can survive
almost indefinitely if unchallenged.6
5There are a number of motives to accord with other people’s expectations: it can be necessary to
acquire social status (or not to loose it), caused by fear of sanction or a basic preference for conformity. In
fact, the different subjects of a social norm, unpopular or not, can be actually motivated to accord with
expectations due to quite different factors.
6The case of political climate evolving under pluralistic ignorance does not necessarily constitute a
social norm, unpopular or not. While it seems plausible to assume a correlation between the existence of
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It is also worth noting that according to Shamir and Shamir (1997), there are two kinds
of pluralistic ignorance: absolute and relative. In a case of absolute pluralistic ignorance,
the population chooses the option that is dispreferred by the majority. Politics offer a
simple example: when the party despised by the majority successfully gets elected in a
two-party system, that constitutes a case of absolute pluralistic ignorance.
When a population of students perceives the mean preference for alcohol consumption
by 2 points on an 11-point scale, it is in a state of relative pluralistic ignorance. Theoreti-
cally, relative pluralistic ignorance is the more fundamental phenomenon, whereas absolute
pluralistic ignorance is rather a product of binary choices imposed on a population. It is
easy to imagine how a relative misperception of the political climate could be transformed
into a case of absolute pluralistic ignorance via binary choice: the misperception just has
to shift the behavioral expectation across a party divide.
From these empirical insights, one can derive some important qualitative benchmarks
for a simulation model that tries to explain unpopular norms by pluralistic ignorance:
1. It must be able to reproduce the basic pattern of a deviation between the mean of
the preference distribution and the distribution of norm perception.
2. It should include variable constraints on the available information to constitute a
model of pluralistic ignorance.
3. Ideally, it reproduces the dynamical behavior qualitatively, i.e. it exhibits the above-
mentioned lag of the dynamic of the norm expectation distribution behind the pref-
erence distribution.
There is one feature of all these empirical studies that has not yet been mentioned, since
it does not concern their descriptive content or explanatory value. The issues investigated
all seem to be of high normative relevance. Excessive alcohol consumption, sexual conduct,
the penitentiary system and Israel’s territorial policy can all be considered ethical problems,
too. While the authors do not explicitly claim anything normative, they can consistently be
interpreted as ascribing collective irrationality to a group following an unpopular norm. If
that reading is appropriate, it suggests that seemingly ethical problems are in fact failures
of rationality and could be resolved by improving collective judgment. These potential
moral implications are not the main concern of this chapter, but the discussion of the
simulation results shall revisit this important issue.
3.2.2 Theoretical Models
The landscape of theoretical models of the evolution of unpopular norms is rather sparsely
populated compared to its empirical counterpart. In fact, there are only two attempts to
model that process formally to the best of my knowledge. The first one is a model by
certain social norms and a particular political climate, the study cited does not explicitly establish the
existence of norms, but rather offers longitudinal data on pluralistic ignorance.
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Centola et al. (2005) that relies on false enforcement as its main mechanism. False enforce-
ment denotes the phenomenon that agents might enforce a norm they privately disagree
with to prove their allegiance to the rest of the social group. While false enforcement is
a potential explanation for unpopular norms, the mechanism is very specific and hard to
detect empirically. None of the above-cited empirical research offers any evidence of false
enforcement, making it relatively hard to validate or refute and improve this particular
model.
The second model has been suggested by Bicchieri (cf. 2005, chap. 6). This model,
referred to as BM from here on, relies on pluralistic ignorance in a binary choice situation
only. The agents represented in BM might, for example, have to decide to litter the street
or keep it clean, both of which could be the norm in a given neighborhood. The chosen
action of an agent i is denoted by xi ∈ {x1, x2} which take on the values 0 and 1. Among
other implications, the binary choice blocks certain impossibility results such as Arrow’s
theorem, which assume at least three options (Arrow, 1950). In addition, the agent has a
private preference y and a degree of nonconformism β.
There is a “true majority” with respect to preference: any agent is a member of that
majority with probability p. There are two kinds of agents: Conformists (β = 0) and
trendsetters (β = 1). In addition, trendsetters lose θ if they suspend their choice. The
overall utility of an agent’s choice is described by the function
Ui = −(xi − xˆ)2 − β2 (xi − y)
2 − θ (3.1)
where xˆ is the perceived majority. In accordance with the utility function, the model runs
in two steps: Trendsetters have to make their choice in step 1 to maximize their utility
because of θ, which is chosen appropriately. They have no majority to perceive and thus
their choice is effectively guided by their y. In step 2, conformists make their choice. For a
conformist, the formula simplifies to −(xi− xˆ)2. It depends only on the perceived majority.
Bicchieri has shown that informational cascades take place in this model, both positive,
i.e. revealing the true majority, and negative, leaving the population in a state of absolute
pluralistic ignorance. In addition, it is possible that trendsetters do not provide a clear
signal to conformists. In such a case, conformists fall back on a coin flip, resulting in a
partial cascade.
While this model offers a first impression of how to formalize pluralistic ignorance to
grow an unpopular norm, it has some significant shortcomings. The model does not meet
the first of the above-stated benchmarks, since it cannot reproduce a pattern of relative
pluralistic ignorance. The second benchmark is met, since the model successfully endoge-
nizes informational constraints in its utility functions. However, such a conceptualization
makes it difficult to model a structurally more complex communication environment. It
would be desirable to decompose what is compounded in the utility function in BM, namely
structural features of the informational environment, psychological features of the agents
and variables that are to be understood purely in terms of rational reconstruction.
Finally, the model does not exhibit any real dynamics. There is only a two step process
that does not allow for a more fine-grained analysis of the dynamics of the system. It is too
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restrictive to assume trendsetters that are psychologically different. The role of an agent
is often determined by structural features of the social environment rather than individual
psychological features. That is not to say that individual differences aren’t potentially
important for the process, but they shouldn’t be assumed to be a necessary condition for
pluralistic ignorance.
These limitations notwithstanding, BM provides a starting point to develop a more
sophisticated model of the process in question, a task the model proposed here is trying to
accomplish. But before the discussion can proceed in that direction, it needs to be stated
explicitly how the concept of a social norm is understood.
3.2.3 Social Norms
Given the reliance on Bicchieri’s model of pluralistic ignorance, her definition of social
norms is a natural starting point. According to that account (cf. Bicchieri, 2005, p. 11),
a social norm is a behavioral rule R applicable to a situation S representable as a mixed-
motive game. It exists in a population P , if there is a sufficiently large subset Pcf ⊂ P ,
such that for each i ∈ Pcf , the following conditions hold:
1. i knows about R and its applicability to S.
2. i prefers to act according to R if i beliefs there is a sufficiently large set of agents who
follow R in situations of type S and an analogous (not necessarily identical) subset
of P exists, which expects i to conform to R in situations of type S, potentially also
willing to punish i for violating the norm.
This definition certainly encompasses some of the important features of social norms
also noted, for example, by Elster (2000). They are socially shared, i.e. not simply indi-
vidual habits, they come with normative expectations unlike simple collective patterns of
behavior, and they do not require codification. In fact, the expectation of sanction is not
a necessary condition for a social norm to exist. Note that, according to this definition, a
norm can exist but not be followed, since the preference is conditional. While this definition
is prima facie quite plausible, there are two major points in need of closer inspection.
First, it offers a rational reconstruction, which, according to Bicchieri (cf. 2005, p. 11f.)
implies that the beliefs and preferences mentioned in the definition are not necessarily
identifiable with beliefs and preferences within the agents. At a first glance, that is an
important concession to remain plausible, since Elster (1990) argued extensively that some
norms are not plausibly explained rationally, in particular certain norms of revenge.7
But this concession of course also raises the question what it actually is in any given
concrete case that explains the existence of a norm, and the motivation to follow it. This
is not a problem in principle, but it highlights an issue potentially concealed by a rational
reconstruction: there are likely numerous different explanations for various cases of social
7Note, that Elster himself concedes that some rational reconstruction will always be possible. But in
some cases, this reconstruction will not be explanatorily valuable.
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norms, and to offer an actual explanation, one has to specify what takes the place of the
rational implementation of preferences in the rational reconstruction.8
Second, the assumption that norms only govern phenomena that are faithfully repre-
sented by mixed-motive games is too restrictive. Gender-role norms, for example, are often
to be represented by asymmetric coordination games.9 A lot of norm-governed behavior
might also be better described by a decision under risk or uncertainty without a strategic
element, where the social component enters only through an additional norm requiring an
agent to punish.
This idea of a norm that requires an agent to sanction is not dissimilar to that of a
meta-norm (Axelrod, 1986) requiring agents to punish agents who fail to sanction norm vi-
olations, since it is logically independent of the actual norm.10 This implies the possibility
of a scenario where a social norm on non-interactive behavior is in place, but the punish-
ment norm, which would allow to interpret the whole as a mixed-motive game, does not
exist in the population. As an example, consider norms against masturbation in a world
where no one is expected to actually sanction it. One would have to construct a seriously
convoluted argument to represent the norm-governed situation as a strategic interaction.11
Elster (2000) avoids such problems by giving an account in terms of what is not a
social norm – i.e. legal norms, habits, moral norms – and providing paradigmatic norms
– social norms against cannibalism or incest – to offer positive guidance of what is to be
understood by the talk of social norms. Where does that leave the modeler, intending
to explain the emergence of a particular kind of norm? While there is no convincing
philosophical definition stating the necessary and sufficient conditions available, one can
build on Bicchieri’s account by relaxing the problematic components and adding the caveat
that it might not offer a perfect demarcation criterion for the class of phenomena accurately
referred to as social norms.
Therefore, for the purpose of our analysis, a social norm is a behavioral rule R for
situations of type S, for which the second condition in Bicchieri’s definition is fulfilled. In
addition, this rule can allow for some “slack”: Even if a situation is classified as an instance
of S, there can be room to behave slightly deviant without violating the norm. This is a
useful clarification for cases of fuzzy norms.
For example, norms of fairness often do not exactly specify what a fair split is, as
experiments based on the ultimatum game suggest (cf. (Roth et al., 1991)). This fuzziness
is likely a tribute to the limitations of human norm-followers, both with respect to their
epistemic powers and their ability to control their actions.
8In this essay, I will actually follow the suggestions towards the end of Elster (2000) and rely on
motivation by conformism; however, this is probably not universally adequate, and can also be dissected
more closely into conformity due to factors like fear of sanction, striving for status or simple habituation.
9It is also not apparent how role-differentiated norms in general are to be stated in this terminological
framework, but I will assume for the sake of argument that it is in principle possible.
10Note that Axelrod’s definition of a social norm differs significantly, since it only refers to the frequency
of norm-following and punishment. While punishment is not necessary according to the definition employed
here, behavioral patterns are not sufficient.
11It might not be impossible to do so, but importantly, it would not be a faithful model of the type of
situation.
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A final remark on this notion of a social norm: it may, for any practical case, be difficult
to establish the existence of a social norm, since it is impossible to spell out the meaning
of “sufficiently large subpopulation” unambiguously. But ambiguity seems unavoidable,
since there is, analogous to the concept of a heap, no non-arbitrary amount of deviation
marking the applicability of the concept of a social norm. But for the purpose of explaining
clear-cut cases of unpopular norms, potentially contentious borderline cases do not pose a
problem. Hence the discussion can now turn to a formal model.
3.3 Model
The basic process of the model consists of agents entering a social network and choosing
their observable behavior from a range of options. They know the behavior of their neigh-
bors in the network and their own private preference, but neither the global distribution
of choices nor anyone else’s private preferences. The theoretical assumption behind this
model outline is the bounded rationality of the agents: they have limited information and
limited capability to make their decision, and therefore rely on a simple behavioral heuristic
to consider their preferences and the cues provided by a small number of other agents.
The model description therefore encompasses two major subprocesses: the decision rule
for the agents and the network growth algorithm determining the evolution of the social
structure.
3.3.1 Decision Under Social Influence
Every agent has two properties: their private preference, which is assigned on initialization,
and their chosen behavioral norm, which is visible to other agents. Which agents actually
perceive an agent’s norm choice is defined by the network structure. Since the model is
meant for relative pluralistic ignorance, the preference is chosen uniformly at random from
[1, . . . , 11]. This kind of scale is able to represent the commonly used Likert-scales from
research on pluralistic ignorance and unpopular norms. When an agent enters the network,
they have to choose a behavioral norm, again from [1, . . . , 11].
The goal of the choosing agent is to accord with the prevailing norm. Since the agents
themselves are part of the population at large, their own preferences have to figure in the
decision. The rationale behind this is that the agent tries to fulfill the social expectations
based on other agents’ preferences. They cannot access them directly, and therefore use
their behavior as a proxy. The only exception is the agent’s own preference, which is
assumed to be known.
This leads to the stipulation of the following utility scheme: For an agent i with the
preference pi ∈ [1, . . . , 11], the behavioral norm choice ci ∈ [1, . . . , 11] and the reference
population of agents N , the goal function to maximize is defined as
Gi(ci) = −
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|N |+ 1(wi(i)pi +
∑
j∈N
wi(j)cj)− ci
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (3.2)
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where wi(j) is a potentially time dependent function describing the weights assigned by
agent i to another agent j. This equation is very similar to the procedures proposed by
Lehrer and Wagner (2012) or Hegselmann and Krause (2002). Their models are targeted at
opinion dynamics, but at least the descriptive component of normative expectation can be
redescribed in terms of belief. The main structural difference to these models is separation
of a privately held preference and an observable choice. This differentiation is what allows
the representation of a failure to reveal the private component to coordinate efficiently.
Otherwise, the process can be understood as a special case of belief formation under social
influence.
Within the model, some constraints on Equation 3.2 are necessary. First of all, it will
be assumed that all the weights are equal, representing that the agents have no reason to
give a particular agent more weight. In an environment with actual power differentials,
this would be an invalid assumption, but in the model environment, it is a reasonable
idealization. Second, the agents’ information is limited to their network neighbors. This
constraint is in fact a crucial component of the model, and leads to the localized version
of conformism that agents are actually able to implement:
Gi(ci) = −
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1|Γi|+ 1(pi +
∑
j∈Γi
cj)− ci
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (3.3)
where Γi denotes the neighborhood of i. The problem with using this Equation as a
proxy for the actual payoff is the potential for admitting too much influence by extreme
positions; this is a simple property of the average, and since the average to be taken by
the agents would be only on a restricted amount of information, choosing on this basis
might exaggerate conformity effects. To avoid this problem, the actual behavioral rule is
determined from
Gi(ci) = −
∣∣∣∣∣ |pi − ci|+
∑
j∈Γi |cj − ci|
|Γi|+ 1
∣∣∣∣∣ (3.4)
which informally is the average distance instead of the distance from the average. A
further advantage from the point of view of bounded rationality is that this proxy utility is
maximized by the median which requires less arithmetic than computing a mean. Equation
3.4 defines the actual choice behavior of the agents under social influence.
Note that an agent without a reference group will always behave on the basis of their
private preference only. Thus, the decision rule is homogeneous across the population,
including an initial set of unconnected agents. This avoids the assumption made in BM
that trendsetters are psychologically special. Instead, the difference is explained by social
structure alone. Both pure explanations are likely incomplete, but since representing social
structure explicitly is one of the main motivations for the current model, the design focuses
on this aspect omitted in BM.
It is not necessary to imagine the decision as conscious, despite the talk of computation
and choice. The model is supposed to be instrumentally valid, but the choice procedure
can also be interpreted realistically in various fashions. Given the interpretation of ci as
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the choice of a behavioral pattern potentially sanctioned by a social norm, the decision
procedure can be interpreted in at least three different ways.
First, it can represent an agent’s anticipation of sanction for deviation. This anticipa-
tion creates an incentive to conform as closely to the perceived norm as possible, given the
agent’s limited information. Less rationalistic, the agent could also have a metapreference
to conform to its neighbors for the sake of coordination itself. Finally, the agent could
also assume that other agents are onto something, in the sense that their behavioral choice
might be more beneficial. This interpretation of course implies that an agent’s preferences
is not everything there is with respect to judging the efficiency of the established norm,
which is likely true for some subject matters, but shouldn’t generally be assumed and goes
strictly beyond the assumptions used here.
3.3.2 Network Growth
There are various different processes to construct networks with certain statistical proper-
ties. A problem with classical random graph models (Erdo¨s and Re´nyi, 1960) or small-world
networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) is that they are not designed to grow dynamically.
While it is possible to reformulate them in a way to address this issue, there is also an
elegant and empirically more plausible alternative in the preferential attachment model
(Baraba´si and Albert, 1999).
The preferential attachment algorithm starts with a small initial network of m0 nodes.
Additional nodes then become iteratively attached to the network by randomly generating
m edges with existing nodes. The new edges are not chosen uniformly at random, but the
probability depends on the current network structure. More precisely, the more network
links an old node i already has, the more likely it is that a new node will attach itself to
that node. Formally, the probability that a freshly created link includes i is defined as
pi =
ki∑
j kj
(3.5)
where ki denotes the degree of i. In the model of unpopular norm growth, this algorithm
is slightly modified by adding the constraint that there are never two links between two
agents. This constraint is added to retain the assumption of equal weight in the decision
rule. Besides its algorithmic simplicity, this procedure has several further advantages:
1. Its statistical properties are quite well understood. For example, Baraba´si and Albert
(1999) have shown that the degree distribution approaches
P (k) ∝ k−γ
with the parameter-dependent constant γ for large numbers of nodes.
2. It has been shown that the degree distribution generated by this model fits well with
empirical data on certain real-world social networks (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999;
Albert and Baraba´si, 2002).
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3. There exist useful generalizations of this model that make it possible to adapt the
growth algorithm to different applications with special requirements (Albert and
Baraba´si, 2002).
As the decision rule under social influence, the preferential attachment procedure lends
itself to various behavioral interpretations. One can just understand it instrumentally, but
an advantage of this model is the possibility to provide multiple realist interpretations.
The two most relevant interpretations for our purposes are a more rationalistic and a
psychological version.
From the perspective of rational choice, it can be an efficient heuristic to acquire infor-
mation to only inquire the choices of the most well-connected members of a network. The
assumption is that (a) creating links is costly and (b) well-connected nodes are statistically
more representative with respect to the relevant information. These assumptions are not
explicitly implemented in the overall model, but they justify preferential attachment as a
potentially efficient heuristic.
An alternative interpretation assumes that human agents tend to prefer to connect
to well-connected individuals. Being central in one’s social network often represents high
status, power or charisma, making it desirable to be socially connected to a highly con-
nected individual. For the purpose of modeling, it is sufficient to note that there are
multiple plausible interpretations of the behavioral rules employed. Any real-world system
following preferential attachment will likely include a mixture of social and psychological
mechanisms implementing preferential attachment without challenging the validity of the
model.
3.3.3 Simulation Algorithm
At this point, the parts of the model can be assembled: It is initialized with a set of
agents who decide on their behavior purely on the basis of their preferences. They become
connected afterward to make the probabilities for the preferential attachment algorithm
well-defined. Note again that agents are not heterogeneous with respect to their decision
functions, only using different information. After the initialization step, agents are succes-
sively attached to the network and make their decisions according to the information they
acquire from their initial neighborhood to create an overall distribution of norm choices.
The following pseudocode specifies the model’s behavior:
1. Initialize m0 agents’ preferences by drawing them uniformly at random out of
[1, . . . , 11], and choose the preference as the observable behavior.
2. Connect the initial set of agents.
3. Repeat:
(a) Create a new node i, with its preference pi chosen uniformly at random.
(b) Add i to the graph by preferential attachment.
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(c) Compute the median behavior choice in i’s neighborhood to determine ci.
A few remarks on the simulation model are appropriate before the analysis turns to
its surprisingly complex behavior. The variables that a simulation experiment can directly
intervene on are m0 and m, thereby to some extent controlling the quality and amount of
information available to the agents that enter the model later on. However, the stochastic
elements of the model are influential, requiring the simulator to run large numbers of
simulations to identify interesting cases; to a significant extent, the explanatory factors are
to be found in the early dynamics of a model run rather than in the model parameters.
Therefore, the analysis will start out with a number of single-run analyses to exhibit the
relevant qualitative behavior, followed by a thorough exploration of the parameter space
and the crucial factors leading to an unpopular norm.
The results in the following section are based on a Python implementation of the algo-
rithm above which can be accessed at https://www.openabm.org/model/5289/version/
1/view.
3.4 Results and Discussion
3.4.1 The Emergence of an Unpopular Norm
The first question to be answered is if an unpopular norm can actually emerge in the
model. The pattern that serves as a qualitative benchmark for an unpopular norm due to
pluralistic ignorance is provided by the alcohol consumption norms reported by Prentice
and Miller (1993): There should emerge an approximately normal distribution of behav-
ioral expectations and therefore choices from an approximately uniform distribution of
preferences, but with different means.
Figure 3.1 depicts the result of a simulation run exhibiting the described pattern. The
parameter configuration is m0 = 40, m = 10 and the simulation is run for approximately
103 timesteps, thereby increasing the population size to 1000 agents. The distribution
of behavioral choices has the form of a steep binomial distribution that has the normal
distribution as its limit. The steepness signifies a high degree of coordination and the
difference of 0.73 between the means of the two distributions represents the unpopularity
of the norm on which the population coordinated.
For a complete interpretation, let me reconsider the concept of a social norm that has
been assumed and match the components of the definition with the results. The possible
choices should be understood as various options for actions, available to become rules for
behavior. The conditional preference for norm-following is assumed in the agents’ decision
rule: they try to estimate a rule which factually has the most followers, and by their
decision rule they assume others to expect to follow and are therefore motivated to follow
the rule themselves, as expressed by their particular choice.
The final piece, and what is revealed by the simulation, is to show that there is a
sufficiently large part of the population sharing the same beliefs on actual followership and
expectation. The distribution of choices in Figure 3.1 exhibits this high degree of shared
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Figure 3.1: Simulation results depicting the difference between the distribution of choices
(upper figure) and preferences (lower). Note the difference in scale between the two distri-
butions.
belief, and thus clearly is not one of the potentially problematic borderline cases for the
assumed definition of a social norm. If, in addition, the norm is allowed to be slightly
fuzzy, the agents only off by one in the spectrum of potential options can even be counted
into the subpopulation of norm-followers, making the case for the emergence of a social
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norm even more clear-cut.
The results of a single run are useful to showcase the model’s behavior, but a more
detailed exploration of the distribution of outcomes is provided in Section 3.4.3. Before
the discussion turns to a more detailed analysis of the dynamics of unpopular norms and
the overall behavior of the model, a few remarks on the interpretation of this first result
are in place.
First, it is at this point easy to see how a binary choice imposed on the simulated
population could generate absolute pluralistic ignorance. Imagine that the scale of choices
and preferences represents a simple political spectrum from left to right. But whereas
political preference is diverse, the political system supports only two parties. Now assume
that everyone votes for the party that is closest not to his or her preference, but to their
behavioral expectation for the population, for example because the election is not secret.
Furthermore, assume that party A’s program exactly mirrors the mean of the preference
distribution (6), but party B is more radical and positions itself at 7.4. In this scenario,
the majority of agents would vote for B, therefore creating a choice that exhibits absolute
pluralistic ignorance. A more extreme case of pluralistic ignorance could lead to an even
more extreme situation, and is exacerbated by the assumption that everyone votes for the
closest party – an assumption that is not obviously true, but quite standard in voting
models (Black, 1948).
Second, the level of coordination achieved in the simulation is quite surprising. There
is no belief revision involved, and there is a steady inflow of conflicting private preferences.
The communication structure of the model seems to enable such a high degree of coordi-
nation with very small effort. This relationship between network structure and outcome
will be explored more closely in Section 3.4.3, but it is crucial to understand how a so-
cial process can become established that sometimes produces highly suboptimal results: It
does not deterministically produce inefficient outcomes, but oftentimes allows for successful
coordination using a minimum of both cognitive and communicative resources.
3.4.2 The Dynamics of Pluralistic Ignorance
One of the advantages of a simulation model that successively emulates a social process
is access to its dynamic features. These features can be compared to known empirical
properties of the process to increase the model’s credibility. The empirical finding referred
to is the lag of change in norm perception and adaption behind changes of the distribution
of preferences.
The model has no mechanism for change in attitudes or preferences, but the actual
distribution of preferences approaches the distribution defined by the underlying generative
procedure over time, due to the growth of the network. Likewise, the distribution of norm
expectations evolves dynamically with the addition of new agents. If pluralistic ignorance
occurs in the model and potentially leads to an unpopular norm, a lag as described by
Shamir and Shamir (1997) and Ge¨rxhani and Bruggeman (2015) should be observable.
This is indeed the case, as Figure 3.2 shows.
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Figure 3.2: Example dynamic evolution of an unpopular norm generated with the simula-
tion model.
The evolution exhibits the characteristic lag of the perceived norm behind the prefer-
ences. The mean of preferences over time approaches the mean of the underlying uniform
distribution.12 The perceived norm, however, lags behind this development and gets stuck
on a suboptimal option. After a highly volatile initial phase, the lag becomes visible:
The mean of the actual preferences starts to drop (modulo random variation) towards the
underlying distribution’s mean. At this point, the average of choices also starts to drop,
but way slower, remaining at a significantly higher value for the rest of the observed time
interval, while steadily decreasing in the direction of the preference distribution’s mean.
This fits observations reported by longitudinal empirical research. In the example of
the political climate in Israel, private preferences evolved towards what became the actual
election results and came fairly close, while the perceived political climate did not change
significantly until the election results became public. Since such an external event does
not occur in the model system, it reproduces the process until the election, where the
preference distribution changes without an appropriate change in the perception of the
situation.
12The mean of realized preferences actually drops below the theoretically underlying mean in this par-
ticular case, as a result of variation in the underlying pseudo-random number generation process. Note,
that the deviation is actually very small (< 0.1), which is not an unlikely deviation from the actual mean
for a medium-sized sample.
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The source of this time lag in the model is the combination of conformism with a lack of
belief revision. As Ge¨rxhani and Bruggeman (2015) argue, belief revision in the real world
is delayed by uncertainty. This is very much in line with both the observation by Shamir &
Shamir and the simulation outcomes, and gives an overall justification of the assumption
that there is no belief revision on the simulation’s time scale. The process starts out with
a non-representative initial agent population with respect to their preferences.
They form a norm that fits their distribution of preferences. Agents entering the group
later on adapt to their norm due to social influence. Then, over time, the preference
distribution approaches the underlying uniform distribution. Notably, the distribution
of norm expectation evolves in the general direction of the preference distribution but is
inhibited by the implicit conservatism of the underlying mechanism and the informational
restrictions imposed on the agents.
The model is also able to reproduce other scenarios than the emergence of unpopular
norms. Two instances of convergence of the norm to the underlying preference distribution
are depicted in Figure 3.3. It is interesting to note the differences between these scenarios.
In the run depicted in the upper graph, an initial misrepresentation of the population-wide
preference distribution creates a deviation of the behavioral expectation, and therefore a
suboptimal norm.
However, the mean of the instantiated preferences then drops sharply, and pulls the
norm towards the mean of the underlying preference distribution. Thus, in this case, the
shift from one misrepresentation to the other allow the mean of normative expectations to
converge comparatively quickly to the population-wide mean of preferences. It is important
to note that the deviation started out relatively small, making the initial situation of
ignorance easier to overcome.
More surprising is the case depicted in the lower graph of Figure 3.3, where the conver-
gence of the mean of preferences to that of the underlying distribution lags behind the norm
as the mean of norm expectations is approaching the underlying preference mean. This can
be understood as inverse pluralistic ignorance, since the initial nodes of the network are
more representative of the underlying distribution of preferences than the subpopulation
that exists after a few dozen time steps.
This suggests the possible normative result that the social process described by the
model is not in and for itself collectively irrational as it might appear. For some configura-
tions, the results are maybe even surprisingly close to the stipulated optimum, in particular
given the uncertainty. The discussion will return to this normative aspect in Section 3.4.5.
The capability of the model to generate a variety of phenomena surrounding social
norms very different from unpopular norms of course raises the question under which con-
ditions the process runs into a problematic, since unpopular, norm and when it generates
a reasonable or even favorable outcome given the assumed preference distribution. To ad-
dress this issue, it has to be investigated which variables within the simulation model can
explain pluralistic ignorance and thereby the evolution of an unpopular norm.
This task will be undertaken in Section 3.4.3, but the candidate hypothesis that will be
tested there could be stated the following way: Given an initial population not representa-
tive of the underlying preference distribution and a network evolution that facilitates the
50 3. The Evolution of Unpopular Norms
influence of these initial nodes providing misleading cues, an unpopular norm emerges.13
Besides testing this hypothesis, the sensitivity analysis has to explore the impact of varia-
tion in the parameters m and m0, which control the network growth algorithm.
A side remark on the stochasticity of the model and potential correlations in the target
system: Random elements of the model are not necessarily related to actual random,
unknown or unpredictable factors. For example, there might be patterns relating political
radicalism and influence, positive or negative. The model’s randomness is meant to allow
a variety of different social settings, generating quite different patterns and exploring their
consequences.
3.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The Importance of Network Structure
A first important question is how relevant the network structure is for the model’s behavior.
The preferential attachment mechanism creates networks with a relatively small number
of highly connected nodes, so-called hubs, while most agents have a degree close to the
minimum set by m. While the model configuration only provides an approximation of the
limit degree distribution for relatively small k, it already assures the general pattern of a
small number of hubs and a large number of peripheral nodes.
Up to this point, it has been tacitly assumed that the informational constraints posed
by this network structure are vital to the model’s behavior. The assumption can be oper-
ationalized for testing by the following hypothesis:
HNetwork The perceived norm in a given network is positively correlated with the prefer-
ences of a small number of hub nodes.
The rationale behind this hypothesis is that most agents make their judgment on the
basis of perceiving mostly hub nodes. They do not only perceive hub nodes – at least they
perceive themselves – but hub nodes’ preferences are overrepresented. Figure 3.4 depicts
the relationship between the average population norm and the preferences of the top 5%
of agents with regard to their degree in the network.
A simple linear regression for the influence of the hubs’ preferences gives us approx-
imately a slope 0.8 with an r-squared of 0.52 and standard error statistics of 0.05, with
p ≈ 5.5e−33. Hence, the average preference of the network’s hubs provides a good predic-
tor of the resulting population-level norm. To better frame this result, a second regression
relating the average population preference to the average norm can be fitted.
The plot exhibits a large amount of variance, with the following regression statistics:
The slope of the regression line is 2.1, with a value of 0.08 for r-squared and a standard
13Note that the model has a built-in self-correction mechanism, since for finite m and m0, new agents
entering the system will always assign some weight to themselves and therefore new information on the
true underlying distribution of preferences keeps entering the process, leading to a correction in the long
run, notwithstanding the potential for a strongly mistaken norm at intermediate timesteps. The model
itself is always evaluated with respect to short to medium term results, since those are of more significance
to the intended target system of groups forming social norms.
3.4 Results and Discussion 51
Figure 3.3: Two cases of approximately successful convergence to the optimal norm defined
as the mean of the underlying preference distribution.
error of 0.52. Comparing these two statistical models confirms the assumed importance
of central nodes for the resulting norm in a given simulation run. The actual preference
distribution’s influence is strongly perturbed, making it effectively useless to explain the
variation.
To summarize, well-positioned nodes are crucial to the evolution of norms in a world of
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Figure 3.4: Average hub (top 5% degree nodes) preference vs. average population norm and
average population preference vs. average population norm, together with the regression
lines.
restricted information and a need for adapting behavior to perceived norm expectations.
With respect to real-world phenomena, network hubs can be interpreted differently to
account for different application domains. For example, in the analysis of the political
climate in Israel, Shamir & Shamir point to the important role of the incumbent government
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with its superior ability to communicate a certain opinion as the norm.
Switching contexts, while Prentice and Miller (1993) do not give this explanation ex-
plicitly, they mention the influence of fraternities on the perception of students. Again,
an established institution allows its leading members to overrepresent a certain behavioral
norm to the overall population. In the case of fraternities on a campus, they might also
have additional influence on the perception of students in the general public, creating an
additional indirect effect on prospective students’ expectation and perception of campus
norms. The discussion shall return to this issue when exploring the effect of explicitly
modeled central influence.
However, even without the assumption of institutionalized influence, the case of a college
campus can be framed in the model’s terms to understand the application of preferential
attachment in a practical example: When a new batch of freshmen enter the school, they
have approximately no social ties. When entering the social network at the campus, it
makes sense for them to orient towards the most visible senior students, since those already
know the social rules in place, which the freshmen have an interest in learning.
In the real world, many links are probably formed simultaneously, and the probability to
connect to fellow freshmen is higher than assumed in the preferential attachment model.
Nevertheless, a process of continuous addition of nodes to the social network with the
probability of new links skewed towards the incumbent population is a reasonable model
of our stylized description.
Parameter Space Exploration
What remains to be analyzed is the model’s behavior across a fine-grained variation of the
parameters. Especially the potential interplay of m and m0 has to be taken into account.
These parameters control network growth, and therefore the available information. Larger
m improves the access of new agents to the existing network, while m0 controls the likeli-
hood that the initial population is representative. The larger the initial sample, the more
likely it is representative of the generating distribution.
Figure 3.5 depicts an exploration of a larger part of the parameter space. The param-
eters m and m0 are varied between 1 and 2 respectively to 50. The upper graphic shows
the maximum difference between the mean norm and the mean preference over 5 runs, the
lower one depicts the average of that difference. This difference provides a rough measure
of the failure to identify the optimal norm in a given simulation run.
Descriptively, there are two main features shown in the graphics: The lowest values of
pluralistic ignorance, signified by the lighter blue, are concentrated in the domain of low
m and large m0. There is a strong increase (signified by orange and red) towards smaller
m0, and a smaller, but clear increase when both m and m0 grow larger. It is also relevant
to observe that cases of stronger pluralistic ignorance are scattered within areas of weaker
ignorance, pointing to the volatility of the underlying process.
To interpret these observations, I shall start by noting that pluralistic ignorance occurs
consistently over a wide variety of parameter configurations. While being mostly a negative
result, it is important to show the robustness of the process to justify the use of single run
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Figure 3.5: Parameter space exploration of m and m0. The top figure shows the maximum
difference between the mean norm and mean preference at the end of the run over 5
simulations, the bottom figure shows the corresponding averages. The dark blue squares
represent impossible parameter configurations.
analysis. But still, the extent of ignorance and its variability differ across the parameter
space.
Configurations with very small m are less prone to pluralistic ignorance, but the most
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extreme scenarios seem to appear more often for relatively small values of both parameters.
It appears prima facie counterintuitive that smaller m improve the performance when m0
is large, since larger values of m imply more information for the agent. But in the case of
a small initial population that is misrepresentative of the actual preference distribution, a
large degree parameter just reduces the weight of the preferences of new agents compared
to the incumbent population, thereby cementing the unrepresentative distribution of the
first m0 agents.
This pattern can be explained more directly from the decision rule, since larger m
automatically reduce the weight agents assign to themselves and increase the relative im-
portance of the current agent population. There are three important takeaways from the
sensitivity analysis for the general validity of the model:
1. Pluralistic ignorance occurs under a variety of different structural conditions imposed
on the network. This justifies the generalization from the behavior under a specific
parameter configuration to the properties of the simulation model more generally.
2. It shows that the skewed degree distribution maintains pluralistic ignorance when
connectivity is increased. This complements the above experiment on the relevance
of hubs: Since the number of hubs remains approximately stable due to the scale-
free character of the degree distribution, the influence of hubs is sustained even in
scenarios with a larger total number of sources of information.
3. The whole process is overall fairly volatile relative to the network structure. This also
implies that to potentially evaluate the risk of the emergence of an unpopular norm,
a researcher would have to know not only the network structure and the distribution
of preferences, but also how preferences map onto the structurally important nodes
in the network.
3.4.4 Central Information
The influence of centralized agencies like government-controlled or otherwise centralized
media seems to have an important impact on the emergence and sustenance of a state
of pluralistic ignorance and, in turn, unpopular norms. Other examples where a central
agent or agency is able to communicate a behavioral norm to a whole population are
centralized churches and media empires holding a quasi-monopoly on a certain widely
consumed medium.
In our basic model, this kind of influence does not exist. It is decentralized, and
the initial nodes, which are most likely to become important hubs in the network, are
independent in their preferences. This is once again similar to many models of opinion
formation (as the basic version of the Hegselmann-Krause-model, see Hegselmann and
Krause (2002)), but in either case an unrealistic assumption. In particular, there exist
extensions to the Hegselmann-Krause-model of opinion formation to include various central
sources of information (Hegselmann and Krause, 2006, 2015).
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Therefore it is an important step to amend the model to represent central influences,
which can be achieved by adding a single node to the network which is visible to everyone
from the beginning on. Figure 3.6 shows the outcomes of simulation runs, again with
m = 10 and m0 = 40, one with a central influence I = 6.0, which is identical to the
mean of the distribution from which agents’ preferences are drawn, and a second one with
I = 8.0, representing a perturbing central influence.
These outcomes can also be compared to the case without any central influence shown
in figure 3.4. The resulting norms are significantly more clustered around the mean of
the preference distribution in the case of representative central information, as one would
expect. In the case of a misleading central agent, again unsurprisingly, the perceived norm
shifts towards this agent’s behavior. In addition, choices are clustered around integer values
due to the agents’ adherence to the median perceived norm that is necessarily discrete on
an integer scale.
It is interesting to note that these effects are pronounced despite the fact that the
central information is only 1 in 11 neighbors in the given configuration. This explains the
variation in the outcomes, but it also confirms the immense influence of a central agent in
a scale-free network.
An interesting feature of this model of centralized sources of information is that it
also generates an indirect effect. When a new agent is added to the network and gathers
information about the current norm, it is directly influenced by the central media node.
But there is also an indirect effect, since all the neighbors it retrieves information from
have been influenced by the central agency before. Therefore, the cumulative effect of
such an agency goes beyond giving information, it also creates a certain informational
background across the agent population it influences. In this manner, centralized agencies
can be highly influential in creating a certain political, social or cultural climate, without
even being perceived as a more important source of information than normal agents close
in the social network.
3.4.5 A Normative Perspective
Up to this point, the normative assumptions making an unpopular norm collectively irra-
tional were largely implicit, since the analysis focused on the genesis of norms that happen
to be unpopular. But evaluative statements are clearly pervasive in the analysis of unpopu-
lar norms. By definition they are norms that are not in the interest of the majority of their
subjects – a point that is also mostly implicitly present in the empirical literature. The
selection of examples includes norms of corruption, alcohol abuse and racial segregation,
which are often not only detrimental to their subjects but also considered social problems
externally. In some cases, they might even be considered ethical problems. The model
and the arguments based on its behavior are, however, open for the application of various
normative standards.
First of all, it is necessary to clarify what the agents’ actual underlying preferences
are, and what is part of their strategy. Agents prefer to behave according to their built-in
ordering of options: an agent who favors option 5 on the model’s scale would prefer 5 to
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Figure 3.6: Results of 100 simulation runs with either representative influence (top) or
misrepresenting influence (bottom). The straight line shows the mean of the theoretical
preference distribution.
everything, 4 and 6 to anything but 5 and be indifferent between 4 and 6, and so on.
In addition, a social component has been assumed: a good outcome, under this assump-
tion, will always engender a high degree of coordination. This factor can be understood as
part of the agentic preference structure, too.
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For example, a member of an emerging political movement might have a very specific
preference on the subject matter, but he or she also has an interest to be part of a demo-
cratic majority to realize something as close as possible to his or her interest. Equation 3.2
can actually be reinterpreted as a definition of an agent’s payoff, since it takes into account
the degree of coordination as well as individual preference. The weights can express the
different importance of coordination with different people – for example, coordinating with
your co-workers or family seems very valuable, while being aligned with all the distant
members of your political community seems less important. For the current discussion,
the assumption is ∀i∀jwi(j) = wj(i).
The last implicit assumptions concerns the features of the utility functions resulting
from the above preferences. First, it is assumed that the distance from coordination figures
proportionately. This assumption can easily be relaxed to construct alternative normative
standards. Quadratic distance measures are a natural candidate, since they put more
weight on extreme deviations. In a population with a uniform preference distribution, this
change would not be particularly relevant. But if there is a substantial minority on one
extreme of the spectrum without a counterpart on the other end, quadratic measures would
favor different points of coordinations.
Second and less innocuous is the implicit assumptions that one can simply weigh all
agents equally in judging the norm. In Section 3.1, the argument relies on simply counting
the agents who landed on a certain choice. But if the collective rationality of the social
norm is to be judged purely on its maximization of its subjects’ utilities, intercomparability
is notoriously problematic.14
But normative standards not requiring intercomparisons are also often unsatisfactory.
Pareto-efficiency provides a standard example. An outcome is considered Pareto-efficient
if at least one agent strictly prefers it to its alternatives. Given the assumptions on the
preference structure, that would make any spot on the spectrum of choices Pareto-efficient
if it is occupied by at least one agent. Under this standard, actually collectively irrational
social norms were practically impossible.
Also, social norms could be considered collectively irrational not directly because of
the preferences of its immediate subjects, because their preference structure might itself
be an unfortunate consequence of their irrational social norms. Such group-level adaptive
preferences 15 may be considered irrational by the surrounding larger community or an
impartial observer, but that judgment could not be passed purely on the actual preferences
of the agents in question.
To summarize, there are strong, but not universally compelling reasons to apply a
standard similar to the one assumed in my discussion on unpopular norms. Constructing
the standard from preferences, assuming intercomparability and valuing coordination are
valid across a significant number of applications – I believe that they are reasonable for all
the examples discussed in this chapter – but I concede that there are likely extreme cases
of unpopular norms, such as foot binding in the traditional Chinese culture (Willer et al.,
14For a discussion, see Sen (1986).
15See Nussbaum (1997) for an introduction to adaptive preferences.
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2009), where different normative standards need to be considered.
3.5 Challenges and Model Limitations
While the suggested model meets all the benchmarks set in the introductory section and
thereby provides a valid theoretical model of the evolution of unpopular norms under
pluralistic ignorance, there are some important challenges and limitations to the model
that ought to be mentioned. They fall in three broad classes:
1. Idealizations that lay bare the dynamics of a single social process, isolated from the
various influences interfering with it in the real world
2. Simplifying assumptions that enable the computational analysis of the model
3. Domain restrictions
Important instances of the first kind of idealizations are the lack of belief revision, the
exclusion of external events, and the backward-looking, i.e. non-strategic behavior of the
agents. It is possible to relax all these assumptions – in fact, it would be highly interesting
– but adding these factors would create a new model of multiply intertwined processes.
Such extensions could easily be added to the model, as the exploration of central sources
of information has shown, but they go beyond what the current investigation set out to
achieve. In particular, if one wants to extend the model to arbitrary time scales, it becomes
crucial to include factors like belief revision and external events. Insofar, these idealizations
can also be understood as domain restrictions.
Besides explaining the phenomenon by the most simple fundamental process sufficient,
there are additional reasons to adopt these constraints. The effects of belief revision, for
example, seem to depend heavily on the particulars of sequencing. How often and when
belief revision would take place would be crucial to its effects on the process. Note that this
kind of idealization is also responsible for the impossibility of quantitative fitting of data.
To account for real-world data, it is usually necessary to include not only a multiplicity
of processes, but also to include a number of theoretically meaningless parameters for
calibration. The model is not supposed to be used in such a research agenda; its main
purpose is to provide a formalization of social theory to allow for the exploration of its
implications.
The second kind of limiting modeling assumption, on the other hand, could be relaxed
not by fundamentally changing the model, but by gradually varying certain factors. In the
decision procedure, the main assumptions concern the choice set and the weighing of other
agents. With respect to the choice set, it has been assumed that it does not make a relevant
difference to have an 11-point scale to having a 7-point scale. While this seems plausible,
it has not yet been explicitly shown. Varying the weights of various agents is a more
intricate problem, since there are infinitely many options to model differential weighing.
Agents could weigh themselves disproportionately, they could emphasize the importance
of well-connected nodes in their neighborhood, or intentionally de-emphasize them.
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For the network structure, a very basic version of preferential attachment has been
chosen. But there are many alternatives to growing an artificial social network. As the
analysis of hub influence has shown, the model’s behavior depends on the stratification
of the network into hubs and peripheral nodes, but there are alternative algorithms to
generate such networks that have not yet been tested.
The results of the analysis of preferential attachment allow speculations that can be
tested by future research. The most common alternatives would be random graphs and
small-world networks, as mentioned above. The prediction for a Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (1960)-
network is straightforward: The binomial degree distribution implies that hubs with high
degree are less likely than in the scale-free preferential attachment network. Therefore,
pluralistic ignorance becomes less likely.
The case of a small-world network is more complicated. Informally, if the network
evolution starts from what will become the bridging agents, these agents would be more
influential then a random agent from within a cluster. The effect should be smaller than in
the case of preferential attachment, since most of the additional influence of the bridging
agents is indirect, and therefore fairly weak under the assumption of equal weights. Given
no alternative assumption on weights, pluralistic ignorance seems once again improbable.
The degree distribution of a small-world network falls between that of a ring lattice and
the aforementioned random graph depending on the parametrization, and both assign low
probabilities to large degrees – as compared to the scale-free distribution generated by
preferential attachment. A more interesting perspective on a small-world based model
might be to compare the within-cluster distributions of behavioral expectation with the
global preference distribution.
Finally, the restricted domain is not so much a limitation, but rather a necessity of
scientific modeling. The model imposes two major constraints on the class of potential
target systems: First, the model has to behave approximately as described by preferential
attachment. To even judge this, it has to be assumed that the network grows sufficiently
large: Small kinship groups, for example, are certainly out of scope. The empirical lit-
erature on preferential attachment has found fitting power law distributions in scientific
collaboration and citation networks as well as the collaboration network of movie actors
(Jeong et al., 2003). Furthermore, the World Wide Web (Donato et al., 2004) and the
link structure of Twitter (Java et al., 2007) have been found to follow power laws in their
degree distribution.
There possibly is some selection bias in the tested examples, since these are all networks
on which data is comparatively easy to obtain. Keeping this in mind as a caveat, one
can tentatively generalize: where agents are able to choose links without strict spatial or
formal limitations and linking oneself to well-connected nodes appears advantageous in
some sense, the network structure arising from preferential attachment seems to be an
empirically adequate model. Note that a network evolution following the rules of a formal
hierarchy will often generate a highly skewed degree distribution, too, if it is assumed
that links represent the perception of behavior and are usually not bidirectional. Thus,
there might be a broader class of applications, but for the discussion in this essay, the
applicability of preferential attachment limits the model domain.
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Second, as mentioned before, the target system’s time scale shouldn’t render it absurd
to exclude external events or belief revision. For example, if there is a major election, a
media campaign, or intense public discourse, the model may only be applied to the process
before that event. In general, the model fits best when a relatively decentralized process of
opinion formation about behavioral expectations takes place over time, with more and more
agents entering the system.16 Norm formation within some growing grass-roots political
movements or the workplace population in an expanding company can provide examples for
processes operating in accordance with these constraints. Note that application is meant
in a qualitative sense, not a quantitative analysis or prediction.
3.6 Conclusions
3.6.1 Summary
It has been shown that the evolution of an unpopular norm via pluralistic ignorance can be
modeled by the combination of agents deciding under social influence given the informa-
tional restrictions of a social network. Relative pluralistic ignorance, denoting a deviation
of the overall perceived distribution of norm expectations from the population’s actual
preferences, emerges in the model under various parameter configurations. Furthermore,
the model turns out to be more general, as it also allows for the emergence of efficient
norms in a population of conformist, boundedly rational agents.
The driving force is the influence of hubs in the network, which can be either misrep-
resenting the actual distribution, representing it correctly for the subpopulation at a given
point in time, or even be representative of the underlying distribution of preferences for the
whole population when the current subpopulation is still way off the unfolding preference
distribution. These phenomena lend themselves to interpretations as hubs being a reac-
tionary or avantgardist elite – with elite defined in purely relational terms. The statistical
analysis of the relation between hub preferences and the resulting population-wide norm
supports this interpretation.
As further exploration has shown, pluralistic ignorance can arise in networks of varying
structural parameters. It occurs most pronounced in configurations where information is
particularly sparse and non-representative. More representative information, however, can
be provided by central agencies in a minimally intrusive way. At the same time, such a
powerful central influence can also perturb the evolution of a norm in a detrimental way,
according to the standard provided by the population-wide preference distribution. This
analysis connects the decentralized model to those case studies that feature central influence
at crucial points. Especially in political contexts, central agencies are pervasive. But also
for small, naturally decentralized groups, establishing a central information instance can
16Agents entering the network can in some cases be taken literally, as in the example of a school
or university. But in many cases, it simply represents the sequential choice of agents who are already
connected; then, the creation of links represents not links in the social networks but a relation of having
observed someone else’s choice.
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be utilized as an intervention.
These leads back to the normative question. The overall process of norm formation
described by the model enables coordination on a social norm beneficial under a variety of
assumed goal structures. The main shortcomings of the process as it stands is the lack of
a secondary process monitoring the quality of the outcomes and triggering interventions
when necessary, and moderately benevolent conditions of communication. However, the
process fails as a collectively rational procedure of norm formation when information is
too sparse or the impact of a subset of agents is overwhelming. This relates the collective
rationality of the process to the distribution of environment configurations to be assumed.
3.6.2 Future Directions
There are some natural extensions to the model that are to be explored in future research.
Mechanisms of belief revision, the inclusion of external events or a more extensive study of
the robustness of the results under varying network topologies are all valuable options to
increase the theoretical understanding of unpopular norms and social influence mechanisms
more generally. Another interesting route to consider is a hybrid approach that combines
the mechanism of social influence with a more strategic behavioral model. This kind of
hybridization is also one of the current problems for formal models of opinion formation
(Ma¨s, 2015), which are closely related to the dynamics of norm expectation and behavior.17
This issue can be understood as an instance of the more general problem to combine
strategic, forward-looking behavior with backward-looking adaptive behavior in agent-
based modeling and simulation.
Besides improving the descriptive accuracy and the explanatory power of the model,
future research should explore normative consequences of the model under a wider variety of
possible evaluative standards. There is an apparent tension between the abstract character
of stylized agent-based models and the need to devise concrete, quantifiable interventions
to ensure collective rationality.
But in that respect, model-based arguments are very similar to ones based on informal
theoretical accounts. In their discussion of availability cascades, a related phenomenon of
apparent collective irrationality, Kuran and Sunstein (1999) make no actual quantitative
claim. Based on an empirically supported theory of individual behavior, they develop a the-
oretical account and suggest concrete interventions – without providing any quantification
of the effects.
Both approaches fit into the general argument scheme for collective rationality. How-
ever, formal models provide a more transparent way to express theory and draw conclu-
sions. As long as we are interested in counterfactual scenarios to solve social problems as
they are represented by unpopular norms, agent-based computer simulations provide an
important tool not only for explanation and description, but also to develop interventions
and support normative arguments.
17Chapter 4 suggests an approach to the problem in the context of belief aggregation.
Chapter 4
Strategic Belief Formation1
4.1 Introduction
Whereas the previous chapter focused on a generic mechanism to coordinate collective
behavior – social norms – I shall now turn to a different range of problems: in a group
pursuing epistemic ends, potentially besides a variety of other motivations, how can in-
formation be effectively aggregated by a decentralized process implemented by boundedly
rational agents? This description already gives a sketch of the decision environment for
the arguments to come. Agents have limited access to information from the world, and
are therefore confronted with the problem of incorporating information provided by their
fellow agents, but without immediate access to their full information about the world.
As a consequence, agents can engage in the strategic presentation and transmission of
their state of belief. Even if agents are not themselves motivated to influence others, they
might be forced to take precautions against strategic manipulation. These are, in a rough
sketch, the outlines of the social process under scrutiny.
With respect to evaluative standards, I argue that while accuracy is of crucial impor-
tance for paradigmatic epistemic communities such as science and truly valued by scientists,
other ends may figure in an evaluation of collective rationality. Even more importantly,
accuracy as an individual-level epistemic norm fails to translate to a unique norm of col-
lective belief evaluation. To exemplify the problems involved and ensure the relevance of
the discussion, science in its current form provides the domain of real-world targets for my
models and the arguments constructed about them.
Science is a social epistemic enterprise. The increasing scope and complexity of both
scientific theories and methodologies requires division of labor (Kitcher, 1990) both verti-
cally, spanning the range from theorists to experimentalists and the engineers constructing
the necessary machinery, and horizontally, by tackling the same problem with a variety of
approaches. This cognitive division of labor creates an ever increasing need to incorporate
socially available results from other researchers.
Agents finding themselves in this condition face the question of how to aggregate avail-
1The content of this chapter is in part published in Merdes (2018)
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able information and how to transmit their results, given that everyone in the scientific
community of their field finds themselves in the same predicament. As suggested by this
description, this epistemic condition creates, among a variety of other problems, the pos-
sibility of strategic behavior (Strevens, 2003). More precisely, it can incentivize a strategic
presentation of one’s own beliefs about significant scientific hypothesis, given a limited
amount of directly accessible data, the potential for others to incorporate one’s expressed
beliefs, and a diverse set of motivations.
Consider the following stylized, but not implausible scenario: Imagine a collection
of scientists, all working on the question whether a particular psychiatric treatment is
significantly superior to the null treatment. Furthermore, assume that some of the agents
involved are invested in psychodynamical approaches to therapy, while others are otherwise
proponents of behavioristic treatments. Some agents are solely motivated by their desire
to uncover the truth, others would like to further their career by appearing – and maybe
being – particularly original. Again others deem all of their colleagues highly reliable, while
others have their reservations.
All being psychologists, they also not only know that there are both rational grounds
and a psychological tendency for human agents to be socially influenced in their beliefs,
but they are also aware that such agents have the capacity to engage in strategic behavior:
they will – within their capabilities – anticipate the reactions of their fellow epistemic
agents and act to further their ends in the light of this behavioral insight.
One possible consequence is the exaggeration of the relevance of one’s observational
results by employing methods such as p-hacking. Not all ways of emphasizing one feature
of one’s results over another are, at least prima facie, epistemically vicious in the same way.
But they all hold the potential to mislead other researchers, and give rational grounds to
discount socially available information.
A few examples from scientific practice highlight the relevance of the topic, as well as
the difficulty to unequivocally assess potentially strategic behavior. Publication bias, i.e.
the tendency to only publish statistically significant results (Auspurg et al., 2014), provides
a useful working example; here, the editor, in anticipation of the reception by the scientific
community, creates an incentive structure that motivates scientists to selectively publish
their results or even compromise their data analysis.2
A less benign example are the case studies of industry-funded biased pseudo-research
analyzed by Oreskes and Conway (2011). In their case studies, a subset of scientists are
motivated in their research entirely independent of the epistemic values internal to the
scientific community. Such cases emphasize the need for robust strategies to incorporate
socially available information, since it is in practice difficult to simply identify biased agents
and to dismiss them entirely.3
The goal of this chapter is to construct a model of the problem of decentralized ag-
gregation with varying motivations across agents, and to employ that model to support
2Gigerenzer (2015) argue that a subset of research on human rationality provides another example of,
at least allegedly, selective reception and reporting of results.
3For a formal analysis of the impact of biased agents in epistemic networks, cf. Holman and Bruner
(2015).
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the following consequence of the social epistemic agent’s predicament: there is a trade-off
between behavioral strategies which lead to epistemically optimal social outcomes under
benevolent circumstances and strategies more robust to variation in the group’s motiva-
tional structure and communication patterns. Furthermore, an ecological analysis using
techniques from evolutionary game theory suggests that under a wide variety of circum-
stances, accuracy-rewarding institutions can diminish strategic exaggeration. However,
mixed reward schemes, which are often inevitable in science, leave substantial space for
manipulative communication within the epistemic community.4
The chapter proceeds in the following way: In Section 4.2, an agent-based model for
motivated exchange of beliefs is constructed. Section 4.3 explores the dynamics of the
model and provides support for the trade-off between accuracy and robustness. The anal-
ysis is extended to an evolutionary approach in Section 4.3.3, and the case study of science
is complemented with a brief sketch of an application to legal epistemology in Section 4.4.
Section 4.5 discusses some of the important challenges to the suggested model. Section 4.6
provides a summary of results and an outlook for future extensions and applications of the
model.
4.2 Deliberation Game
4.2.1 Iterated Opinion Expression
Science constitutes the paradigm of collective epistemic enterprises. From a comprehensive
point of view, scientific research is not a uniform process, but consists of a variety of
activities, such as experimentation, literature review, direct discussion as on a conference
or workshop, indirect disputes via publications and so on. Any complete model of the
scientific enterprise therefore would need to be extraordinarily complicated. Instead, social
epistemologists focus their modeling efforts on specific features pertinent to one particular
mechanism or process in the target system. In the following inquiry, the process under
scrutiny is the potentially strategic exchange of expert opinion on a specific hypothesis of
interest.
The process of collective opinion formation is reduced to two subprocesses: data col-
lection and repeated opinion expression. Initially, every agent receives a noisy signal bi,
drawn from a beta distribution centered on the true value µ.5 Depending on the discipline
at hand, an agent can be interpreted as either a single person, a small research team, or
an entire lab. The signal represents either the probability that some hypothesis H is true,
or the true value of a variable of interest; either interpretation is consistent.
After the data collection phase, agents are allowed to express their belief. There are
multiple ways to model the initial expression si(0). One could allow the agents to reveal
4For alternative, but related models of strategic behavior in opinion dynamics, cf. Hegselmann et al.
(nd) and Eger (2016).
5Any other non-degenerate probability distribution will serve the same purpose; the beta distribution
has simply been chosen for technical reasons.
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their signal or at least do so with some additional noise due to the imperfections of human
communication. Instead, some of the agents might be perceived as starting off from an
entirely random position, based on previous imprecise predictions or as an expression of
external motives . Complete randomness is of course an idealization, but it constitutes a
useful limiting case.
After the first step of aggregation, agents are allowed to engage in repeated updating
of their expressed opinion si(t) to incorporate information made available in the previous
time step. The iteration allows the agents, among other things, to acquire higher-order
evidence. Cognitively limited agents will not always epistemically profit from the iterative
structure, but it is an indispensable feature of scientific debates.
The strategy space in the model ranges over sequences of si, and the agents have access
to their own signal bi, and some or all choices of sj made before. What is missing to
complete this simple deliberation game are appropriate payoff functions.6
4.2.2 Payoff Schemes
The scientific community, like most social groups, is not subject to only one scheme of
rewards, even if it was only for the individual differences between scientists and their
motivations. This is partly due to the influx of non-epistemic values. But it is also a
consequence of the variety of epistemic values (Kuhn, 1977) and the difficulty to always
identify the epistemically valuable directly. Looking purely at accuracy, it is often possible
only in hindsight to attribute the comparative value of predictions. In particular when it
comes to the prediction of rare events, it can be difficult to assign credit before the fact.7
To accommodate such problems – and also because scientists are psychologically func-
tioning human agents – science relies on social judgment to a significant degree.8 At least
three relevant components for determining a scientist’s reward can therefore be identified:
accuracy, coordination with their epistemic peers, and the impact of their results on the
scientific community.9
The deliberation game model suggests a very simple but common approach to modeling
6One might notice that the model is structurally very similar to linear averaging models, and wonder
whether the opinion of an agent is represented by bi or si, or put otherwise if there is an actual dynamic
of evolving opinions, or just an adaption of the beliefs expressed to other agents. A more appropriate
interpretation for an application to science is that of an actual evolution of opinions, the possible impor-
tance of their initial signal to an agent notwithstanding. There are different target systems the model is
applicable to, such as political discourse, where often an evolving compromise is better understood as just
a convergence on expressed opinion, with no underlying revision of private belief.
7For clarification, the need to assign credit long before the predicted event is supposed to take place
arises frequently in fields like climate science or high energy physics, where predictions extend far into the
future or theoretical progress precedes technical realizability by decades.
8This is the crucial difference between models explicitly incorporating agent motivation and standard
models in opinion dynamics such as Lehrer and Wagner (1981). In applications of such deliberation
processes, it is acknowledged that strategic behavior poses a problem (Regan et al., 2006).
9Accuracy stands in for a number of plausible epistemic values discussed e.g. by Kuhn (1977). The
reason is both ease of quantification and the almost universal acceptance of this particular virtue.
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accuracy, namely by an agent’s distance from the truth.10 It has been argued that proper
scoring rules, such as the squared distance measure, are an appropriate way to evaluate
accuracy (Leitgeb and Pettigrew, 2010a,b; Brier, 1950).
This characterization of accuracy suggests a reward scheme specified by the following
payoff equation:
ui(si) = −(si − µ)2 (4.1)
where i is an agent, si their expressed opinion, and µ the correct value of the variable of
interest or degree of belief warranted by the data.
Under this payoff function, agents have an incentive to reveal their signal on the first
step of the deliberation game, and from thereon always choose the average of the revealed
signals, under the joint assumptions that everyone shares the same reward scheme and
common knowledge of rationality.11 There is no new information entering, there is no
incentive for an agent not to reveal, and signal variance is assumed to be homogeneous,
making the linear average the maximum likelihood estimator. In particular, it does not
matter how many iterations are run, since there is no dynamic after the first two steps.
But the value of µ is generally unknown – that is why a scientific investigation is
undertaken in the first place. Therefore, the community cannot simply implement Equation
4.1 as their reward scheme. To alleviate such accessibility problems, the second reward
scheme to be examined is based on coordination with the scientific community. Note that
agreement-based rewards need not be understood as irrational or arational: they can be
based in rational reliance on the approximate accuracy of the epistemic community.
There are multiple ways to model a coordination-based reward scheme. Consider the
following options:
uci(si) =−
(
si −
∑n
j=1 sj
n
)2
(4.2)
uadi (si) =−
(si − bi)2 +∑j 6=i(si − sj)2
n
(4.3)
udai (si) =−
(
si − bi +
∑
j 6=i sj
n
)2
(4.4)
where again bi is i’s private signal and n is the total number of agents. The squared differ-
ence is taken to avoid discontinuous payoff functions and to maintain structural similarity
as compared to the accuracy-based payoff. The first equation reproduces equal-weight lin-
ear averaging under synchronous choice, and is considered the baseline option. The second
and the third incentivize the agent to either minimize the distance to the average or the
average distance, though with the additional twist of inserting their own signal instead of
10As Douven (2010) points out, beliefs in this kind of model can either be interpreted as degrees of belief
or estimates of a certain variable of interest. For the purpose of the analysis of accuracy, it is unnecessary
to distinguish between those two interpretations.
11The strategy profile where all agents play this strategy is a Nash equilibrium. However, the strategy
is not dominant: if all other agents play, for example, by uniform randomization, the agent should stick
to their own signal.
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their expressed opinion. The rationale is that, while agents are assumed to be rewarded
for conformity with the expressed opinions of others, they retain the signal they have priv-
ileged access to; they treat this signal as constituting part of the collection of expressed
beliefs to be in agreement with.
It is noteworthy that all three options imply different optimal solutions in a popu-
lation of agents homogeneously subject to the respective payoff scheme. The baseline
scheme is trivially maximized by perfect coordination on any value. Differentiating and
synchronously maximizing the padi is also maximized by perfect coordination, but in this
case specifically on the median of the bi. Unlike the baseline scheme, it is not trivial for
agents with limited information to coordinate on this point, since it requires them to es-
timate the private signals of other agents correctly; but since they do not have access to
the other agents’ signals directly, they can only estimate on the basis of already expressed
opinion.
The optimal solution to the third scheme differs more substantially, since it deviates
from perfect agreement. In equilibrium, every agent plays a mixture of their private signal
and socially available information. For example, in a simple three player case with complete
information and common knowledge of rationality, a signal vector of [0.1, 0.5, 0.9] will result
in an equilibrium strategy profile of [0.4, 0.5, 0.6]. Because of this maintenance of diversity
in opinion, strategies inspired by this payoff scheme can be described as limited or cautious
conformism.
One final relevant component is missing so far, and it concerns a scientist’s interest
to coordinate the community on their result. The immediate psychological interpretation
makes such a reward scheme appear epistemically irrational. Instead of trying to incor-
porate all socially available information, it incentivices the scientist to (at least publicly)
engage in a form of motivated reasoning to lead their fellow scientists as closely as pos-
sible to agree with them. This raises the questions why actual reward institutions carry
significant resemblance to this apparently epistemically problematic scheme.
A plausible answer, if one does not want to resort to the claim that science is merely
a playing field of social forces and in important respects devoid of any special epistemic
motivations, can be found in the reconstruction of opinion leadership as a stand-in for
the epistemically valuable. Coordinating the community on one’s own signal functions
as a proxy for the originality of scientists and their results.12 Rewarding scientists for
originality, as they are for example by the priority rule (Strevens, 2003), seems a legitimate,
if sometimes troublesome, component of the payoff structures in epistemic communities.
Formally, there are once again multiple options of representing what can be called
idiosyncratic or originality-based payoff depending on the context. Consider the following
12A recently discussed example of this substitution is the priority of (Sakoda, 1971) over (Schelling,
1971) described by (Hegselmann and Flache, 1998) and in more detail in (Hegselmann, 2017), where the
suggested models are similar though different in subtle details, but the community allocated all their
acknowledgment to Schelling and coordinated on his results.
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two options:
usdai (si) =−
(
bi −
∑n
j=1 sj
n
)2
(4.5)
usadi (si) =−
∑n
j=1(sj − bi)2
n
(4.6)
Even though these are in important ways different functions, they have quite similar impli-
cations with respect to an agent’s behavior. The reason is that an agent can only directly
influence the term si − bi with their strategy choice. Of course their ability to choose si
incentivizes other agents to take i’s possible behavior strategically into account, but this
is merely an indirect effect. When it comes to payoffs, the first equation, which once again
penalizes the distance from an average, puts more weight on extreme deviants, whereas
the second function puts more weight on the median agent.
In terms of interpretation, the first payoff scheme benefits normal, non-extraordinary
science. If one imagines that, as in Weisberg and Muldoon (2009)13, not all agents operate
under the same scheme, this would give the idiosyncratic agent an incentive to reduce the
deviance of others from their personal standpoint.
The second scheme creates much less of an interest in the normal scientist to pull
deviants towards the center. However, it is important to note that either payoff rule
differentiates between a one-sided deviation and a scenario where more extreme agents
exist on either side of the focal agent. That is plausible, since it both provides reason
to belief in one’s own accuracy, according to the argument offered for social aggregation
and positions the agent well to receive acknowledgment and funding from both ends of the
spectrum.
What the payoff scheme cannot describe is the agents’ actual capability to influence
the distribution of expressed opinions. This depends crucially on (1) the agent’s assumed
cognitive abilities and (2) the behavioral patterns of the population the agent inhabits.14
From hereon, I assume that scientists are in important respects limited in their knowl-
edge, memory and cognitive ability, which suggests the transformation of the deliberation
game into an agent-based model, featuring boundedly rational agents imperfectly trying
to operate under the introduced payoff schemes.15
4.2.3 Boundedly Rational Agents
Given the basic structure described by the deliberation game and the possible reward
schemes, there is a multitude of options to model the behavior of scientists. The objectives
13Note that this model itself has been under severe criticism. cf. Thoma (2015) and Alexander et al.
(2015). However, the basic structure of the model and the problems it addresses still provide a valid point
of reference.
14As before, other relevant components have to be set aside, in particular the impact of material resources
on the actual outcomes.
15These assumptions block the game theoretic solutions partially discussed before, since they conflict
with perfect information and common knowledge of rationality.
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of this particular inquiry are to create artificial scientists who follow simple rules, but whose
behavior can still be interpreted as strategic. To achieve this, the model follows Eger (2016)
in using naive best-response learning; an agent employing this learning mechanism acts at
t+1 by choosing an option that would have been optimal at t. Naive best-response learning
itself is thus a backward-looking pattern of behavior, which requires minimal amounts of
memory and knowledge.
The strategic component enters on the level of interpretation. Imagine a naive learner
behaving as dictated by the following equation:
si(t+ 1) =
∑n
j=1 sj(t)
n
(Social Learner)
which is obtained by applying naive best-response learning to the baseline coordination
rewarding payoff scheme. Intuitively, this rule defines an agent who takes expressed opin-
ions, e.g. papers and conference talks, very seriously and assumes that any announcement
of belief carries valuable information.
Now consider another agent who anticipates this behavioral pattern and believes that
the actual payoff scheme in place is a combination of social coordination and idiosyncratic
reward; such an agent could be modeled by the following rule:
si(t+ 1) =

1 if n ∗ bi −∑i 6=j > 1
0 if n ∗ bi −∑i 6=j < 0
n ∗ bi −∑i 6=j sj otherwise
(Social Influencer)
The first two cases of the equation ensure that the agent will not express an inadmissible
belief, the third case controls the behavior for the rest of the domain of belief. The resulting
behavior depicts an agent who is interested in getting the current state of collective beliefs
closer to their initial signal. Regardless of the exact source of this motivation, the agent
can only directly influence their own strategy to move the average closer to their target;
since they look for the average, that results in pushing their expressed opinion beyond their
signal. Alternatively, the resulting behavioral pattern can be interpreted as strategically
anticipating social influence on other agents, such as the simple learners above.16
Yet another agent might anticipate the idiosyncratically motivated behavior, but also
believe that accuracy pays off and socially available information needs to be included to
maximize it. Assuming that the agents are only capable of naive-best response learning,
what would be a good compromise between robustness to unwanted influence and utiliza-
tion of socially available information? Once the agents are situated in a mixed population
they have little knowledge about, there is no trivial answer to this question.
The discussion of various reward schemes suggests employing a constrained version of
learning from other agents:
si(t+ 1) =
bi +
∑
j 6=i sj(t)
n
(Cautious Social Learner)
16The factor n before the signal bi might strike the reader as odd; it is a consequence of optimizing
the payoff scheme the social influencer is based on, and effectively corrects the weights such that agents
compare their signal to the average opinion within the community.
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Cautious social learners give significant weight to the opinions of their fellow inquirers, but
reserve additional weight for their own signal. This models, for example, an experimenter
who is willing to take the claims published by others into account, though still trusts
results the most they created in their own lab, measured with their own instruments and
statistically analyzed themselves from the raw data to the published result.
As the number of other researchers providing results increases, their own relative weight
shrinks. Hence, they are willing to correct their beliefs in the face of an overwhelming social
consensus, but as long as the community engaged with a topic is small, they treat socially
available information with modest suspicion without entirely ignoring it.17
While social learners of various kinds are the most interesting class of agents, the model
is easily extensible to, for example, a steadfast agent:18
si(t+ 1) = bi (Steadfast Agent)
which is behaviorally equivalent to a model suggested for charismatic leaders (Hegselmann
and Krause, 2015). But in the context of the deliberation game, it is subjectively justifiable
by the agent’s attempt not to be influenced by agents misrepresenting their belief; this
behavior represents the limiting case of constrained incorporation of social information. In
practice, such an extreme case can only rarely occur, since the agent would just not be
perceived as part of the scientific community under most circumstances. But it provides
an approximately true model of, among other things
1. extraordinarily reputed researchers, who are able arrogate to themselves such behav-
ior, at least for a limited time span,
2. agents who enter the population from the outside and therefore are at least initially
presumed to be proper members of the community, but for some reason, e.g. an
externally funded agenda, are not actually interested in anyone else’s results,
3. agents who are so deeply embedded institutionally that they cannot be easily ignored
or pushed out of the process, such as a powerful journal editor or the head of an
important research institute.
These examples are all violating social epistemic norms, and while there are scenarios where
being steadfast is the most reasonable response, this is not by accident: it is at odds with
participating in a social epistemic process. An agent who is systemically steadfast in the
sense of the behavioral rule stated above could just as well pursue their inquiries on their
own if they searched for truth. Therefore, while the model is able to represent steadfast
agents, they will be left aside within the following analysis of model dynamics.
17This particular strategy actually lives in a continuum: by introducing additional weight parameters,
one could adjust the exact degree to which the agent responds to socially available information. Having
no explicit weights results naturally from the payoff scheme, but this shouldn’t be taken as a fundamental
limitation to a cautious learning strategy.
18cf. Elkin and Wheeler (2018) for discussion of steadfastness as a response to disagreement
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Figure 4.1: Opinion dynamics under a single opinion leader, simple learners (left) and
cautious learners (right).
4.3 Results and Discussion
4.3.1 Model Dynamics
The original motivation for constructing a framework to model strategic behavior in opinion
dynamics is a concern with the interaction between influentiable and intentionally influ-
encing agents. To understand the basic dynamics, it is useful to focus on a small number
of stylized examples.
First, consider a population of basic social learners (Eq. (Social Learner)) combined
with a single opinion leader (here modeled by Eq. Social Influencer. A typical run is
depicted in Figure 4.1, together with the same scenario using cautious social learners
(Eq. Cautious Social Learner). Before going deeper into the interpretation, a few basic
observations are in place. There is little complexity in the opinion evolution in the social
learner scenario. They effectively converge immediately the way the behavioral rule is
defined; this simplistic mode of convergence can be modified by basic manipulations of
the learning rule, as explored in Appendix 4.7. In practice, social learning will often take
place at a slower pace, but with similar consequences. Second, the expressed opinions of
cautious learners generally fail to fully merge, due to their tendency to retain part of their
initial signal throughout the process. As individuals, however, they converge to a steady
si.
Furthermore, the opinion leader exhibits cyclical behavior. This is due to the over-
adaption of social learners to the belief represented by the opinion leader, which triggers
that agent to steer them backwards again after causing them to move beyond its preferred
opinion. This phenomenon occurs regularly, but there are also simpler dynamics where the
population converges to equilibrium without oscillation.19
These scenarios provide stylized descriptions of certain phenomena in the process of sci-
entific discussion. The most obvious application comes from externally motivated research
trying to promote certain outcomes, exemplified by instances of corporate sponsored re-
19Whether there is oscillation or not depends on the initial distribution of signals, and the type of social
learners. Cautious learners create less oscillation, since they are less prone to overadaption.
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Figure 4.2: Dynamics under dual influence, simple learners (left), cautious learners (right).
search in medicine (cf. Holman and Bruner, 2015, for a discussion and alternative model).
The high degree of specialization in science both requires the utilization of socially available
information and makes the influence of a single agent plausible. It is also worth noting that
the manipulative scientist in the model is not trying to steer the group to an empirically
entirely unwarranted conclusion, but rather to whatever happens to be the information
they actually gathered themselves. The interested external party could simply have chosen
to sponsor the scientist with the most convenient results, without rendering them entirely
intellectually dishonest.20
In practice, corporations may also resort to more extreme measures (cf. Oreskes and
Conway, 2011, ch. 1), which could easily be represented by setting the initial signal of
the manipulative agent to an arbitrary value instead of the noisy signal. But in the case
of pharmacology, a company often has an incentive not to put forward arbitrary claims.
On the one hand, they might be interested in downplaying side effects of a new drug and
exaggerating its efficacy, on the other hand, they have to avoid legal liabilities.
The cyclical change is the most puzzling feature with regard to this interpretation. If
an agent’s declared opinion would oscillate in such an obvious way, that person or lab may
quickly loose reputation. But in practice, it is quite difficult to determine whether someone
is deliberately exaggerating their findings in different directions, or is just trying to weigh
in all available data. Furthermore, while it is obvious from the modeler’s stance that no
new information enters during the modeled process, the same is not assumed to be true
from the participants’ perspective.
Throughout the modern era, science was rarely influenced as heavily by a single agent
as in the single influencer scenario. Even relatively small, specialized groups tend to exhibit
a competitive dynamic of multiple influential agents. Once again, the analysis has to focus
on simple cases. Therefore, a second potential opinion leader is introduced, trying to steer
either a group of simple social learners or cautious learners. Typical dynamics are depicted
in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 showcases the basic dynamic of scenarios with two potential opinion leaders.
A competitive dynamic ensues between the leaders with both of them exaggerating their
20This is not to say that the scientist is not to some degree epistemically blameworthy, but their claims
are still connected to actual empirical results and not, for example, based on makeshift data.
74 4. Strategic Belief Formation
results towards the extremes of possible opinions. If the two opinion leaders are initially
both on one end of the range of signals and pulling towards the same general direction, the
dynamic shifts to the range between their two signals after an initial phase of the opinion
leaders pulling in the same direction. The initial phase resembles the scenario with only
one influencer.
As the simulations are set up, there is an inherent asymmetry due to the expected value
of the signal distribution at 2/3. This incentivizes the opinion leader on the lower end of
the range to oscillate more often, since there is more room to exaggerate successfully and
turn back afterwards.
Once again, the difference between simple social learners and cautious learners is easily
observable: simple learners end up in perfect agreement with each other, while their more
epistemically conservative counterparts tend to retain disagreement. As expected, the
latter keep up disagreement in a competitive scenario, too. To illustrate the kind of debate,
consider the development of sociological theory from the middle to the end of the 20th
century, the history of which it is extensively reconstructed by Joas and Kno¨bl (2004).
There are two extreme answers when it comes to the question of what makes a good
sociological explanation, and sociological theories are often substantially defined by their
stance on this methodological question. On one extreme, sociological explanation has to
reduce to individual attitudes and actions entirely; macroscopical entities cannot figure in
genuine explanations.21 This end of the spectrum is probably best represented by neoclas-
sical economists, but rational choice sociologists take this position within the sociological
discourse.
At the other extreme, individuals almost fall out of the explanatory picture. The
paradigmatic proponent of such an account is the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann,
whose position is referred to as radical functionalism. On his account, what explains social
phenomena is the functional requirements of social systems and their subsystems.
Much of the theoretical developments in sociology can be interpreted as working on the
middle ground between these extreme positions, representing the larger mainstream that
is represented in the simulation model by social learners. Over the course of time, either
of the extremes more successfully influences thoses agents occupying the middle ground,
creating attracting forces to one extreme or the other. At least in this application, the
scenario featuring restrained social learners who end up not fully converging offers a more
compelling representation. Even the oscillatory behavior becomes intelligible under this
interpretation, since agents are not necessarily to be understood as individual sociologists,
but can represent whole theoretical schools, who shift around their position to a limited
degree over time due to the influence of different individuals within the school.
So far, the analysis focused on exploring and describing possible dynamics, but not
much of normative relevance has been said. But of course the model strongly bears on the
question how strategic opinion expression impacts the accuracy of an agent population. At
21Even defenders of a very strong version of this kind of individualism can of course accept the possibility
that such explanations are pragmatically useful. Such explanations are, however, always assumed to be
reducible to agent-level explanations.
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this point, the environment and process components of the argument are established, and
I turn to the evaluation of the collective behavior depicted, arguing for a general limitation
to optimal strategy choice in the assumed environment.
4.3.2 An Accuracy/Robustness Trade-Off
Informally, it is easy to present a line of reasoning supporting the claim that there is a
tension between the most effective social learning strategy under optimal conditions as
opposed to a strategy that is less accurate in a wide variety of social epistemic situations,
but more robust to imperfections within the environment. The reason is that the best
strategy under optimal conditions takes into account all socially available information, and
since circumstances are optimal by assumption, this leads to the most accurate state of
belief.22 At the same time, such a very credulous strategy performs poorly under less
favorable circumstances. A strategy that instead discounts socially available information
to some degree is less prone to social influence in general, which is advantageous under
suboptimal epistemic conditions.23
This argument can be recovered within the framework of strategic opinion formation
by the following simulation experiment: the populations of the above scenarios are run for
a large number of times, in the initial step – unbeknownst to the agents – all revealing
their signal, which provides a lower bound for the error scores relative to the signals they
actually received. Error is measured by quadratic distance to the true value of the variable
of interest represented as the mean of the noisy signals the agents receive.
It is noteworthy that under these assumptions, there remain multiple ways of measuring
accuracy: for example by either computing the error score of the mean of the agents’
beliefs, or by calculating the individual quadratic error scores and taking their average. In
the discussion so far, more emphasis was put on individual accuracy in the social process,
but for certain scenarios it is more interesting to take a measure of collective accuracy into
account in addition or even instead. The results are summarized in Table 4.1.
The left-hand values in the first data row provide the benchmark accuracy attainable
by aggregating the signals actually received by the population. Since agents initially reveal
their signals, the squared error of the mean belief would be the error made by a population
comprised entirely of simple learners, because such agents would simply converge to their
average signal. A remark to avoid misunderstanding is in place: it is not known to the
agents that everyone reveals their private signal in the first round; otherwise, the social
learners would ignore any opinion expressed later in the interaction. Furthermore, nobody
has information about the strategies constituting the population of the current game.
Without this assumption, the agent should try to filter out the beliefs expressed by agents
attempting to exert social influence.
22A similar argument has been put forward in a different formal framework investigating epistemic norms
(Mayo-Wilson, 2014).
23This argument is also similar to the claim defended by Zollman (2007) that restricting the communi-
cation structure of a community can protect them against fallacies related to premature convergence.
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Simple Learners / Cautious Learners / Simple Learners / Cautious Learners /
Single Leader Single Leader Competing Leaders Competing Leaders
t = 0 0.006/0.056 0.006/0.055 0.006/0.56 0.006/0.055
t = 10 0.048/0.051 0.031/0.036 0.024/0.060 0.017/0.052
t = 20 0.054/0.055 0.034/0.038 0.025/0.060 0.017/0.052
t = 80 0.055/0.055 0.034/0.038 0.025/0.060 0.017/0.051
Table 4.1: Accuracy scores (squared error of belief mean/mean of squared error of beliefs),
averaged over an ensemble of 500 runs.
In all scenarios, the existence of strategic behavior leads to higher error scores, i.e.
less accurate beliefs. Comparing the scores of populations of simple learners with those of
cautious learners, the argument goes in favor of cautious learners. But this type of agent
has worse results in expectation in the ideal scenario of a population consisting entirely of
cautious learners, since they do not converge to the mean of their signals, which is the best
estimator of the true value. Thus, cautious learners are worse under optimal conditions,
but are able to outperform simple learners under strategic influence.
There are many other elements of a social epistemic situation that can hamper the
effectiveness of a strategy fully incorporating socially available information. Miscommuni-
cation, dependencies between the signals of some of the agents or simply highly unreliable
agents could lead to problems similar to those posed by strategic interaction. But it is
plausible to conjecture that these additional hindrances support complementary formal
arguments to support the informal claim of a trade-off between robustness and accuracy.
The data also suggests a second interesting argument concerning the relationship be-
tween a single agent trying to influence the group, and two competing opinion leaders.
Competition drastically improves the error scores, as the last row exhibits. This holds
since competition creates a mainstream between the most extreme positions, and since the
exact expressed opinion of an opinion leader still depends on their own underlying signal,
the mainstream ends up at more accurate results when incorporating information provided
by two competing influences.
As in the single influencer condition, it is advantageous to be more cautious, which is
less obvious than in the basic case, because it implies discounting the strategic agents, but
also agents who are partially revealing their signal. But under the model assumptions it is
still recommendable to discount this information, since it indirectly duplicates the opinions
of the strategically motivated opinion leaders.
Thus, contingent on the prevalence of strategic opinion expression, competition in-
creases accuracy. This result, unlike the trade-off between maximal accuracy and robust-
ness, is more dependent on the specific modeling assumptions. For example, the model
does not represent the allocation of resources, which is likely affected by competition.
Other authors have argued that competition also is conducive to an optimal allocation
of scientists – one of the major resources in science – to projects (Kitcher, 1990), but there
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is significant room for doubt: if science is at least partially governed by similar forces
as commodity markets, market failure is also a possibility to be taken seriously. Hence,
the recommendation of competition in epistemic enterprises is strictly conditional on the
appropriateness of the stylized model in a given application.
Finally, as I alluded to before, there are competing norms to evaluate the resulting
pattern of belief resulting from a decentralized communication process. The argument for
a trade-off between robustness and accuracy is based on an individual-level assessment
of the agents aggregated by calculating the mean. This argument carries over to several
other evaluative standards, such as maximizing the minimum accuracy or maximizing the
best accuracy within the group of learners given the opinion leader is excluded: simple
learners fully merge, and therefore there is no difference between minimum, maximum
and average. Cautious learners, in comparison, converge but fail to merge in general, and
therefore perform worse under norms such maxi-min, where the worst performing agent is
considered.
But it is possible to imagine epistemic goals invalidating the argument. Imagine an
application, where convergence itself is extraordinarily valuable. In that sense, what the
above argument establishes is not the universal impossibility to devise an optimal strategy
in decentralized information aggregation, but really only a specific problem for achieving
consistent levels of accuracy across a variety of unknown environments.
4.3.3 The Evolution of Misrepresentation
So far, these results exhibit the dynamics of an opinion expression process, limited more or
less to one specific question. It offers the observer a sketch of relevant behavioral patterns
on the level of a concrete controversy; the next step is to take a more macroscopical
perspective.
In the social process of science, agents are not merely engaging in inconsequential
debates, but some scientists are more successful in the long run than others. But according
to what metric? One obvious measure would be individual-level accuracy, as described by
Equation 4.1. This is the most obvious choice when implementing a reward structure for
the social system of science. However, it is not the only relevant consideration. For starters,
it is important to find significant accurate results (Weisberg and Muldoon, 2009) and often
to be the first to find them, i.e. to be original (Strevens, 2003).
The following analysis takes significance for granted (otherwise agents would not engage
in social exchange of information at all). Inaccuracy is taken as the squared deviation from
the epistemically best possible result given the collection of signals provided. Given that all
agents draw from the same distribution and therefore their signals share the same variance,
the best attainable degree of belief is the mean of initial signals. Though generally plausible,
sometimes it does not matter what would have been the best judgment possible given the
evidence, but accuracy is judged after the fact by comparison with the actual value of the
variable under consideration, or either truth or falsity of a hypothesis.
In the instances of the deliberation game we are interested in, the expected difference
is small, but in particular conceptually, the two standards should be kept distinct. Fur-
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thermore, in a different application context, contingent on the assumptions on the relation
between true value and received signal, the difference can be increased arbitrarily.
Originality is less obvious to be defined within the model. Part of the difficulty to frame
originality in the model is that the represented process brackets the more creative parts of
science, such as theory construction or experimental design.24 The component depicted by
a strategic model of opinion formation most faithfully represents part of the consolidation
phase of scientific knowledge, where experimental results and theoretical interpretations
are on the table, but have not yet been aggregated and unified into a canonical account.
But there is still room to identify certain outcomes as instantiating originality. An
agent can at least appear as the source of an eventual consensus (or partial consensus)
opinion. In terms of the model, they can be rewarded for minimizing the distance between
the final opinion distribution25 and their original signal. The rationale is that it would
seem to the community as if an agent on whose signal they converge had been correct all
along, and by analogy this argument can be expanded to cases of incomplete convergence
(and in principle, even fragmentation or polarization).
Against the background of these payoff schemes ranging across multiple instances of
the opinion expression game, it becomes possible to take an evolutionary perspective on
the behavioral strategies defined in the previous section. The question becomes how the
composition of a given agent population evolves conditional on a combined reward scheme
of the form
ri(si) = α(si − µ)2 + (1− α)(bi −
∑n
j=1 sj
n
)2 (4.7)
with α ∈ [0, 1]. The scheme weighs the squared difference between the truth and the
focal agent’s chosen strategy by α to represent rewards for being accurate. The second
component, weighted by 1−α, describes being payed off for moving the population average
opinion to one’s own initial signal. This represents, within the constraints of the model,
rewards for originality.
For the purpose of evolutionary analysis, discrete replicator dynamics without mutation
is used (adapted from Weibull, 1997, p. 113) where xp(t) is the proportion of agents
employing strategy p, e.g. cautious learning, at time t:
xp(t+ δ) =
1− δ + δrp(t)
1− δ + δr¯(t) xp(t) (4.8)
where rp(t) is the expected reward for playing p at t and r¯(t) the average reward across
the population at that time. The presence of δ implies that only a proportion of δ agents
is exchanged each time step.26 Importantly, payoffs are determined from the opinions
expressed in the final stage of the opinion expression game.
24For account of the ingenuity required in these components of science, cf. Kuhn (1970).
25This measure is represented by pairwise squared distances to retain structural similarity to accuracy.
26Besides renaming some of the functions for convenience, this version leaves out the background repro-
duction rate β present in Weibull’s formulation, which is assumed not to be relevant here. This assumption
is an idealization that might warrant relaxation to check robustness elsewhere.
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The evolution described by this model corrects a strategy’s proportion for the next
generation by comparing that strategy’s average payoff to the population average payoff.
If a strategy is highly accurate (if that is determining the payoff), but the majority of the
population outperformed it, its prortion decreases. Since the adaption of successful strate-
gies takes time, only δ percent of the population is exchanged in one time step. In terms
of science, tenured faculty tends to persist – for better or worse – until their retirement,
and can stick to any strategy that is not too inferior compared to the population.
Not only does this model of strategy evolution possess the virtue of simplicity, the dis-
crete time evolution also mirrors funding and hiring cycles in academia, which are often
aligned with teaching or central funding allocation. Mutation is left out of the picture
mainly to restrict the parameters space; failure to imitate correctly27 as well as exper-
imentation with new (or currently unused) strategies could be included for a separate
investigation.
The setup for the following simulation experiments is as follows: at each evolutionary
step, the population is split into groups of 10 agents playing the opinion expression game
for 50 timesteps. Then, the payoffs are computed from final expressed beliefs per group
and aggregated for the whole population to calculate the strategy proportions for the next
round, with δ = 0.1. Assuming an initial equidistribution, the set of four strategies –
naive learner, cautious learner, strategic exaggerator and steadfast agent – would result –
contingent on the number of agents to be assigned a strategy – in a large number of possible
scenarios. Since the focus of this essay is at its core on the effects of attempts in strategic
influence, the analysis focuses on the three types of scenarios containing exaggerators plus
one other type and a fully mixed population. The results are depicted in Figure 4.3.
A few cautionary remarks are in place before interpreting these results in detail. The
data contains a significant amount of random variation, meaning that it should be read
qualitatively rather than quantitatively. In particular, the rate at which the strategically
misleading population goes extinct varies quite heavily, and any result close to 0 repre-
sents a scenario where it will go extinct eventually. Second, while the results for three
of the four cases exhibit strong similarities in their macroscopic behavior, the underlying
mechanisms differ in important ways. Given these cautionary remarks, we can turn to the
interpretation.
For all populations under consideration, increasing α drives down the success of strate-
gic exaggeration quickly: the more accuracy-based the reward structure is, the less does
strategic exaggeration pay off. What exactly quickly means in this context depends on the
projection of generations within the model onto any given target system.
Take, for example, the following interpretation: A single opinion expression game rep-
resents a highly focused, contained debate, i.e. one carried out at a specialized conference,
potentially carried on in the conference proceedings. Rewards had to be distributed shortly
thereafter, for example in the form of further conference invitations. Extinction is imple-
mented by omission of invitation, leading to lack of recognition. In such a case, a run of
the simulation could be mapped onto a normal scientific career (50 conferences being quite
27I thank Kevin Zollman for pointing out the relevance of mutation for the most accurate representation.
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Figure 4.3: Strategy evolution for varying proportions of accuracy-based and self-centered
coordination payoffs.
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low of an estimate). Such an interpretation is of course not uniquely adequate, and also
has further implications.
The need for a fairly immediate allocation of payoffs reduces the access to reliable
accuracy estimates, since in many cases, the debate simply cannot fully be settled in
an agreed-upon set of results. If the debate concerns speculations about the outcomes
of easily implementable experiments, accuracy could be very significant in determining
rewards, but often selection committees have to stick to proxy criteria, such as apparent
or actual originality and community impact.
This provides a useful frame to the central result contained in all of the above datasets:
while strategic exaggeration is soft to evolutionary pressure in an accuracy-driven environ-
ment, where accuracy is unavailable as a criterion, it can be successful. But even in such a
setting, it cannot take over the whole population, since it creates evolutionary pressure on
itself. This leads to the obvious question of what, in any given case, determines the evo-
lutionary dynamic; and at least in the first three scenarios, the question can be answered
employing the previously established understanding of microscopical dynamics.
In all three cases, there are four distinct types of subpopulations generated from the
overall population for a generation. For the naive learner scenario, these are pure groups of
social learners, pure groups of exaggerators, groups with a single exaggerator, and groups
with multiple exaggerators. I discuss their effectiveness in finding the best estimate of the
truth in turn.
1. A pure group of naive learners converges to the best estimate possible based on their
signals, namely their average.
2. A pure group of exaggerators contains two isolated individuals, one on either extreme
of the opinion spectrum. These two exaggerate beyond their signal towards the
extreme, while the rest of the agents converges in the center, creating suboptimal
outcomes for the extremists.
3. A mixed group with a single exaggerator converges on the exaggerator’s signal in the
long run, leaving all members with the same accuracy-based payoff determined by
the exaggerators signal quality.
4. A mixed group with multiple exaggerators behaves essentially like a pure group of
exaggerators, with the two most extremely signaled exaggerators receiving strong
negative payoffs.
Overall, exaggerators cannot outperform naive learners in terms of accuracy, explaining
their rapid demise in scenarios where accuracy is crucial to the reward scheme. In scenarios
that are based mostly or entirely on coordinating the group on one’s own signal, exagger-
ators are able to profit in subgroups otherwise consisting of naive learners, while naive
learners never perform particularly well on this originality measure. Therefore, originality
payoffs are relatively even throughout all groups except for those mixed groups with only
one exaggerator who drives the dynamic.
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The analysis for cautious learners is very similar, the main difference being worse payoffs
in pure groups of cautious learners and lower maximum social coordination payoffs due to
non-merging.
The case of steadfastly revealing agents is slightly different. These agents basically
represent the case of asocial scientists, who completely filter out socially available informa-
tion. The effective result in evolutionary terms is very similar, but the underlying dynamics
differ. Under social coordination payoff, basically everyone receives low payoffs – as com-
pared, for example, to a group of naive learners – since the population is constituted by
agents who are not desiring coordination. This makes it virtually impossible for strategic
exaggerators to succeed. At the same time, steadfast agents also perform poorly, since they
leave all socially available information on the table, even if they partake in an instance of
the opinion expression game where nobody engages in strategic exaggeration.
In the more accuracy-driven part of the parameter space, however, exaggerators once
again are on the decline, since their strategy drives them away arbitrarily from their own
signal, leaving them at a less informed position as the partially informed retaining at least
their own signal.
Finally, the mixed population of naive and cautious learners, influencers and steadfast
agents gives an impression how more complicated mixtures of strategies can evolve. The
basic pattern is similar: for low α, there is little to be gained by trying to learn socially,
and strategic exaggeration pays off, but never takes over the whole population due to the
cost influencers inflict on each other.
Interestingly, it seems that cautious learners become most successful when accuracy
pays off more and more. This is a deliberate product of the finite time span under consid-
eration. In the long run, both steadfast agents and exaggerators are driven to extinction
in such a scenario. But as long as such agents are part of the population, cautious social
learning provides a competitive advantage over naive social learning, since it discounts
misleading signals to a limited extent as a consequence of discounting all socially available
information.
This matches the accuracy estimates from the previous section and precisely mirrors
the advantage of cautious learners in an ensemble of games with a static population. Why
are we licensed to put the equilibrium consisting only of naive social learners to one side?
There are two reasons, one more technical, the other immediately regarding the target.
On the technical side, any significant amount of mutation added in can at least tem-
porarily shake up the naive learning equilibrium. Furthermore, even a marginal compo-
nent of coordination-based payoff creates an advantage for cautious learners and steadfast
agents, though as the above two-strategy populations show, either case leaves exaggerators
under strong evolutionary pressure. Given these complexities, it seems more informative to
look at the out-of-equilibrium dynamics, which depend less on assumptions of non-mutation
and similar random variation.
Second, when it comes to the target of scientific group deliberation, discussion and
opinion exchange, it is a very real possibility that strategic exaggerators are fed into the
system at a steady rate. Such influx might be the product of big money interests or the
personal engagement of scientists with new projects. As an example, economists enter-
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ing the debate on failures of rationality in cognitive psychology may not be subjected
to the same selective pressures as the resident psychological researchers in this debate;
their rewards are still determined by the substantially different standards for research in
economics. Therefore, the out-of-equilibrium dynamics are a highly relevant part of the
outcomes provided by the model.
Summing up the results of evolutionary analysis, there are good and bad news. On
the one hand, the possibility of strategic exaggeration limits the rationality of naive social
learning, instead suggesting to discount socially available information. But the model also
supports the conclusion that an orientation towards accuracy strongly limits the efficacy
of strategic exaggeration in the long run.
Furthermore, the demise of socially ignorant steadfast agents underlines that the uti-
lization of at least some socially available information actually benefits agents in terms of
accuracy. Of course the simple strategy of cautious learning employed here is in general
not optimal, but it showcases an exemplar of a species of agents who are partially robust
against strategic manipulation while still incorporating information provided by their social
environment.
4.4 Alternative Application: Jury Deliberation
So far, the analysis interpreted the model as representing scientific discourse. Science
provides a particularly interesting case, since strategic behavior is often considered unim-
portant where everyone shares the same epistemic values.28 Therefore, applying it to
science without simply denying the importance of epistemic values to scientists appears a
particularly challenging enterprise and therefore a particularly strong corroboration of its
power.
However, it is interesting to look at other applications, where a strategic interpretation
of opinion expression is less controversial. Legal epistemology offers a prime example.
Since it is generally the best known, I shall consider the example of a jury trial roughly in
accordance with the legal system of the USA, and will focus on defense, prosecution and
the jury itself, leaving the judges out of the picture for simplicity.
The scenario of jury deliberation can thus be reconstructed in terms of the deliberation
game model: the hypothesis in question can be the defendant’s guilt, or anything more
complicated, such as the amount of damages to be paid to a plaintiff or the likelihood
that a particular relevant event has taken place. Depending on that, the values would
represent the credence of agents involved in “guilty”, or their best estimate of the variable
in question, normalized to the interval [0, 1]. Lawyers on both sides have the explicit
mandate to drive the opinion to whatever their party in the trial deems accurate; though
they are of course not legally allowed to lie, as argued in the case of science, there is a lot
28There is a tradition in particular in the sociology of science that more or less flat out denies the actual
relevance of epistemic values. While it is correct that science is a social system, I conjecture this approach
generally underestimates the actual relevance of epistemic values due to its failure to acknowledge that
suboptimal outcomes may be the consequence of epistemically virtuous behavior on the individual level.
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of leeway to represent the information available to oneself without straightforwardly lying.
What type of agent would best represent the jury? That depends on the particular
instance; some jury members might themselves be motivated to take the role of opinion
leaders, it might contain simple and cautious learners, and, making deliberation particu-
larly difficult, it could contain agents entirely steadfast in their opinion. All these types of
agents could, for example, be found in the famous theatrical depiction of jury deliberation
by Rose (1997).
Model time maps onto the range of the whole trial under this interpretation. During
the public part of the trial, jury agents receive their signal – potentially a combination of
prior beliefs and evidence provided throughout the trial. The deliberation phase may either
be mapped onto the isolated phase of jury deliberation, such that strategic influencers are
only other jury members, not the lawyers. Alternatively, the lawyers could be represented
as the strategically representing agents.
The jury deliberation case therefore needs to model the initial signals as correlated:
though the lawyers may have information unavailable to anyone else through their clients,
and the jury may not have access to all the same evidence as, e.g. the prosecution, they
are learning largely the same evidence as their initial signal. This modification is, however,
easily implementable.
Thus, as it turns out, a jury trial is another natural target for the deliberation game
model. Let me end the sketch of this application to legal epistemology with two observa-
tions about the implications for a jury trial.
First, the equilibria of the game incentivize the lawyers to exaggerate, if the mean of the
jury agents deviates from their preferred position. To illustrate this, assume that the jury
consists of simple learners and converges to 0.5. The preferred position of the prosecution
is 0.9, for the defense it is 0.1. To maximize, the prosecution has to play 1 and the defense
has to play 0, since otherwise, the resulting point of convergence of the jury agents would
move away from their respective preferred positions. While this is a particularly simple
case, the example can be generalized. If the other party to the trial reveals their preferred
position, it is individually rational to exaggerate under the modeled assumptions.
This result might not be particularly surprising, since it is akin to standard problems
in bargaining. However, it takes a different turn here because of its epistemic implications.
This leads to the second observation, concerning the relevance of accuracy in rewarding
agents within the legal system. While there have been large waves of exonerations long
after the fact, there is generally no remotely immediate way to check the correctness of
the judgment passed in a trial; otherwise, much of the rationale for running the trial
would dissolve. But as the evolutionary analysis in the context of science shows, to create
pressure for epistemically purer agents, accuracy cannot be replaced with simple proxies in
the payoff scheme. But in the legal system, accuracy-based payoffs are extremely difficult
to implement. Among other things, jury members often will serve a very small number of
times.
Of course this whole argument comes with the important caveat that it relies on a highly
stylized model of deliberation and opinion aggregation. Therefore, it is recommendable to
be very cautious in claiming external validity of any kind. Since much of the debate in
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legal epistemology has to be executed on similar levels of abstraction due to the sheer lack
of data (Laudan, 2006), the argumentative support can still be a valuable contribution to
an empirically difficult topic.
The adversarial system in particular creates strong strategic incentives easily overlooked
when focusing on formal constraints on the procedures – a dangerous omission, which the
deliberation game model exposes: under the right circumstances, as I argued, competition
increases accuracy. This insight, in its informal way, could be identified as the original
motivation to establish an adversarial system of defense and prosecution. But it is entirely
unclear whether the actual world instantiates the right conditions, and therefore, whether
the overall effects of competition in this context are beneficial or detrimental.
4.5 Challenges in Strategic Opinion Modeling
The stylized nature of models of social opinion dynamics generally limits their quantitative
fit. In particular, this makes their application in prediction inherently problematic. But
besides these obvious standard limitations of highly stylized theoretical models, there are
certain challenges for models such as the deliberation game. Discussing these issues both
improves understanding of the model as well as its scope, and has implications for opinion
modeling in general. Therefore, it is worth investigating two such challenges more closely.
First, a very broad interpretation of the term “strategic behavior” is assumed through-
out the discussion. In standard game theoretic analysis, agents are assumed to be per-
fectly forward-looking. Boundedly rational agents modeled and simulated here are rather
backward-looking, adaptive agents under that regime of terminology. Hence, they can only
be considered strategic in a limited sense requiring further specification.
The boundedly rational agents can be interpreted as behaving strategically in two ways:
(a) While it is desirable to introduce more forward-looking agents, Hegselmann et al. (nd)
argue that perfect forward-looking behavior is excessively demanding in non-trivial models
of opinion dynamics. Constructing agents with explicitly stated motivations and a behav-
ioral strategy – naive best-response learning – that converges on an optimal strategy for
many games without overly taxing the cognitive abilities of the agents presents a substan-
tial advance towards fully forward-looking agents. (b) Strategies employed by boundedly
rational agents are constructed to allow for an interpretation that assumes more strategic
depth than the equations themselves unequivocally state. Part of an agent’s motivation
to utilize, for example, a strategy of cautious social learning lies in their anticipation of
potential strategic misrepresentation of signals. Even though their behavior on the level
of the internal model of the agents is entirely backward-looking, the exogenous strategy
choice can be understood as anticipating the potential behavior of competing agents.
The second point of significant theoretical worry is the inability of the modeled agents
to ever learn one another’s strategies. There is some plausibility to this idealization, since
it is highly problematic to draw conclusions about another agent’s honesty based solely on
the difference between one’s initial signal and expressed opinion. If the agent happens to
have received a misleading initial signal, this introduces a bias in the evaluation of everyone
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else’s reliability.29
But the model dynamics suggest that a perceptive agent should be able to identify
suspicious patterns; most obviously to an external observer, the oscillating movements of
strategic influencers seem highly characteristic, even though the caveat mentioned above
holds for potential confounding factors in a more descriptively rich account. Even if it
turns out that there is no robust rule to learn another agent’s authenticity, it would be of
great value to understand the impact of this additional mechanism – or mechanisms – on
the process of opinion formation. For now it has to be left for future research.
4.6 Conclusions
The analysis and discussion of an agent-based model of motivated exchange of beliefs
supports three main claims: First, the introduction of various motivations and strategic
responses in the reach of boundedly rational agents creates a rich dynamic of beliefs.
Depending on the composition of the population, phenomena from oscillating fluctuations
to convergence, fragmentation or polarization occur. Second, the model formalizes and
confirms the informal claim that there is a trade-off between robustness and accuracy
across epistemic environments.
Third, the evolutionary study provides an argument that even mildly accuracy-driven
reward structures create substantial pressure on strategic manipulators. Their prevalence
may, however, be a result of the system moving out of equilibrium, an influx of such agents,
or their entirely independent motivation by non-epistemic motives.
The first two insights in particular shed light on the example of researchers in clini-
cal psychology that provided our starting point: given the suggested assumptions on the
composition of their population, they have good reason to discount socially available in-
formation to some degree. One important caveat applies: even with perfect information
about agents’ motivations, the model should not be expected to quantify this qualitative
result, given its highly idealized nature.
With respect to the argument scheme of environment, social process and collective
goals, the model and its analysis further details some possible arguments and their internal
structure. Starting with the last and simplest point, the analysis applies a plurality of
possible evaluative norms. Coordination, accuracy and originality can point in different
directions when it comes to the evaluation of epistemic performance. Usually, accuracy is
presumed to be the norm of choice in epistemic circumstances, but as I sketched, there is
no unique translation of accuracy from the individual to the collective variant. In total,
different normative standards clearly support different normative conclusions on the social
process.
29Note that this problem can be circumvented if both an agent’s initial reliability estimates and signal are
constrained to be accurate to a minimum degree. For a model of expectation-based updating of reliabilities,
see the competing accounts of Bovens and Hartmann (cf. 2003, ch. 3) and Olsson and Vallinder (2013).
However, neither of these approaches helps under unfavorable conditions (Hahn et al., 2018).
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In terms of the social process, this study focused more on the individual behavior con-
stituting the social process. Varying strategies can be understood as individuals choosing
different strategies, but it may also represent social planning influencing the agents’ moti-
vation by selection. It also showcases that certain negative arguments, in this case, that
neither learning strategy supports a universally optimal social process, can be constructed
without specifying all possible social processes. For practical purposes, such arguments
are of immense importance, as an inspection of all possible alternative processes is not
generally a realistic goal.
Finally, switching from the analysis of individual model runs to an evolutionary per-
spective showcases how variation in environmental conditions can strengthen arguments
by showing a sufficient degree of robustness. In our case, evolutionary analysis supports
the claim that cautious learners can be advantaged over naive learners, yet only in out-
of-equilibrium dynamics. Generally, any controversial assumption on the decision environ-
ment could be tested like that while still representing the static features of the situation
under consideration relative to one instance of the argument scheme.
There are several paths for future research in the framework presented, and I shall briefly
suggest some of the most promising ones. The theoretically most provocative assumption of
the model is the inability of the agents to learn their colleagues’ strategies within the model.
The consequences of including such learning procedures could improve model performance
– or lead to further unwarranted discounting of socially available information.
Furthermore, interpretation of the model is not inherently limited to scientific commu-
nities. Social groups face epistemic problems from areas as distant as legal epistemology,
political philosophy and economic theory. An adapted and reinterpreted version may yield
a potential explanation of the polarization of elites in a democratic society, but the possible
scope of applications is vast and varied.
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As the next chapter explores in more detail, the robustness of theoretical ABM to relax-
ations is a standard part of its analysis. Some of the more ambitious options are mentioned
in the model limitations and future directions sections. What I shall consider in the follow-
ing sections are moderate variations on the naive best-response learning algorithm. The
reason to focus on this issue, conditional on how central the learning mechanism is to the
model, is that rule’s rigidity. While it is very easy to implement, plausibly not only on a
digital computer but also in a human being, there is a lot of room for small error, variation
or slow adaption to the strategy profile confronting the agent. Therefore, I replicate a
part of the above results using relaxations of naive best response learning, which are called
softmax and partial best response learning.30
30I thank Kevin Zollman for suggesting these alternative learning rules to corroborating the results of
the main analysis.
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Figure 4.4: Opinion dynamics under softmax learning, naive learners with single leader
(upper left), cautious learners with single leader (upper right), naive learners with two
leaders (bottom left), cautious learners with two leaders (bottom right).
4.7.1 Softmax Learning
Softmax learning can be understood as taking the naive best response and adding some
random noise to the choice. For the purpose of the following robustness checks, instead of
playing the naive best response, agents draw from a normal distribution with their best
response as the mean. To remain within the modeling assumptions, the choices are cut off
at 0 and 1. The variance is set to 0.05, which already creates a highly visible effect, but
without turning the agents’ actions into a merely random signal yet.
Random variation translates into added noise as compared to the results under best
response learning. In general, agents converge not to a fixed value, but to a limited range;
however, the high responsiveness of the opinion leader (or leaders) can create repeated
strong shakeups. With respect to accuracy (depicted in Table 4.7.1), the overall results
are slightly worse scores, but the differences to the naive best response learning results are
minimal.
I restrict the robustness tests for the evolutionary process to the fourth and most
universal scenario. Once again, softmax learning does not change the qualitative picture.
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Simple Learners / Cautious Learners / Simple Learners / Cautious Learners /
Single Leader Single Leader Competing Leaders Competing Leaders
t = 0 0.006/0.056 0.006/0.057 0.006/0.56 0.005/0.057
t = 10 0.045/0.052 0.033/0.042 0.023/0.058 0.019/0.054
t = 20 0.052/0.058 0.036/0.045 0.024/0.058 0.020/0.054
t = 80 0.052/0.059 0.037/0.045 0.025/0.059 0.020/0.055
Table 4.2: Accuracy scores (squared error of belief mean/mean of squared error of be-
liefs), averaged over an ensemble of 500 runs, using softmax instead of naive best response
learning.
Figure 4.5: Evolution of a fully mixed population under softmax learning.
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Simple Learners / Cautious Learners / Simple Learners / Cautious Learners /
Single Leader Single Leader Competing Leaders Competing Leaders
t = 0 0.005/0.058 0.006/0.056 0.005/0.57 0.005/0.056
t = 10 0.032/0.038 0.022/0.029 0.020/0.054 0.018/0.051
t = 20 0.047/0.048 0.031/0.035 0.023/0.056 0.019/0.052
t = 80 0.056/0.056 0.036/0.040 0.025/0.057 0.020/0.052
Table 4.3: Accuracy scores (squared error of belief mean/mean of squared error of beliefs),
averaged over an ensemble of 500 runs, using partial best response learning.
This should not come as a surprise, given the above explanation of evolutionary results
based on the microdynamics and the similarities regarding those same dynamics.
4.7.2 Partial Best Response Learning
Whereas softmax learning may represent, for example, communication error of some kind,
partial best response learning provides a model of more conservative updating, be that
for reasons of cognitive capacity or an explicit decision of the agents not to get on the
bandwagon too quickly. Instead of playing their naive best response, agents choose a convex
combination of their previous action and their naive best response. The general form for
partial best response learning is stated by Equation 4.9. For the following simulations,
both factors are evenly split.
oi(t+ 1) = αoi(t) + (1− α)NBRi(t) (4.9)
where NBRi(t) is i’s naive best response to the opinion profile at t and α ∈ [0, 1] determines
the relative weight of i’s previous opinion.
The main result for the dynamics (depicted in Figure 4.7.2) is a smoother evolution of
opinions. There is less oscillation and the difference between naive and cautious learners
is diminished, since all learners are now moderately conservative.
The differences in accuracy to naive best response learning are marginal. The only
interesting systematic observation – besides establishing the robustness of the claims made
on the basis of naive best response learning – concerns the advantages in the early stages of
the process. The above-mentioned dampening of exaggeration and oscillation is responsible
for those improvements. The observed reduction in inaccuracy is further increased by the
superlinearity of the employed measure of accuracy.
The same remarks on evolutionary dynamics made for softmax learning also hold for
partial best response behavior. A difference not efficacious in the evolutionary study here
concerns the out-of-equilibrium behavior of partial best response populations: conditional
on the population composition, partial best response learners converge either significantly
faster or slower than both of the other mechanisms under consideration. For example,
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Figure 4.6: Opinion dynamics under partial best response learning, naive learners with
single leader (upper left), cautious learners with single leader (upper right), naive learners
with two leaders (bottom left), cautious learners with two leaders (bottom right).
Figure 4.7: Evolution of a fully mixed population under softmax learning.
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opinion leaders have an increased ability to coordinate groups, while a pure population of
simple learners converges more slowly.
Let me conclude on two final remarks on robustness. First, the results are mostly neg-
ative, but not entirely. That is particularly satisfying, since it implies that the assumption
of strict naive best response learning is not critical, but at the same time, relaxing it im-
pacts the results to a degree, depending on the exact parameters chosen for the alternative
learning rules. In other words, the model is sensitive to modifications, but in a rather
continuous, expected fashion.
Second, the robustness results themselves may appear in need of robustness checks, since
as rely on the choice of a single value for the respective additional parameters, variance in
noise and the combination factor α. But these values are not chosen arbitrarily: increasing
the variance merely increases noise, thereby turning the dynamics more and more into a
random process independent of its previous states. Decreasing variance lets the dynamic
once again approximate naive best response learning, and the chosen value exemplifies the
presence of relevant, but limited random variance.
Similar reasoning applies to partial best response learning: increasing conservatism
slows the process down further, magnifying the effects already visible at 0.5, while reducing
it once again moves the dynamics closer to naive best response learning. The alternative
learning algorithms are specific continuations of naive best response learning. Therefore,
it is sufficient for the robustness argument to test for a small number of values.
Chapter 5
The Epistemology of ABM
5.1 Introduction
Engineers should be able to build their own tools. Analogously, philosophers should be able
to analyze the epistemology of their methods. The epistemology of computer simulations
in general has been discussed extensively in philosophy of science1, but agent-based models
and simulations as a subset allow for a more specific analysis.
Agent-based models differ in several respects from the simulation models underlying
standard arguments in the philosophy of computer simulations. Those models are usually
taken from physics or climatology, and they consist of numerical approximations to a
system of differential equations.2 Agent-based models, on the other hand, are largely not
constructed by approximating a pre-existing mathematical model.
ABM often are the formalization of informal social theory or the modeler’s pre-theoretic
intuitions.3 Therefore, it is impossible to quantitatively evaluate the error between model
and theory. As a consequence, ABM should be considered on equal footing with the
often more general, but only qualitative, informal theory. If the computational model of a
pendulum introduces too large of an error relative to the underlying theoretical model, it
is a defective tool. The same scenario never arises with ABM.4
Furthermore, agent-based models are often inherently discrete – or could be formulated
as discrete without meaningful loss – removing yet another common source of error between
mathematical and compuational models. The modeled agents are usually supposed to have
finite memory, finite choice sets and finite computational capacity. There is no underlying
theory that requires the assumption of continuity. Even time in an ABM need not be
continuous, since all that is relevant is the smallest time interval the agents perceive.5
1Cf. Winsberg (2010) for an influential monograph, or Saam (2015) for a more recent overview
2See Beisbart (2012) for a standard example.
3The main class of exceptions to this generalization are models constructed by relaxing game-theoretic
models, such as the study by Axelrod (cf. 1984, in particular ch. 2–3).
4Of course, an ABM can be rendered defective by empirical inadequacy.
5Agent-based models on opinion formation, such as the one discussed in the previous chapter, often
assume continuous levels of belief; however, in these cases, continuity is generally an idealization, while
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For these differences one should expect agent-based models and simulations to be an
interesting special case of simulations; a special case that allows defending stronger claims
than for computer simulations in general. In the following sections, these four questions in
particular will be discussed:
1. How does the use of digital computers impact understanding?
2. Can the robustness of simulation results provide confirmation?
3. Which relationship holds between ABM and controlled experiments with respect to
the inferences they support?
4. How are normative models in particular evaluated as sound or adequate?
5.2 The Challenge from Opacity
A running computer simulation, whether it implements an agent-based model or a system of
approximated differential equations, performs an excessively large number of basic logical
and arithmetical operations within the machine’s processing units. This capability to
crunch the numbers at a superhuman rate is what enables computer simulations to deliver
results that are otherwise unattainable. However, it has been argued that this exact
power also comes at a substantial epistemic price, namely the opacity, i.e. epistemic
intransparency of the method (Humphreys, 2009).
To fully grasp the threat posed by opacity to theoretical ABM, it is necessary to first
explicate the term a little further. Following Beisbart (2012), I assume that the epistemic
power of a computer simulation can be captured in its reconstruction as a deductive argu-
ment; the initial conditions and the transition rules of the model constitute the premises,
and the resulting sequence of states follows. Deductive arguments per se are not intrans-
parent, but in principle open to human inspection.
Furthermore, the premises are also not problematic, since they are, even on the level
of machine language, still inspectable in principle. This leaves two loci as the possible
source of opacity. Either the sheer length of the conclusion poses a problem, or the actual
execution of the argument does. If it is assumed that the conclusion consists of all states
of the model during the simulation in a large conjunct, it is plausible that the resulting
proposition becomes practically impossible to maintain by a human agent.
The mere length of the conclusion only creates opacity insofar as our tools to analyze it,
i.e. descriptive and inferential statistics, also count as opaque. For sophisticated statistical
techniques, as various kinds of machine learning, the claim to opacity comes down to the
same as for computer simulations in general. But for theoretical ABM, the sequence of
states is actually sufficiently simple to omit tools themselves prone to the challenge of
opacity. Theoretical models of opinion dynamics are often limited to a single state vector
actual agents likely hold beliefs from only a finite set.
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evolving over time, which can be visualized without loss.6 Thus, in the general case, the
sheer number of conjuncts in the conclusion could threaten opacity, but theoretical ABM
are highly resistant to this problem, as their opacity would be tantamount to the opacity
of any large set of data or the methods for its representation.
What about executing the argument? Beisbart (2012) argues that the argument un-
derlying the simulation is actually executed by a coupled system of machine and scientist.
The machine is, at least in some cases, indispensable to the execution; otherwise, the sim-
ulation itself could simply be eliminated in the context of justification, even if it played a
crucial role in the context of discovery. Therefore, the argument is opaque to the scientist
in isolation, and only transparent to the coupled system.
At this point, it is worth stopping and asking: Why is the scientific community actually
interested in epistemic transparency? There are at least two plausible answers, which
may both be true at the same time. Epistemic transparency enables other scientists to
check results. The natural analogy is the surveyability of mathematical proofs: another
competent mathematician should be able to follow a proof, i.e. it should be transparent
to them.7
This rationale for transparency is compatible with considering theoretical ABM trans-
parent, since another coupled system of a different scientist and a different machine has the
capacity to replicate simulation results. This is not to say that there are no practical prob-
lems in following another researcher’s simulation-based argument. Lack of documentation
and limited computational power are standard problems in ABM replication, but they do
not threaten their fundamental epistemic status, just as various limitations in resources
and documentation do practically, but not in principle threaten the epistemic status of
laboratory experiments.8
However, the second reason to require transparency references the scientists themselves
as a psychological agent. Under a certain account of science, the researcher does not
only want to acquire the power to predict events and successfully manipulate the world in
technical applications, but also aims for an understanding of the causal processes in the
world. Understanding by individual scientists, however, is severely limited in the coupled-
system-account: their psychological state alone may or be not be in what Reutlinger et al.
(2017) call the state of “grasping”, since this is not an implication of the coupled system
being in such a state.
What understanding means precisely, and therefore what is required to achieve it, is
controversial both among scientists and philosophers.9 Controversy notwithstanding, all
6There is, as Kuorikoski et al. (2010) point out, a risk to overestimate one’s understanding of a model
in the face of compelling visualizations. But their worry concerns a sense of understanding the causal
process within the model, while I am at this point only interested in the intelligibility of the sequence of
states.
7On a related note, mathematicians have, for this exact reason, been suspicious of automated proofs
(De Millo et al., 1980).
8Note, that this argument fails for certain other simulation models, as replication can become in prin-
ciple impossible due to the need for parallelization and adaption to a specific high-performance computing
machine.
9See the discussions by Reutlinger et al. (2017) and De Regt and Dieks (2005).
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these accounts agree that understanding is a pragmatic notion, and therefore a lack of
understanding fails to pose a threat to the justification of conclusions derived by agent-
based simulations. This observation, though correct, is insufficient to address the original
worry.
The problem is not that inferences based on ABM are not justified – which is closely
related to the peer checks previously discussed – but that they fail to achieve a different
epistemic goal regarding the mental states of scientists. The scientist tries to understand
a phenomenon by grasping a correct explanation.10 Unfortunately, the often employed
notion of “grasping” is notoriously vague and supposedly philosophically primitive.
This vagueness makes it difficult to assess the understanding provided by ABM. For
example, does it count as grasping an explanation in the relevant sense if the relation ranges
over explanations, phenomena, and coupled systems of computers and scientists instead
of scientists alone? To circumvent this problem, I suggest to spell out the motivation for
understanding more precisely.
I conjecture that scientists are striving for understanding to acquire a justified sense
of understanding. The sense of understanding is the purely subjective state of mind that
human agents can enter on grasping an explanation, regardless of its correctness. Whether
the sense of understanding is justified depends on the precise account understanding; on
Streven’s “simple view”, for example, it requires the scientist to entertain an explanation
and for that explanation to stand in a certain relationship to the world (?). On another
account, such as the contextual account suggested by De Regt and Dieks (2005), the
conditions differ. But in all cases, there is a notion of legitimate understanding, to which
scientists are implicitly committed, but which is only contingently linked to the sense of
understanding.
Note that this account includes a psychological claim: scientists are motivated, at least
partly, by their desire to experience a sense of understanding, though constrained by some
set of justificatory criteria. The history of science seems to stand witness to this claim,
but its truth remains a contingent empirical matter.
If this claim is correct, the use of theoretical ABM poses no threat to understanding.
Theoretical ABM can clearly create a sense of understanding.11 Part of the reason is that
the transition rules are interpretable in terms of human behavior, and the simplicity of the
models allows the analyst to inspect not all, but still a substantial portion of the executed
operations. The fact that no translation between the theoretical model and its algorithmic
implementation is necessary contributes further to the sense of understanding by removing
technical hindrances.
Of course this does not ensure that the criteria for actual understanding are fulfilled.
But as argued above, there is no reason to believe that partial opacity to the human
scientist threatens the justification of their inference. Whether such an inference is actually
10This is the core of Strevens “simple view”. Reutlinger et al. suggest certain important refinements,
without changing the core of the theory. (Reutlinger et al., 2017). DeRegt and Dieks also discuss the
opposing position of Trout (2002), whom they trace back to the view presented by Hempel (1965).
11The discussion of simulation results in Axelrod (cf. 1984, ch. 2) and Hegselmann and Krause (2002)
stand witness to this claim.
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justified depends on the relationship between the explanation embodied in the simulation
and the model’s target, and imposes no additional conditions on the mental state of the
scientist. Therefore, theoretical ABM can succeed in providing that good that is sought
for in understanding.
5.3 Robust Phenomena in ABM
Agent-based modelers are often expending substantial effort to establish the robustness of
their results. Variations in assumptions, sensitivity analysis and cross-implementations are
standard techniques in the field.12 But what is supposed to be established by robustness
results, what are their limitations, and when should results be fragile to modifications in
the model rather than robust?
The analysis of robust consequence of models has a history that ranges back at least
to Levins (1968), who suggested robustness analysis as an important tool in theoretical
biology. Models in population biology, for example, often have to resort to various strong
idealizations, approximations and tractability assumptions to yield solutions. As these
assumptions are not themselves justified directly, the model’s epistemic status depends on
its robustness against variation in these arbitrary assumptions.
Agent-based models may appear to differ, since they often are constructed as simulation
models right from the start, and therefore are less reliant on tractability assumptions.
However, they are still very much reliant on both idealizations and technical assumptions
of various kinds, and the need for robustness is anything but lessened in ABM.
My intention is not to analyze the ongoing controversy on robustness analysis and its
epistemic role in general 13, but instead I shall focus on two particular questions: (1) Is it
possible to confirm the existence of phenomena by establishing robustness across models?
(2) Under which conditions should the results of a model break down, or put otherwise: to
which variations in modeling should the results be fragile?
5.3.1 Non-Empirical Confirmation
At a first glance, the idea of non-empirical confirmation is anathema to modern science. As
important as theory is, it only acquires credibility by empirical testing. The elegance, con-
sistency, scope and any other virtues of a theory, that is the standard assumption, cannot
step in for thorough empirical confirmation.14 The literature on robustness analysis thus
understandably either expresses incredulity at the suspected suggestion of non-empirical
confirmation (Odenbaugh and Alexandrova, 2011) or tries to establish the increase in cred-
ibility provided by robustness analysis as different from confirmation to avoid a seemingly
12Axelrod (1997) offers a good example of how difficult it can be to achieve even the simplest form of
robustness, namely replicability.
13Main positions in the debate can be found in Holman and Bruner (2015)
14I presume that accounts like naive falsificationism remain discredited due to arguments along the lines
of Lakatos (1968).
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absurd claim.
But on closer inspection, confirmation by robustness is not nearly as absurd, at least
in the realm of agent-based modeling.15 Agent-based models of opinion dynamics serve
as the running example. A central objective of such models is to establish the conditions
under which polarization arises. As Ma¨s and Flache (2013) point out, various mechanisms
have been suggested to explain polarization phenomena: bounded confidence in other
agents, negative influence and the homophilous choice of communication partners provide
prominent examples.
Now consider the following thought experiment: imagine a medieval scholar, who, by
a time traveling accident, gets hold of a digital computer and an introductory textbook
on agent-based modeling and simulation to acquire all the basic skills to build the above
mentioned models on his own – and so he does. Next, the scholar wonders about the
patterns of opinion in the villages surrounding his monastery; given his insight that a wide
variety of mechanisms could bring about polarization, is he warranted in increasing his
belief to find patterns of polarization, and thereby, acquire confirmation for the hypothesis
“for all villages X, opinion polarization is likely to occur”?
The answer is yes, for the following reason: Assume that the scholar attributes some
probability p(M1), p(M2), . . . p(Mn)16 for all the mechanisms which are potentially at
work.17 His simulations show that all these mechanisms generate phenomenon R, patterns
of polarization. Furthermore, the different mechanisms are not counteracting each other
to the best of his knowledge. Therefore, any additional mechanism added to the scholar’s
knowledge base increases the credibility of finding polarization in any given village.
The point is strongest when a phenomenon is considered impossible or at least extremely
unlikely, such as the existence of Giffen goods in economics.18 A Giffen good is defined as
one for which demand increases with rising prices. If a phenomenon is deemed impossible
for the lack of a plausible explanation, its existence should become more likely to an agent
first encountering such an explanation.
Given the apparent absurdity of its consequence, this argument requires closer inspec-
tion. First of all, the kind of robustness is different from the technique Kuorikoski et al.
(2010) identify with economic theory. According to their account, the desideratum is ro-
bustness against variations in merely mathematical tractability assumptions, not the core
causal mechanism or substantial idealizations. This actually establishes the relevant differ-
ence between the two cases: increasing the number of mechanisms that could bring about
a phenomenon increases the likelihood of the phenomenon, given that the mechanisms
themselves are not impossible and do not counteract each other.
15I suspect that the argument is extensible to include at least some of the standard examples from
geographical economics (Kuorikoski et al., 2010) and population biology (cf. Levins, 1968, cited from
Odenbaugh and Alexandrova (2011)), but I am not defending such a claim here.
16Following a common shorthand, I use capital letters both to denote an entity or process in the world
and the proposition asserting its existence in the actual world.
17The number of possible alternatives is assumed to be finite. For a defense of this assumption, cf.
Dawid et al. (2015).
18See Nachbar (1998) for a discussion.
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Tractability assumptions, on the other hand, are known not to be true for the target
system and supposed to not contribute anything to the explanation. Therefore, unlike
robustness against variation in the core mechanism, replacing the former type of assump-
tions cannot provide confirmation the same way showing robustness against substantial
assumpations can.
Another crucial assumption is constituted by the two conditions mentioned in passing,
namely that the mechanism is actually not known not to be instantiated and that the
various mechanisms do not counteract each other. Let me start with the former.
In the case of ABM, it is often plausible that in different social systems in the space of
potential target systems, different mechanisms are at work. There is, to the best of con-
temporary knowledge, no universal law precisely governing the social exchange of opinion.
In fact, there is a more general skepticism about universality in social systems (Gallegati
et al., 2006), blocking arguments common to discourse in physics (Dardashti et al., 2015).
Therefore, the assumption that a certain social group is operating under a certain
mechanism usually cannot be known to be false in advance of inspecting this particular
group. Therefore, it is plausible that numerous mechanisms should be attributed positive
probability.
The assumption of non-counteracting processes is more difficult to establish. To be
precise, the assumption is that the mechanisms do not counteract each other such as
to render the phenomenon R at most as likely as by one of the mechanisms operating
alone. Put simple, adding another operating process has to make the outcome to be
confirmed more likely. This assumption can be circumvented by additional assumptions on
the likelihood of the processes to operate, but obtaining such likelihoods plausibly requires
empirical means.
If this is actually a sound argument, why doesn’t non-empirical confirmation play a
bigger role in science? There are several possible answers. First, the probabilities to be
gained may very well be tiny compared to the gains by empirical investigation. Actually
inspecting the opinions of the villagers and finding a pattern of polarization seems to
provide a lot more confirmation than enumerating mechanisms; the pragmatic scientific
rationale of such an enumeration is hypothesis generation, not confirmation.
Second, there simply might not be a substantial number of possible mechanisms known.
Theoretical ABM are, due to the ease of manipulation and simulation, particularly capable
of inflating the number of possible explanations. However, the results of this practice point
to a third, and the most important reason that non-empirical confirmation plays little to
no role in the acquisition of scientific knowledge.
In ABM, for each result establishing a certain phenomenon using a particular model,
one can usually find at least one response, be that another model, a variation of the original,
or merely a further exploration of the full parameters space, showing that the result is only
valid for a narrow parameter range or that mechanism M∗ actually generates quite different
results R∗. As any known mechanism Mi generating R increases the likelihood that R
actually occurs, every mechanism Mj generating R∗ =⇒ ¬R decreases this likelihood.
Therefore, the actual degree of confirmation is not only diminished substantially, it also
waxes and wanes dramatically in an area where new models are constructed as easily as
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in ABM.
It is also helpful to contrast these considerations with a different, but related argument
for non-empirical confirmation, the so-called no-alternatives argument (Dawid et al., 2015).
If certain conditions on the number of possible alternatives, the difficulty of the problem and
a few technical requirements are satisfied, according to the no-alternatives-argument, the
fact that scientists are unable to identify equally empirically adequate alternative theories
confirms the existing theories.
The argument shares the basic tenet that non-empirical facts can provide confirmation,
but is structurally very different. The argument is set before the background of physics,
which has a successful history of narrowing down the set of empirically adequate candidate
theories. The argument from multirealizability or robustness instead has to be understood
in the light of scientific practice in the social sciences, where theories rarely are rejected,
and even basic empirical facts can be controversial.19 What is actually to be confirmed is
a proposition on the prevalence of a phenomenon.
Furthermore, the no-alternative-argument departs from a point of highly satisfactory
theories, while the baseline of the argument from robustness is actually not to have any
mechanism at hand explaining a phenomenon, and therefore rejecting its existence when
empirical evidence is lacking or ambiguous. But both arguments are built on the idea that
the existence of an alternative theory or mechanism may impact the degree of confirma-
tion. In the case of the no-alternative-argument, the absence of alternatives to explain an
established phenomenon supports existing theory; in the case of robust realizability, the in-
dependence from a particular theoretical mechanism confirms the existence of an uncertain
phenomenon.
5.3.2 The Need for Fragility
The debate on robustness is generally centered around the question which epistemic ad-
vantages robustness confers once it has been established. But at times, the flip side of
this debate surfaces, as when Kuorikoski et al. (2010) point out that outcomes should be
sensitive to changes in the Galilean idealizations. By Galilean idealizations, they refer to
idealizations which remove the influence of causal factors that are believed to impact the
systems behavior in the actual world.20 The point of such idealizations generally is to
investigate a particular causal mechanism. Disregarding friction in physics, migration and
mutation in population biology or transaction cost in markets are common examples of
Galilean idealizations.
Opposed to these are mere mathematical or technical assumptions that ensure tractabil-
ity. Choosing a certain class of utility functions, assuming infinite populations, and deciding
on a particular update schedule in ABM are common examples of such assumptions. They
are, according to the prevailing view, insubstantial and should therefore not impact the
results. Robustness against such assumptions is seen as evidence that the outcome is a
19Compare my previous references to the polarization debate in political science.
20For another classification of idealizations, cf. ?.
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product of the substantial assumptions at work.
This picture of the adequate extent of fragility is, however, too limited in the case of
ABM.21 There are two major problems: (1) Fragility against variation in or relaxation of
Galilean idealizations is not always desirable. (2) In some cases of prima facie arbitrary
technical assumptions, fragility is desirable. Let me start by elaborating the former claim.
Take, once again, the example of polarization of opinions. Empirical investigations
support the hypothesis that polarization is a pervasive phenomenon.22 But at the same
time, it is very plausible that a variety of mechanisms is operating in opinion dynamics.
Therefore, relaxing Galilean idealizations in models of opinion dynamics, such as the in-
dependence of beliefs in different propositions, should be expected not to threaten the
prevalence of polarization in all cases,
By definition, relaxing a Galilean idealization should have an impact on system behav-
ior; it is possible for different effects to cancel out, in particular when relaxing or varying
multiple idealizations at once, but more commonly there should be an observable impact
on system behavior. Adding friction to a frictionless plane should change the behavior of
the ball rolling down. Up to this point, the received view that model behavior should not
be robust against changes in Galilean idealizations holds up.
However, when switching from the exact quantitative picture to a more qualitative one,
there is no compelling support for the same claim. First of all, while there are quantitative
measures of polarization that could be evaluated precisely as to what a certain variation in
idealizations effectuates, polarization is not uniquely defined by one particular measure. If
different measures agree that a social group is somewhat polarized in opinion, but disagree
about the precise degree, a change in idealizations can end up in the same measures still
pointing to polarization, just to a different degree. In particular, one measure may judge
polarization to be more severe under idealization I, another measure under the alternative
set of idealizing assumptions I∗.
This points to a second reason why phenomenological fragility against variations in
Galilean idealizations is not generally to be expected. Phenomena are often operational-
izations of fairly abstract concepts such as, in the running example, opinion polarization;
but the same holds true for the division into center and periphery in geographical eco-
nomics – the example Kuorikoski et al. (2010) utilitze. The reason that one should expect
such higher-level phenomena to be robust not only against technical, but also substantial
assumptions, is their multirealizability in the actual world.
The social world is, just as agent-based models representing it, highly varied in the
details of its organizations. Nevertheless, social scientists and philosophers observe certain
relatively universal phenomena: Social norms are established and maintained, certain pat-
terns of opinion in a communicating group repeat across conditions, market failures occur
across time and geographical location as long as something resembling a market exists,
and so forth. But the underlying organizational forms and therefore the implementing
21Once again, I believe that a similar argument could be put forward in other areas, but since I am not
providing such an argument here, I will only commit to the more modest claim about ABM.
22Cf. McCright and Dunlap (2011); Fiorina and Abrams (2008); Evans (2003); Poole and Rosenthal
(1984) for a differentiated discussion.
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mechanisms to be modeled change drastically.
There are two plausible general forms to explain this fact. First, there are actually
certain universal human features that allow the replication of said phenomena under a va-
riety of circumstances. For the time being, I dismiss this approach. The second one claims
that the same macroscopical phenomena are realizable by means of various different mech-
anisms. If this view is accurate, there is a correspondence to the variation of non-technical
assumptions in agent-based models. If the phenomena are robust across actual mechanisms
in the real world, they certainly should be against variation in the representations of those
mechanisms.
But it is also not clear that model behavior should always be invariant under changes
in technical assumptions. Consider the following two examples:23 in the case of the core-
periphery model of geographical economics, as mentioned before, it is necessary to assume
some class of utility functions to fully specify the model. In the original version of the
model, these are so-called iceberg utilities. As Kuorikoski et al. argue, economists have
since provided results supporting substantial robustness against variation in this assump-
tion, which they take to strengthen the model.
Similarly, Hegselmann and Krause (2002) point out that they tested their model to
be robust against replacing a synchronous update schedule for their agents by sequential
update in random order. Again, they treat this as increasing the robustness of their results
in some relevant sense.
However, while the assumptions are considered technical, they could just as well be
framed as Galilean idealizations. Instead of using an update ordering of any real group of
agents – which is highly unlikely to be ever known – opinion dynamics models assume an
update order in their algorithm. But effects such as anchoring, where agents adapt their
estimates according to an initially presented anchor (Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995), point
to the actual impact of ordering on process outcomes.
Similarly, while it is a technical requirement to choose one particular class of utility
functions, it might still be assumed that there is a utility function that actually models
accurately human behavior in spatially differentiated markets. Hence, these assumptions
could be analyzed as Galilean idealizations, too, and as a consequence, the analyst can
legitimately expect outcomes generated by their model to be fragile against variation in
these assumptions.
The simplest response to keep up the idea that results should be fragile only against
Galilean idealizations in the light of these problems would be to argue that these assump-
tions have been misclassified as technical assumptions. The class of technical assumptions
would then shrink drastically; the discretization of continuous equations in physics is one
of the remaining examples, so the distinction would still not break down entirely. This
response seems largely satisfactory, but leaves one significant point of concern.
There is a clear difference between the omission of friction on a plane and the assumption
of a specific update schedule in an ABM: without friction, the physicist can still write down
a completely specified model, in the sense that it can be solved – or at least attempted
23The example of the core-periphery model and its analysis is adopted from Kuorikoski et al. (2010).
5.4 ABM in the Methodological Landscape 103
to be solved. An ABM without an update schedule, on the other hand, is incomplete; it
cannot be solved. It is not clear how fundamental this difference actually is, but at least
at the surface, it provides a distinction between these assumptions.
To summarize, the claim that models should be robust against variation in merley
technical assumptions can be upheld, if at some cost. However, there is no general fact of
the matter whether the behavior of ABM – and potentially other types of model – should
be robust or fragile against variation and relaxation in Galilean idealizations. Deciding
towards what an ABM’s outcomes should be fragile has, unfortunately for the philosopher,
to be decided partly on empirical grounds.
5.4 ABM in the Methodological Landscape
Since the early days of agent-based modeling and simulation, its practitioners tried to
situate it on the methodological map. From the early days on, agent-based models have
been suggested as a great tool in the theoretician’s toolbox. As Schelling (1971) famously
argued, his model of residential segregation offers only a potential explanation of the phe-
nomenon.24 Agent-based models can undeniably support claims to possibility, which are a
crucial part of the enterprise of social theory.
Beyond this basic capability, ABM like the Schelling model allow the theoretician to
block certain inferences; in the case of residential segregation, an inference from the phe-
nomenon to underlying racist sentiments. The mere existence of an alternative explanation
invalidates the inference from the macroscopical observation to a certain set of individual
level motives. This picture also fits very well with accounts within the social sciences: Ax-
elrod (1997) argued that simulations are theoretical in the sense that they are built from
a set of formalized assumptions; the analysis of simulations results resembles the analysis
of empirical data, but it actually is an application of inferential statistics to a distribution
of theorems.
Putting aside their theoretical capabilities, it has been a long standing controversy in the
philosophy of science to which degree computer simulations are also epistemically similar
– more precisely, similarly powerful in their ability to support inferences – to controlled
experiments. The arguments often fail to transfer from the general case of simulations to
that of ABM, so I will skip large parts of the debate and turn immediately to this particular
case.25
The appropriate category for comparison in the case of ABM are human subject lab-
oratory experiments in the social sciences. Such experiments are most often employed
in psychology and economics, but there is also an increasing utilization in sociology, and
certainly on sociological issues.26 There are, at the surface, obvious differences between
24He actually claims explicitly that legal and economic inequality are indispensable for an actual expla-
nation of residential segregation in the United States of his day (cf. Schelling, 1971, p. 144–145).
25I refer the reader to (Saam, 2015) for an overview of the debate from the viewpoint of social science.
26Paradigmatic cases of lab experiments are reported, to give just a minimal, but quite representative
sample from various disciplines, in the studies by Milgram (1963), Tversky and Kahneman (1981) or
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agent-based simulation and experiment.27
But on closer inspection, most of these differences vanish and only one main epistemic
difference remains: experiments, unlike ABM, give immediate rise to the claim that the
observed behavior could also be observed outside the laboratory, that the investigated
mechanism could also impact behavior in uncontrolled environments. This inference can
be called an inference to implementability.
My argument will proceed from an account of the epistemically irrelevant differences
between simulation and experiment to establishing and investigating the remaining dis-
tinction and its impact on the interpretation of results generated from ABM.
5.4.1 Narrowing the Gap
Since there is no uncontroversial account of the epistemic power of computer simulations
(CS), it is difficult to establish an unassailable argument on its relationship to experiments.
To arrive at an account that is robust against even strong variations in basic accounts of the
epistemology of CS, I shall sketch two accounts which at the surface lead to contradicting
conclusions on the relationship between simulation and experiment. The focus will be the
exact remainder in difference between those two accounts, since this difference, as it turns
out, can be identified with the difference between human subject experiment and ABM.
The most thoroughgoing argument to establish a fundamental epistemic difference be-
tween laboratory experiment and computer simulation is Beisbart’s argument view (Beis-
bart, 2012). According to Beisbart, every CS can be reconstructed as a deductive argument,
and its epistemic power reduces to that of the argument. Another way to put the difference
is that relative to an experiment, CS are “overcontrolled” (cf. Beisbart, 2011, Sec. 4.5.1),
meaning that the outcomes depend solely on the assumptions and implementation details
going into the simulation model and its implementation as a computational model.
In terms of causation, experiments in the social sciences assume at least one causal
pathway relevant to the experimental outcome running through a human agent. In a
computer simulation representing the same process, everything is internal to the model’s
implementation, and could, at least in principle, be derived without simulation. This is an
accurate observation in principle, but misses the point when transferred from the original
application to rather simple physical systems to human subject experiments and ABM. I
remain agnostic as to whether it is actually useful for more complicated physical systems.
First, the argument view fails to account for the opacity of computer simulations 28. The
complexity of computer simulations hinders the scientist from effectively overcontrolling the
simulation; this is why results obtained from agent-based simulation are so often surprising
Diekmann et al. (2015).
27When I refer to experiments in this paper, it always means human subject controlled experiment. I am
aware that there are other experimental methods employed in the social sciences, such as field experiments,
and I believe that their epistemology differs more substantially from that of ABM.
28Cf. the discussion in Section 5.2. Note that the argument there was not to dismiss opacity, but only
its impact on understanding.
5.4 ABM in the Methodological Landscape 105
to the modelers themselves. As a consequence, the overcontrol argument, though plausible
in the abstract, fails to delimit simulations from experiments.
Second, the object of investigation actually can exist in a digital computer in agent-
based models. There is no pendulum, no acceleration or angle to be found in the machine
running Beisbart’s pendulum model. However, the mental states of human agents – a
crucial object of interest in ABM and human subject experiments – can be reproduced by
a digital computer. As human agents maintain certain beliefs by virtue of certain brain
states, artificial agents can maintain the same states of belief by virtue of hardware states.29
Beisbart is still right that the actual processes running within the simulation are entirely
determined by the modeler, but the particular difference between physical models and ABM
diminish the distance between experiments and this particular subtype of simulation.
On the opposite end of the debate, Morrison (2009) utilizes the shared need for mediat-
ing models in experiments and computer simulations to narrow the gap between these two
methodologies. The experimental measurement of particle spin serves as one of her main
examples: it requires not only heavy experimental machinery, but it remains indirect with
physical necessity. Therefore, the models connecting spin with measurable quantities are
indispensable to the measurement procedure. According to Morrison, this creates a fun-
damental similarity to computer simulations, which are also interpreted as measurement
devices in the same fashion as the models employed in the experimental measurement of
spin.
This account can be labeled “assimilatory”, since it narrows the apparent epistemic
gap between computer and laboratory experiments, without generally closing it entirely.
Morrison concludes that simulation results are measurements in the same sense as the
outcome of an experiment. Note that, even if the conclusion is valid, it does not yet
imply that simulations and experiments are epistemically on a par. As Guala (2002) and
Winsberg (2003, cited from Frigg and Reiss (2009)) point out, the power of computational
methods crucially depends on background knowledge, and so do experiments.
Morrison appears to believe that this leaves both methods equally epistemically pow-
erful; the mere fact that experiments are executed on “the same stuff” the target system
consists of cannot establish an epistemic difference, and background knowledge can be as
good as or better in the case of simulations than experiments.
It is important to point out that Morrison’s account is logically compatible with Beis-
bart’s argument view. With sufficient background knowledge and technical capability, it
should be possible to exert enough control in a human subject experiment to reconstruct
it as an argument, too: If the scientist can set the relevant initial brain state and has an
approximately formal theory of its transitions under experimental manipulation, it seems
plausible that this activity is also reconstructible as an argument, employing the coupled
system of scientist and human subject instead of a digital computer.
The scientist does not even have to be able to choose the initial brain state: she could
29Beisbart is, I believe, himself committed to the view that machines are able to entertain beliefs, since
his reconstruction thesis claims that the argument reconstructing the simulation is performed by a coupled
system of scientist and machine. (cf. Beisbart, 2012, pp. 419–428)
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instead measure it with high precision; just as in many computer simulation studies, where
the initial state is often not directly controlled but chosen at random and recorded.
So as it turns out, the difference between plausible assimilatory views and accounts
emphasizing the fundamental epistemic difference between simulation and experiment is
way more subtle than it appears at first. I conjecture that the main difference actually
concerns the background knowledge necessary to transfer simulation and experimental
results to knowledge about the target system.
Is there a general account of the relevant background knowledge, regardless of the type
of computer simulation and subject matter discipline? While the above-mentioned accounts
of simulation draw heavily on examples taken from physics, the implicit assumption is that
they are transferable. Before turning to the special case of ABM and controlled experiments
in the social sciences, I shall provide an indirect argument against this hypothesis.
Returning to Morrison’s spin example, there appears to be an important difference
between running an experiment and simulating the same process, even if either results in
measurement: In the experiment, according to physical background knowledge, a feature
of the same physical kind (spin) as in other physical systems is present. The justification
of external validity, i.e. the transfer of outcomes to spin systems in general, depends on
this physical similarity. Note that it does not rely on material similarity unqualified, but
according to a specific physical background theory that attributes spin to many physical
systems.
Computer simulation does not rely on an actual instantiation of the physical property of
spin, and therefore establishing its external validity needs additional inferential steps that
establish the relationship of representation between the model and any physical system.30
The same is not necessarily true for human subject experiments. As argued above,
artificial agents actually are able to hold belief, i.e. the object under investigation is of the
same kind – namely a multirealizable mental state. While there is still additional work to
be done to establish external validity, it is much less demanding than in the physical case.
Between the physical spin system and the computer model, there is a difference in kind.
I leave it to physicists and philosophers of physics to spell out the exact requirements
on inferences to establish the model-target relation necessary to conclude external validity.
But mental states, the fundamental building block of an ABM’s target in the social sciences,
are of the same kind as the representations possible in a digital computer. Therefore, the
epistemic difference between the two can be narrowed down to one very particular inference
relying on background knowledge.
5.4.2 Inferences to Implementability
First, consider which inferences are generally supported by laboratory experiments in the
social sciences. A typical example can be found in framing experiments (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981). Subjects are split into multiple groups, with the most basic version being
30Parker (2009) makes a very similar point to support the idea that materiality itself is not important,
but relevant similarity, which can, but does not have to be, ensured by material similarity.
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two. Then, they are presented with a choice between a risky and a deterministic option
to choose. Scenario descriptions differ for the experimental groups, but the respective
options across the frames are equivalent in terms of expected outcome; they only differ, for
example, with respect to whether the deterministic outcome is letting people die or killing
them.31 Such experiments regularly result in significant framing effects, i.e. the proportion
of agents choosing the risky or the deterministic option – in general probabilistically –
depends on the framing in terms of killing or letting die.
What claims can be established by such experiments and their results? For starters,
it does not follow that human agents are subject to framing effects regardless of context.
The laboratory necessarily creates a highly artificial environment to control for the impact
of anything but the investigated phenomenon, in our case framing. Standard techniques to
control for interfering influences include randomization of conditions, recording certain fea-
tures of the subjects and applying inference statistics category-wise and most importantly,
isolating the laboratory environment from the innumerable set of events accompanying and
impacting real-world choices.
However, laboratory experiments support certain claims about the mechanisms under
investigation. Framing experiments establish the existence of framing effects, therefore
providing potential explanations for various phenomena observable in the wild. Potential
explanations, though, are precisely what agent-based models and simulations are supposed
to deliver. Schelling’s famous model of residential segregation according to his own account
provides a potential explanation, whereas the real-world phenomenon of ethnic segregation
requires a complex, multi-factorial explanation.
The shared artificiality of controlled experiments and ABM lets neither of them pro-
vide immediate actual explanations of any phenomenon found in the real world of human
behavior. Both are suitable to establish possible explanations, but laboratory experiments
are also able to establish certain existence claims. Precisely in those existence claims lies
the remaining difference between experiment and ABM.
The inference that any laboratory experiment supports, but needs to be established
separately for any ABM, is the one to implementability in the target system. The infer-
ence is in fact tautological for the experimental setting, since to perform an experiment
successfully implies that whatever the relationship between the resulting phenomenon and
the experimental manipulation turns out to be, can be realized in actual human agents.
The same does not hold true for the computer simulation of an ABM, and in some cases,
the inference to implementability is quite difficult.
In general, ABM are designed on the basis of simple agentic rules that enable an easy,
though merely inductively valid, inference to implementability. Consider, once again, the
Schelling model. The only behavioral rule agents follow requires them to count the fre-
quency with which members of different ethnicities occur in their immediate neighborhood,
compare the result with a certain threshold and, conditional on the result of the compari-
son, move to a different neighborhood. Every step in the algorithm can be easily performed
31This is not the place to discuss whether there is an important difference in the propositional content
of the two vignettes, such as an important moral difference.
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by a human agent with normal perceptual capabilities, the ability to count and to compare
natural numbers.
Some real human agents lack some of these abilities, and furthermore might be limited in
their choice to move or impacted by competing causal pathways determining their settling
behavior, but it is difficult to deny implementability in human agents. But this fallible
argument has to be provided, since the inference does not come with the construction and
execution of the simulation model itself.
Not all agent-based models make it that easy to argue for implementability. Olsson and
Vallinder (2013) suggest an ABM for epistemic communities engaging in individual inquiry
and social exchange of reports, simultaneously updating their beliefs in a given hypothesis
and the reliability of both themselves as an inquirer and their interaction partners as
sources of information. The degree of belief is represented as a simple probability, but the
reliability estimation requires entertaining and updating a continuous probability density.
Here, it needs to be established that the numerical representation of the continuous
function is sufficiently good with respect to the model’s purpose; numerical adequacy is
a generic problem for discretization that could just as well arise in a physics simulation.
The more interesting point is that the most common architecture for digital computers,
the von-Neumann machine, is structurally very different from the human brain. Thus, the
claim that the von-Neumann machine and the human brain are capable of implementing
the same function or a sufficiently similar one efficiently, is less than obvious.
In summary, laboratory experiments provide the experimenter with the inference to
implementability for free, whereas the simulationist has to put in additional work to draw
it. How much additional work is required depends on the ABM in question. On a side
note, this gives at least one argument to keep agent behavior simple to ensure a robust
inductive inference to implementability.
As important as this difference is, it seems to be less than is commonly assumed about
the epistemic difference between computer simulation and laboratory experiments. This
assimilation is both attributing more epistemic power to agent-based simulations, and
reducing the assumed power of laboratory experiments in the human sciences. However,
the remaining difference seems to leave laboratory experiments as the epistemically superior
method, all else being equal; but all else is very much not equal.
Even if simulations were epistemically strictly inferior, they would not be rendered ob-
solete, since there are prudential and ethical limitations to human subject experiments.
Not only do they bear the potential to harm subjects, they also tend to consume immense
resources. Standard ABM of opinion formation can easily be run on a modern desktop
computer simulating thousands of agents, which is for all practical purposes impossible in
the laboratory. In the age of large-scale online social networking platforms, field experi-
ments on such scales have actually become possible. The degree of control necessary for
a controlled experiment in the strict sense cannot be exerted in such experiments, leaving
them in a different methodological category.
But the advantages of agent-based models and their simulation go beyond enabling
otherwise impossible studies. Such models, unlike an experiment, explicitly state the
mechanism(s) governing agent behavior. Thus, an ABM does not only establish an input-
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output relationship between independent and dependent variables, it gives an immediate
theoretical interpretation as long as the behavioral rules have been designed providing a
thoroughgoing interpretation. In the case of an experiment, a theoretical model has to be
imposed on the processes unfolding within the actual human agents. Therefore, the ABM
can support a more immediate claim to understanding.
The experimenter may – and probably should – supply the additional inference to
a theoretical mechanism, just as the simulationist should offer an argument for imple-
mentability. Unlike the inference to implementability in ABM, this kind of inference is
commonly included explicitly in experimental studies, since experiments are usually set up
as operationalizations of certain theory-inspired hypotheses.
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that any well-designed ABM, meaning in this
context one with a thoroughgoing interpretation of any variable and rule included, provides
the connection to theory for free. This fact is plausibly a driving reason for social scientists
to employ ABM in theory exploration rather than in support of existence claims, based on
the free inference preferred for the purpose.
To summarize, the epistemic capabilities of simulations of ABM versus laboratory ex-
periments in the social sciences differ, but only in a narrow sense: agent-based simulations
require background knowledge that supports inferences to implementability that come for
free with laboratory experiments. On the other hand, agent-based models easily provide at
least one theoretical interpretation due to their formal nature, which has to be supplanted
in experimental studies. Either method requires more extensive inferential work if it is
to be generalized beyond claims to existence and possibility, but the only fundamental
difference is to be found in establishing these very basic types of claims.
5.5 The Adequacy of Normative Models
The philosophical use of agent-based models differs in one important respect from its ap-
plication in science: Normative conclusions are to be derived by its utilization. Titelbaum
(2017) explores a variety of the advantages of model building in a normative enterprise,
but throughout his discussion assumes that there is a normative equivalent to descriptive
facts that model outcomes fit or fail to fit. If that assumption is necessary to make sense of
normative modeling, the modeler seems to be committed to a realist view of the normative
realm.32
But on closer inspection, it turns out that normative modelers should commit to a
constructivist view of the normative realm, even though they are not logically forced to
adopt such a theory. Let me first state what I take to be a realist and a constructivist view
of the normative:
Definition 1 (Realism) On a realist account of normativity, normative statements are
true or false, regardless of our knowledge of or even access to the normative facts thereby
32Note that my claim is not itself ontological, but rather concerns the ontological commitments of a
certain epistemology.
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expressed.
Definition 2 (Constructivism) On a constructivist account of normativity, the truth or
falsity (or undecidability) of normative statements depends on an agent’s – or population’s
– attitude towards them. In that sense, normative facts are constructed, usually following a
procedure such as reflective equilibrium (Rawls, 1975). Hence, the construction is restricted
by requirements such as rationality, and results in propositions, i.e. implies that normative
assertions can be true, false or undecidable.
It is worth pointing out that, while certainly not uniformly accepted, in particular among
philosophers, a realist account of descriptive facts and their relationship to models is ap-
pealing. There, Titelbaum’s description of comparing models with respect to their fit to
data offers an adequate account of modeling practice. This is not to reject the claim of
theory-laddeness for the realm of descriptive modeling. Which descriptive facts are con-
sidered relevant or are sought after in the first place may very well depend on the available
models. As Morrison (2009) points out, models can be irreplaceable tools in accessing
empirical facts. But this does not threaten the idea that there are facts regardless of our
attitude towards them, or whether we even existed with our particular cognitive capacities.
The same is problematic in the normative realm for a number of reasons that metaethi-
cists have been developing for quite some time. I focus on two points particularly relevant
to normative modeling: the possibility of epistemic access to data, and pragmatics of the
model construction process.
Titelbaum suggests that the relevant data for normative models could be provided, for
example, by intuitions (Titelbaum, 2017).33 But intuitions fall notoriously short of two
important conditions we expect from data: interpersonal and intrapersonal persistence.
Examples of both intra- and interpersonally ephemeral intuitions are easy to be found.
Nozick (1969) discusses his observation that audiences confronted with the Newcomb prob-
lem have strong, but divergent intuitions of what is rationally required.34 Philosophical
thought experiments eliciting intuitions are often faced with this challenge, and whatever
constitutes their utility, it cannot rely on it producing interpersonally consistent intuitions.
For the intrapersonal part, it is helpful to look at framing effects in the so-called trolley
problem. Trolley problems are a type of thought experiment, commonly analyzed in nor-
mative ethics. In one standard variant, the decision maker faces a choice between killing
one person to save multiple others in one case, and letting one die to achieve the same in
another (Thomson, 1976). There are many further variations of the problem, but it ap-
pears that people facing this decision problem fail to be consistent in their action-guiding
33I discuss only intuitions as a possible source of normative facts, since Titelbaums only alternative
suggestion – well-constructed arguments – have to be built on assumptions themselves and generally
cannot serve as a fixed point for model evaluation as is required by the realist view.
34The problem creates diverging guidance from the decision principles of dominance and expected utility
maximization, and elicits intuitions on which to follow. One way of reading it may also be that neither rule
tells the whole story, but I am not concerned so much with the interpretation of this particular thought
experiment than the diverging intuitions it evokes.
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intuitions. A common explanation to such inconsistencies of intuition are the aforemen-
tioned framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981): when essentially the same decision
problem is rephrased, human agents often respond to the re-framing and switch judg-
ment. If that is the correct explanation of the observed behavior, intuitions also fail to be
intrapersonally persistent.
But to fit a model, it cannot be that one philosopher has “data” another cannot repli-
cate; even worse, the fit of a model may depend largely on the way the modeler chose to
frame the problem to himself before formalizing it. Therefore, intuitions fail to play the
role of data for normative modeling, and a compelling alternative is lacking.
Note, that this argument need not even deny the possibility that intuitions might be a
somewhat unreliable device of accessing normative facts. The argument is built entirely on
the features of these “measurements” that make them unfit to play the role that empirical
data plays for descriptive modeling.
Titelbaum touches the pragmatics of normative modeling several times, in particular
when discussing the AGM framework. The aspect I am interested in concerns the way new
normative principles arise in modeling; sometimes they are built-in, and serve the purpose
of satisfying certain desiderata, such as logical consistency.
But there are many cases where normative principles are better understood as a con-
sequence of the model, or introduced within the context of the model and later re-applied
to the target as already normative. Weisberg and Muldoon (2009), for example, introduce
multiple alternative success measures along the way of analyzing their agent-based model,
realizing that their initial normative standard did not capture everything they found rele-
vant.
For another example, Douven (2010) switches from one measure of accuracy to another
to accommodate the possibility that one of his variables represents a probability instead
of a simple scalar value. That step changes the normative standard employed within the
model, and is based purely on the technical requirements of one interpretation of the model
instead of another. This is not to say that anything is wrong with that practice, quite the
opposite is true.
The reason normative claims within models often change during the iterative process
of model construction is that the normatively valid is constructed along the way, too; or,
at least, a suggestion to what should be recognized as normatively valid is made. Maybe
the model is built on latent inconsistent assumptions, or it fails to satisfy other criteria of
acceptance. But what would make its claims true is not adequacy to any kind of normative
data, but their being part of a sound normative model.
This also captures Titelbaum’s claim to model holism much better than a realist view.
I agree when he says on the role of Normality in Bayesian modeling: “To a modeler,
Normality was never meant to stand alone as a rational norm. Its significance, and its
advantages, can be seen only in light of the other Bayesian rules, and in light of the effects
it produces in concert with those rules.” (cf. Titelbaum, 2017, p. 13 in the manuscript)
His reasoning seems to be based on a variant of Quinean holism (Quine, 1980), arguing
that only the whole of the model, not any single assumption such as Normality, can be
confronted with the facts.
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But as I argued before, there are no such facts available at all; the only reason to reject
a normative principle based on normative modeling is the principle’s failure to fit into a
sound model with all the other desirable principles. Therefore, a constructivist point of
view is more adequate to normative modeling. To avoid confusion, this does not imply
that a modeler should be a constructivist with respect to the descriptive features of her
model; the same model can be descriptively adequate – since it fits the relevant data – and
normatively inadequate – since it relies on inconsistent normative assumptions – or vice
versa. Being a realist about the descriptive is still possible under the presented view.
The work of normative modeling and simulation is not incompatible with a realist
perspective, but it poses certain challenges to the realist in particularly sharp contour that
the constructivist need not face. Let me conclude with but a brief remark on antirealism,
by which I understand either the position that all normative statements are false or that
they do not carry any truth value at all (the latter view is sometimes also called non-
cognitiviesm).35 In general, it seems irrational for a normative modeler to take an antirealist
stance to his work.
Why engage in the process of constructing deductive arguments, if they are neither
true nor false or made true by ex falso quodlibet? However, there is one interesting point
I cannot currently answer: Modeling requires to idealize away many features of the world,
and make all statements within the models technically false. To solve this problem, we
need a more thorough understanding of what it even means to impose idealizations on
normative facts than is currently available.
5.6 Conclusion
The epistemology of philosophical agent-based models, as it turns out, provides enough
specific details to resolve some of debates that cannot be settled on the general level of the
philosophy of computer simulations, or at least have not yet been settled.
Agent-based models, as I have shown, are defended much easier against opacity chal-
lenges than simulation models in general do. This is partly due to the simplicity of theoret-
ical ABM, but even more importantly due to the fact that the very process of building an
ABM, often as the initial formalization of a phenomenon or theoretical account, forces the
modeler to ensure a thorough interpretation. As a consequence, theoretical agent-based
models are an effective tool to enable scientific understanding.
Furthermore, robustness and fragility form important criteria of adequacy for agent-
based models – as they do for other kinds of models, even beyond the realm of compu-
tational models. The main reason to restrict attention to ABM on these complementary
concepts is to avoid certain atypical cases, such as purely mathematical simulation models,
for which these criteria plausibly differ substantially.
A more substantial reason to restrict attention to agent-based models concerns the dis-
cussion on the relationship between ABM and experiments. Here, focusing on ABM allows
35Mackie’s error theory (Mackie, 1997) and emotivist theories (Stevenson, 1996) provide typical examples
from metaethics.
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to restrict the comparison class of empirical research methods. Human subject laboratory
experiments, as I argued, are epistemologically equivalent to agent-based simulations ex-
cept for the inference to implementability. An analog argument for additional empirical
methods, such as physical experiments or survey studies, seems impossible. Some sim-
ulations can be related to some empirical methods, but nothing more general seems to
hold.
Finally, and not restricted to agent-based models though clearly extending to them, I
touched on the issue of normativity. As I argue, an agent-based modeler deriving normative
consequences has strong reasons, but is not logically forced to, take a constructivist stance
on normative facts. However, the discussion of normativity in models is still in a more
exploratory phase, and there is no canonical understanding of what it means, for example,
to apply idealizations to normative states of affairs.
To summarize, agent-based models are able to support the kinds of arguments I made
in Chapters 3 and 4: they enable an audience to understand the modeled process, their
outcomes are sufficiently, but not universally robust and the necessary simplicity of agents
enables inferences to implementability.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary
This essay started by posing the question how to analyze an instance of social behavior
suspect of collective irrationality. Inspecting environmental conditions, the social process
of the group in question, and the set of applicable evaluative standards deriving from the
group’s ends allows an observer in principle to attribute collective irrationality.
The normative perspective provides an important extension of the empirical research
available on apparently irrational collective behavior, since that line of work tends to retain
a purely positivist stance. The college drinking norms discussed in Chapter 3 exemplify the
problem arising from leaving normative standards implicit: the existence of an unpopular
social norm is inferred from the recorded preference structure of the population. But in
this account, “unpopular social norm” is reduced to a descriptive label, since no sufficient
argument is given to support an actual normative inference.
Moving beyond this shortcoming is a genuinely philosophical contribution. Using a
general argument scheme, the analyst need not impose their own norms implicitly to judge
rationality, but can explicitly state assumptions and develop a transparent argument for
collective irrationality – which may or may not be compelling to the target audience.
However, as the case studies in Chapter 2 showcase and Chapter 4 develops in more
detail, there is often insufficient reason to choose a unique goal structure to judge a social
process. Instead, any analysis of collective rationality has to take into account multiple
criteria, and ideally, show them coinciding for the social phenomenon under scrutiny. In
the case of social information aggregation, many variations of accuracy norms support the
same conclusions, leaving us with a robust though not universal result.
My investigation of unpopular social norms also supports a simple, yet important insight
on collective rationality: generally effective and efficient processes sometimes yield poor
outcomes – e.g. unpopular social norms – and the observer needs to be careful on which
level of description collective irrationality can legitimately be attributed. If the behavior
in question is the norm-guided behavior of bullying school children, attributing collective
irrationality seems warranted. But the underlying process of norm formation is, according
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to the presented analysis, fairly effective and often leads to a high degree of successful
coordination on reasonable social norms.
Furthermore, the argument for a trade-off between robust strategies and optimal strate-
gies under ideal conditions used the argument scheme in slight variation: if two social
processes (referring to the strategy mix employed) are optimally effective under plausible
variation in the environment, neither of them can be regarded rational or irrational uncon-
ditionally. There is a substantial open space of social processes for which it is currently
undecidable whether they are rational or irrational.
Given this account, the rational status of a process may change when new processes
are suggested and investigated. If there is a process superior to the previously known ones
under all circumstances considered, the previously undecidable cases are now classified as
irrational. This conclusion may seem strange, but it is a consequence of relativizing the
validity of an argument for irrationality to known processes, which I argued for in Chapter
2.
Finally, the discussion of the epistemology of agent-based models serves a dual purpose:
for the more obvious one, it justifies the extensive utilization of ABM to construct argu-
ments for – or against – the collective rationality of various social processes, and arguments
on such processes more generally.
A bit more subtly, it provides further reasons to take an engineering approach to phi-
losophy: if ABM (and other problem specific models) are epistemically as powerful as
I argued, philosophers can gain a great deal of insight from constructing and studying
such models, even before they are transferred to the sciences and empirically investigated.
Building models itself provides valuable philosophical insight.
To conclude this essay, I want to discuss the issue of interventions based on stylized
models, which I largely set aside during the previous inquiry, but which seems to be a chief
concern for the application of theoretical models (Section 6.2). Furthermore, Section 6.3
elaborates on a relationship briefly mentioned at several points, namely between collective
rationality and morality. Finally, Section 6.4 provides an outlook on the work still ahead in
resolving theoretical and practical problems of collective rationality using computational
methods.
6.2 Interventions
From the central influence in norm learning to the choice of strategies in belief aggrega-
tion, I discussed a variety of interventions on social processes. This should not come as a
surprise, since the structure of the argument scheme set up in Chapter 2 relies on refer-
ence to alternative processes; and interventions allow the analyst of collective rationality
to construct alternative processes that are, due to their similarity, prima facie plausibly
implementable.
I use the term “intervention” in a non-technical way1 to denote any change in a process
that impacts the outcome and appears realizable from the current process. This under-
1As opposed to, for example, Woodward and Hitchcock (2003).
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standing of intervention is context-sensitive: when designing communication processes in a
company, changing the entire network layout may be realizable, but for most normal social
networks it is not. But this is to be expected given my original discussion of splitting up
any model of the target system into environment and process.
The possible objection to be addressed here concerns the justification of actual inter-
ventions on the basis of arguments relying on heavily stylized theoretical models – namely,
a significant part of the arguments presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The objection may be
phrased roughly thusly: stylized theoretical models contain numerous false assumptions,
and generally fail any test of quantitative fit. When deciding on interventions in real world
systems, however, quantitative fit is necessary, since the decision maker needs to compare
costs and benefits of at least the status quo to that of the intervention condition. More
often, the status quo also needs to be weighed against alternative interventions. Since styl-
ized theoretical models fail to enable such quantitative comparisons, they cannot justify
the choice of an intervention.
There are other potential objections, but the lack of quantitative fit seems to be the
clearest and most compelling. Defeating the aforementioned argument – or at least weak-
ening its force – requires to spell out some of its implicit assumptions.
The objection’s main assumption can be stated in the following way: there is a viable,
that is more reliable, alternative to grounding one’s decision for or against a particular
intervention on a highly stylized model. It is helpful to pull this assumption apart into
two components. For the assumption to hold, either of the following claims has to be true:
(1) the status quo is an acceptable alternative to any risky intervention with an unreliably
predictable outcome. (2) there is another method of assessing both interventions and the
status quo that is, all things considered, more reliable than a stylized theoretical model.
Let me start on (1): it is very difficult to ascertain the truth of this claim without
also making the second true. If the status quo is well enough understood to allow for
this judgment, any method to assess the status quo may seem a way to go to assess
interventions. This line of reasoning is incorrect. First of all, many methodologies, such
as survey studies, allow a fairly precise investigation of the actual, but are hardly useful
to support counterfactual claims, such as the argument for the superiority of a possible
intervention.
Furthermore, the status quo could also be clearly and obviously bad – in our case,
produce collectively irrational outcomes. A social norm of excessive violence in the class-
room may, for example, warrant an intervention that is less well understood due to the
urgency of the situation than the suspicion that astronomers are influenced too much by
their theoretical preferences instead of available data.
Hence, scenarios are imaginable where the performance of a group, though in some
respects suboptimal, is good enough to shield it from dubiously justified interventions,
even if the analyst is unable to precisely quantify everything. Many fields of science could
be taken as examples: they work – for example in terms of technical application – fairly
well, and therefore social epistemologists should be hesitant to risk the outcomes currently
provided by the process by implementing sweeping interventions based solely on stylized
models. But in many cases, the status quo is not clearly good enough – in a qualitative
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sense – to support refuting arguments from highly stylized models.
So let me turn to the second clause of the disjunction: there is an alternative method
to justify – or reject – suggested interventions. Presumably, such a justificatory procedure
would rely on some kind of empirical method, like experimentation, survey studies, obser-
vational studies and so on. But all these methods have their own shortcomings: survey
studies are poor at supporting counterfactual inferences. Experiments, if the argument
developed in Chapter 5 is valid, are only in a very narrow sense superior to simulation
models with respect to external validity.
Furthermore, ethical considerations, resource constraints or time pressure can cut al-
ternative methods off. In some cases, a policy maker should not wait until the results of a
longitudinal survey study come in, since too much harm is done in the meantime. Or an
intervention on schoolyard bullying should – in the ethical sense – not be tested experimen-
tally unless its efficacy is already supported by another method, to avoid the unnecessary
harm of a failing intervention – at least in the domain of human social interaction.
All this is necessarily vague. If there was no vagueness in the normative assessment
of the status quo, one could probably dismiss a merely qualitative model. But generally,
assessments of collective rationality are just not that precise. This is not to say that
stylized theoretical models and computer simulations could replace other methods; neither
is the implication that nothing can be justified anyway. The point is merely that in an
environment where precise quantification itself is problematic, highly idealized models can
support arguments for interventions, at the very least by complementing the empirical
methods by virtue of their differential pragmatic disadvantages.
6.3 Rationality and Ethics
Even though this is not an essay on ethics nor even metaethics, it is closely related to
ethical questions. In particular, an attribution of collective irrationality could serve as a
motivational tool for ethical behavior: if an ethically inadmissible pattern of behavior also
turns out to be irrational, it should be easier to convince agents to change their behavior.
Similarly, a group realizing their collective irrationality should be motivated to switch over
to a different process.
Of course, there are some additional difficulties to this motivational consideration in
the case of groups, since the relationship between anyone’s motivation and the group’s
ends is indirect, and the group cannot act without its members. Nevertheless, discovering
a shortcoming in collective rationality is plausibly a reason for members of the group either
to leave, to change its behavior, or to get rid of the agents who block behavioral change;
to name a simple example, members of an NGO with a certain purpose failing to realize
its end will, on recognizing this failure, either switch to a different NGO or try to change
the processes within their organization.
But this connection is not particularly tight, and it may also work in the opposite
direction, i.e. drive a collective agent to unethical behavior, if it happens to be a more
effective means to their ends. This leads to a second question on the relationship between
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normative ethics and collective rationality: is there actually a logical relationship between
the collectively rational and the morally good on the level not of motivation, but of nor-
mative content? More precisely, can certain moral notions be reduced to rationality to
sidestep the difficulties of ethical and metaethical discourse?
There is no simple response to this question, partly because it depends on one’s stance
in both metaethics and normative ethics. Let me explain the two points in turn.
The main metaethical problem is the relativism ensuing from identifying even a minimal
ethical system with a collectively rational social process. The problem, as metaethicists are
well aware, is that constraints provided by rationality requirements are generally unable
to single out one ethical system, but leave us with entirely incompatible but rationally
admissible options.2
Hence, to maintain an identity of minimal morality with collective rationality its propo-
nent has to bite the bullet of relativism. Maybe there are societies organized efficiently and
effectively but maintain a system of slavery. No matter how unappealing such a position is,
it seems consistent. The argument, therefore, is rather that once our imaginary proponent
buys into relativism, they have to defend their position against the usual metaethical ob-
jections to this position and hence, a debate purely on collective rationality cannot replace
the metaethical debate.
Can at least normative ethics be taken entirely out of the picture if one accepts a logical
connection between the rational and the right and good? The answer is also negative. To
see this, consider just two competing accounts of utilitarianism, simplified for the purpose
of this discussion. On the one hand, there is rules utilitarianism, which claims that the
adequate subject of moral evaluation are sets of rules; act utilitarianism, on the other hand,
argues that instead individual actions should be judged. They agree, or at least that will
be assumed here, on the goal of utility maximization, but they differ on the entities in the
world to judge by that standard.3
But the analyst of collective rationality is also forced to take a stance on the same kind
of question. In the discussion on unpopular norms, the focal object of analysis is a process
generating norms, and while individual actions of course take place in the course of this
process, they are very much not the object of normative attribution. When inquiring ag-
gregation of socially available information, however, the focus was very much on individual
strategies, and hence their actions.
Thus, if deciding between act and rules utilitarianism is a serious problem of normative
ethics, the choices an analyst of collective rationality makes for structuring her inquiry can
have consequences for her stance in normative ethics. If that is correct, criticism of this
choice or another translates back from normative ethics. Independent reasons developed
in normative ethics to refuse judging individual acts may invalidate the ethical conclusions
drawn from an account of collective rationality assuming the focality of action.
Where does this leave us on the relationship between collective rationality and ethics?
2A discussion of the possible coherence of Caligula’s ethics provides a compelling example of the problem
in Street (2010).
3For an introductory discussion of these views in normative ethics, cf. Sinnott-Armstrong (2015).
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Collective rationality, as it turns out, cannot provide a way around having debates in moral
philosophy. As appealing as the idea is that there might be some baseline ethical canon
the realization of which in most societies is guaranteed by pressures to collectively rational
behavior, it is mistaken for two reasons: the first is that, whether one accepts these minimal
standards is still dependent on their stance in normative ethics, as I just argued. Second,
as this essay’s models and the large body of empirical literature they are built on suggest,
collective irrationality can persist indefinitely, and therefore failure in rationality fails to
create sufficient selective pressure to ensure even minimal morality.
Henceforth the sober conclusion has to be that the investigation of collective rationality
may support ethical improvement by, for example, dissolving ethically wrong unpopular
social norms; but the connection is contingent, not one of logical or conceptual necessity,
and no a priori argument carries from the collectively rational to the ethically good.
6.4 Outlook
Following an engineering approach to philosophy, one naturally expects an inquiry to leave
any number of open problems. If, as assumed in this essay, arguments on collective ra-
tionality need to reference the particulars of the group processes under consideration, a
myriad of additional problems and phenomena remain to be analyzed.
Yet I still want to provide an outlook on how to progress from here. There are at
least three projects deriving from the present inquiry: analyzing further case studies with
the suggested models to extend and test their reach as theoretical models, systematizing
collective goal structures and – the most general and far-reaching project – building up
a modeling toolbox for social philosophy in general and social epistemology in particular.
Let me expand on these projects to conclude.
The discussion of legal epistemology in Chapter 4 briefly touched on an important as-
pect of theoretical agent-based models: they are often to some degree generic and adaptable
to further purposes. While there are clearly important differences between jury deliberation
and scientific knowledge aggregation, a good model can build from their commonalities. In
this sense, further case studies could strengthen understanding of the relationship between
model and target as well as of the target systems themselves.
Similarly, simulating the evolution of unpopular norms is not the only plausible ap-
plication of the ABM suggested in Chapter 3. Voting behavior in a context of partial
observability would be another interesting application; how is the parliamentary process
impacted by partial visibility of other parliamentarians’ voting behavior, be it by knowl-
edge of their political allegiance, direct communication or any other process of limited
communication? Which important pieces of such voting procedures are missing in the
model?
The various arguments I constructed along this essay relied on a motley crew of col-
lective end structures.4 From Pareto-optimality to accuracy, from maxi-min norms to
4I avoid the term “norms” here to avoid inappropriate associations and confusion.
6.4 Outlook 121
utility summation, there is a wide variety of evaluative standards to judge the rationality
of groups. The difficulty of bringing order to this diverse assortment has several distinct
sources, two of which I want to mention.
First, part of these end structures are referencing beliefs, while others are defined on
utilities, preferences and the like. Second, as I argued, many goals can be molded into
different specific forms to fit a purpose. Accuracy, for example, is not a single norm, but
can take a number of different shapes for a group, some of which result in incompatible
judgments. As a result, it is difficult to put these goal structures in a uniform conceptual
framework.
The key to the first problem may lie in an observation made in Chapter 2: for collective
rationality, there is no strict differentiation between theoretical and practical rationality,
between belief and action. Therefore, I conjecture that all collective goal structures are
expressible in terms of actions, or more precisely, their outcomes. This conjecture parallels
the analog controversial position in the case of individual rationality.5 The second problem
is rather one of structuring a wide variety of aggregation mechanisms, which plausibly can
be done by a more technical than philosophical analysis of their mathematical properties.
Finally, the engineering approach to philosophy suggests building a more complete
formal toolbox for social epistemology. Many of the tools are already available from a
technical standpoint: network theory, formal learning theory, game theory and a number
of other relevant formal frameworks are all well-developed for themselves. However, when
it comes to ABM in social epistemology in particular, there is little in terms of standards,
reliable conventions and methodological guidelines.6 This might seem like a minor technical
point of little philosophical impact, but the impression is deceptive.
Before social philosophers can succeed in establishing a more systematic way of building
their agent-based models, they run the permanent risk of misunderstanding each other,
failing to fully analyze their model, or leave any number of theoretically important features
out. Building on standard models in opinion dynamics in one case, and at least on a pre-
existing model with decision theoretic background as I do in Chapters 3 and 4, is a small
step towards unifying philosophical ABM, but hopefully a useful precedent.
5For example, Dutch book arguments rely on the assumption that the rationality of beliefs has to be
fundamentally grounded in the actions they entice.
6Note that several authors have already suggested quasi-formal protocols to reign in ABM, though at
least in philosophy, so far with little success. For examples, see Grimm et al. (2010) and Richiardi et al.
(2006).
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